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Economic development has several stages, from the exchange of tools 
and weapons in prehistory, to the adoption of money systems, to globalised 
economies driven by digitally-represented currencies. These stages present 
different challenges to societies, but also common ones. Perhaps the most 
important of these is cooperation. Exchange puts parties in positions vulnerable 
to exploitation, as they have to give payment in anticipation of goods, or goods 
in anticipation of payment. At its origin, money use creates a similar situation in 
which a party gives up valuable objects for a promise of future repayment. 
Explaining the diversity in economic performance and money systems therefore 
requires consideration of ecological and cultural factors that shape the levels of 
cooperation in societies. History can also have an influence on this diversity. 
Events in a society’s history can have persistent effects on its culture and 
institutions, and more general patterns of shared history can determine how 
culturally similar societies are. A cultural evolutionary framework can be used to 
synthesise these different factors as part of the same explanation. Historical 
experiences, the ecology and cultural traits all shape variation in each other and 
create conditions that determine the adaptiveness of cooperation, and therefore 
the potential for money use and large-scale economic activity to emerge and 
spread. Using a multiple method and multiple hypothesis approach, in this 
thesis I seek to examine existing theories for variation in economic development 
and money use, and generate and test new hypotheses using a cultural 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In their lives, virtually all people will participate in behaviours that 
contribute to an economy. Purchasing objects using money or credit is an 
obvious example of a common behaviour that supports economic growth. Such 
economic behaviours involve numerous parties, and are therefore a 
fundamentally social interaction (Graeber, 2012). Fulfilling the needs of yourself 
and others involves calculation of costs and benefits, trading-off cultural 
expectations of fairness and duty against payoffs that can contribute to your 
own fitness. This all takes place in the context of legal frameworks and systems 
of storing value such as money. These shape what choices are most beneficial 
for oneself and the broader economy, and are themselves shaped by history, 
ecological factors and culture. I use a cultural evolutionary perspective to 
generate and test hypotheses explaining the emergence of monetary systems 
and global disparities in economic performance. In this first section I introduce 
the reader to key concepts including economies, money and cooperation. I 
describe cultural evolution and present how a cultural evolutionary approach 
can be used to synthesise economic, historical and behavioural literatures and 
ask new questions of existing theories and ideas around the development of 
economies.  
 
What is an economy? 
An economy is the system of industry, trade and investment by which 
societies produce and use goods, services and money. The scope and content 
of economies have changed through time, reflecting the attainment of key 
historical milestones which changed the nature of economic activity. At its 
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origin, economic activity involved small groups foraging for food, creating 
material culture and trading ideas, tools, food and mates in response to needs. 
For example, starting in the upper Palaeolithic, flint weapons and other tools 
were traded between groups to aid their hunting success (Gamble, 1980). 
Evidence for economic specialisation, in which individuals or groups become 
dedicated suppliers of particular skills or items, has been found as early as the 
late Pleistocene (Rots & Van Peer, 2006), and appears more clearly in the 
Neolithic. Some societies may develop the technology to produce salt, while 
others may be skilled weavers. Trade allows both societies to have access to 
salt and cloth without spending the time learning how to produce both (Dorward, 
1976). This specialisation often reflected differences in environmental 
conditions and resources. Specialisation drove a greater scale of exchange, as 
it encouraged individuals to seek out and trade with different groups to access 
their specialities. This expansion of economic activity is associated with the 
emergence of commodity and token moneys. Around 3200BC, we see the first 
evidence of economic systems based on credit and debt relationships that 
involve token money objects such as clay tablets (Graeber, 2011). Tokens of 
debt first took the form of bills in Europe around 650 years ago (Hart, 1986). 
These systems that enable debt to be used in economic transactions further 
increased the scale of exchange possible and laid the foundations for modern, 
globalised economies which are largely based on the circulation of credit and 
loans as opposed to physical currency.  
In each of these historical milestones, the purpose, scale and media of 
exchange are different. However, common to each of the milestones is that to 
develop an economy, a society must have the ability to supply goods or 
services that others desire and/or have a means of acquiring goods and 
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services produced by others. Individuals or societies must be able to offer 
assets or skills such as tools, resources and food; and they must have the 
ability to pay others for their assets and skills, using systems like money, 
exchange or debt. A society’s economy is also functionally related to other 
aspects of societal development. A successful economy provides the resources 
needed to govern effectively and maintain infrastructure. A society’s economic 
success also encourages meaningful relationships with other societies seeking 
to invest in growing economic opportunities. Economic performance is therefore 
considered a critically important goal for modern societies, and has become the 
yardstick that is used to measure the success of different political regimes, 
polices and other initiatives. For example, the policy-making procedure for all 
OECD countries incorporates an assessment of economic impact (Malyshev, 
2006).   
 
What is money? 
 Exchange exists in all human societies that have been observed 
ethnographically and documented archaeologically (Earle, 2002). As there is 
geographical variation in resources and specialised skills, some individuals and 
societies can produce goods and services that others cannot. This makes these 
goods and services accessible only by exchange. Common examples of such 
goods and services are commodities such as tools, food, medicine, weapons, 
decorative items such as feathers and pigments, or labour in the form of slaves 
(Earle, 2002; Einzig, 1966; Quiggin, 1979). For example, the Tiv are a large 
ethno-linguistic group in West Africa historically well-known for their skill in 
manufacturing cloths. These cloths were coveted by neighbouring societies for 
their durability, and were used in exchanges for cattle (among other items) that 
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the neighbouring societies had a greater specialism in producing (Dorward, 
1976). Commodities, decorative items and labour all contribute towards societal 
or individual needs such as combat, ceremony or subsistence, which makes 
people motivated to secure access to them. Since this motivation is mutual, 
individuals can offer things that are easy to for them to secure in exchange for 
those that are not (Beckwith, 1991).  
A central dilemma with exchange is that the goods that parties want and 
those that they can offer fluctuate over time. This means that more often than 
not, one party wants what the other does not have, which precludes any 
exchange between them. When two parties want what each other has, this is 
called the ‘double coincidence of wants’ (Jevons, 1897). Ethnographic evidence 
suggests that achieving such a double coincidence is rare, as there is no 
evidence for the existence of economies based on direct exchange at all 
outside of modern, artificially-controlled environments such as prisons 
(Humphrey, 1985). According to classical economic theory, the emergence of 
money was a result of the motivation of parties to maximise the frequency with 
which the double coincidence of wants is met. Money achieves this by 
fundamentally being objects that are desired by everyone (Jevons, 1897; 
Kitoyaki & Wright, 1989). Money, therefore, is considered an early step in the 
development of large-scale economic activity.  
Money has featured in human societies for millennia. The definition of 
money is long-standing and states that money is comprised of three properties 
(Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989). First, money is a medium of exchange. It is offered to 
others as compensation for the goods and services that they provide. Second, 
money is a unit of account. It provides a common measure to represent the 
relative prices of particular goods and services. Third, money is a store of value. 
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It is reliably useful, and so can be saved and used over time. These three 
components make money an effective solution to the problem of achieving a 
double coincidence of wants. 
 Alongside this broad traditional definition, money can be divided into two 
types: commodities and tokens. Commodity moneys are objects with intrinsic 
value. This value makes them desired by many parties, which means that they 
are widely accepted in exchanges. In instances where one party lacks what the 
other desires, a commodity can be offered instead as it can be used in 
subsequent exchanges with parties who do possess desired objects.  For 
example, subsistence-related objects such as cattle were commonly used as 
money because they were highly-coveted resources able to be used in 
exchanges for other items (Hutchinson, 1992). Cattle, however, are difficult to 
transport and because they can be destroyed by ecological changes or disease, 
they do not infinitely hold value. In general, a given commodity is more or less 
likely to be used as money depending on its portability, divisibility and durability 
as a store of value, as these variables contribute to how readily they can be 
used in exchanges (Clower, 1984). These early commodity moneys laid the 
foundation for coinage, the earliest known mints of which date to 650-600 B.C 
Asia Minor. Although the intrinsic value of precious metals may be disputed due 
to the fact that they lack an intrinsic use (in the sense that coins are difficult to 
work into something that provides direct benefits outside of being used as 
payment), it is largely accepted that coins get their perceived value from their 
intrinsic precious metal content (Bell, 2001).  
 Token moneys are objects used as money despite having no intrinsic 
value. These tokens work as money by being markers of outstanding debts 
(Graeber, 2011), whose value is backed by social systems such as third-party 
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institutions that track debts and impose costs on those who default on their 
debts. In contrast to commodity moneys whose value is derived entirely from 
the object itself, tokens theoretically can be any object. This is because the 
object only exists to signal an outstanding debt. As a consequence, token 
moneys have historically taken many forms. Among the most well-known are 
tally sticks and clay tablets, used in Medieval Britain (Maurer, 2015) and 
Mesopotamia (Ezzamel & Hoskin, 2002; Keister, 1963) respectively. These are 
intrinsically valueless objects distinguishable only because they contain 
information about creditors, debtors, amounts owed and dates. They circulate 
on the basis that the holder of the token is due repayment from the debtor. After 
this repayment takes place, the object is destroyed. However, consistent with 
the idea that the objects themselves are immaterial, circulation of these tokens 
does not require them to physically change hands. Rai stones used by the 
Micronesian Yap society as token money are disc-shaped stones that are large 
enough to be immovable. Between which parties these stones circulate—and 
therefore who is indebted to whom— is knowledge tracked and disseminated by 
community elders (Frisby, 2014; Morse, 2018). This illustrates that token money 
objects are not restricted in terms of their divisibility or portability, and can in 
theory be any object provided that members of the society recognise that they 
signal outstanding debts. 
 
Variation in economies 
The value of goods and services a society produces in a given time 
period is changeable. Variation in available resources, the development of 
particular industries and institutions and the extent of global demand for specific 
products or services all shape the ability of a society to take a position within a 
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global marketplace (de Ferranti et al, 2002; Stijns, 2005). For example, 
Venezuela enjoyed economic growth in the latter half of the 20th century largely 
due to global demand for its considerable oil reserves. But its economy has 
since suffered a downturn and now experiences massive inflation due to 
decreases in global oil prices and political corruption causing the misallocation 
of funds (Davis et al, 2003; Hammond, 2011; Leite & Weidmann, 2002). In 
contrast, India continues to be one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world as a result of a shift to a more diverse and service-based economy which 
allows it to satisfy the demands of a large range of trading partners 
(Eichengreen & Gupta, 2011; Kohli, 2006).  
Despite this variability, economic development around the world does 
show some broad patterns that are fairly consistent over time. Western 
European, North American and East Asian societies are currently the wealthiest 
in the world, while Central Asian, Sub-Saharan African and South American 
societies are among the last wealthy (World Bank, 2018a). This distribution of 
wealth seems to reach back into history. The majority of the world’s wealth has 
been accounted for by eight countries, mostly comprised of Western European 
and East Asian populations (France, Germany, the UK, Italy, USA, India, China 
and Japan), for the last two thousand years (Maddison, 2007). This suggests 
that although fluctuations in economic performance do occur, there is a broader 
overarching pattern in which some societies are persistently wealthy, and others 
are persistently poor.  
One way in which the economies of modern nation states do not vary is 
money systems. The relative wealth of modern nation states can be easily 
compared because they all share a common concept of what money is. In these 
societies, token moneys such as physical coins or notes (or a digital 
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representation of these objects) are used. These acquire their value from a 
shared belief that they can be given in exchange for goods and services, which 
makes the tokens themselves relatively immaterial. For example, the precious 
metal content of coinage has varied throughout time, but has never impacted on 
its purchasing power as whatever is accepted by states as taxation and by 
vendors as payment is considered money (Graeber, 2011). This shared 
definition provides a common measure of the value of goods and services 
societies buy and sell, which enables economic development to be defined 
almost exclusively in terms of money and its relative flows. The most common 
measure, GDP, is a combination of measures of spending, investment and 
production that derives the net monetary value of goods and services created 
by a society, and allows us to determine, for example, that South Korea’s 
economic output per person is more than five times that of India (World Bank, 
2018a, b). 
However, the unanimous adoption of token money in modern nation 
states understates the huge amount of variation in money systems in traditional 
societies and in the histories of modern nations. Many existing traditional 
societies that are not tightly linked to centralized state governmental systems do 
not use money, having never been exposed to the system or after finding it 
unhelpful as a mechanism used to organise their economic activity (Sahlins, 
1974). Some societies use commodity money. For example, several societies in 
Siberia, Mongolia and China use bricks of tea as money, the value of this 
money object being determined by the quality of the tea that comprises it 
(Einzig, 1966). Other societies use tokens that signify outstanding debts like the 
notes used in modern nation states, such as giant immovable Rai stones in the 
Micronesian Yap society. The diversity of this aspect of economies has not 
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been the subject of much research relative to investigations into wealth, despite 
the dependence of modern economic development on the emergence and 
maintenance of a money system. 
  
Cultural evolution and economic behaviours 
  The diversity in economic development in terms of wealth and money 
systems can depend on competition and intentional actions by some societies 
on others. The network of development loans from developed nations to 
underdeveloped nations is a modern example of how societies can maintain 
their relative wealth by exploiting others (Perkins, 2006). Colonialism is a better 
-known example. Societies have long transplanted institutions into other 
societies, having long-lasting detrimental effects in the case of extractive 
regimes and stimulating long-term growth in the case of systems such as 
money and formalised law (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Acemoglu et al, 2001, 
2002).  
 But economic development is also led by the behaviours and 
psychologies of individuals within societies, and so can emerge endogenously 
as opposed to being the result of actions by other societies. Classical economic 
theory argues that a central component of economic behaviours that drive 
growth is the human ability to weigh the absolute value of different 
opportunities, and our stable preference to maximise payoffs in any situation 
(McKenzie, 2010). As these are calculations, they are independent of context 
and will always result in the same outcome. These economic principles are 
convenient for statistical modelling of how individuals behave in economies, and 




 However, these are not the only principles driving economic behaviour. 
Cultural evolutionary theory proposes that there are different drivers that explain 
the substantial variation we observe in behaviour. Cultural evolution involves 
applying the mechanisms that shape biological evolution to understand how 
cultural traits such as behaviours, norms and beliefs change over time 
(Mesoudi, 2011; Richerson & Boyd, 2005). The differences in the features of 
biological organisms that we observe are due to selection acting upon heritable 
variation (Darwin, 1859/1975). Over generations, heritable traits that provide 
fitness benefits are passed on to offspring, and traits that are deleterious are not 
passed on. This changes the distribution of traits in the population over time 
(Byars et al, 2010; Price & Grant, 1984; Stearns et al, 2010). Cultural 
evolutionary theory argues that the distribution of cultural traits is shaped by an 
analogous process (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Laland et al, 2000; 
Mesoudi et al, 2004). Behaviours and practices that exploit local conditions for 
fitness benefits and/or avoid costs are preferentially learned by others who seek 
the same benefits and are taught to offspring so that they can continue to 
acquire fitness benefits (Henrich & Henrich, 2010; Henrich & McElreath, 2003; 
Nakahashi et al, 2012). Classical replacement experiments have provided many 
examples of this process. In these experiments, groups of participants are 
challenged with tasks over several generations. Each generation, most group 
members are retained, but a few are replaced with new members who are naïve 
with regard to the task. These experiments typically show that over generations, 
new members learn the best strategies from the other group members, and task 
performance gradually increases over generations as new ideas are introduced, 
explored and kept at a rate approximately proportional to their success (Baum 
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et al, 2004; Caldwell & Millen, 2008; Efferson et al, 2007, 2008; McElreath et al, 
2005, 2008).  
 Cultural evolutionary theory makes important predictions about economic 
behaviour that are not part of classical economic theory (Bowles et al, 2006). As 
cultural adaptations are responses to local conditions, what behaviours are 
adaptive can be different in different societies. Different social systems or 
ecologies legitimise different social practices or ways of thinking. This shapes 
how we react to economic opportunities, in contrast to the traditional economic 
idea of context-free calculation. For example, when given the chance to choose 
to keep resources in their own group or give resources to other groups, 
participants from Fiji, Bangladesh and Bolivia allocate substantially more 
resources to themselves than participants from Iceland and the United States. 
This is because of differences in food security within these countries. Individuals 
from Fiji, Bangladesh and Bolivia have a greater motivation to secure their own 
needs (Hruschka et al, 2014). Such differences in preferences for how many 
resources to keep, as well as the fact that no populations studied chose the 
option that would confer the most personal benefit (which is to keep all the 
resources for yourself) cannot be accounted for by classical economic thinking, 
but is consistent with evolutionary pressures causing diversity in peoples’ 
responses to economic opportunities.  
Another prediction of cultural evolutionary theory is that economic 
behaviours can be shaped by information that is inherited culturally. When 
making economic decisions, we are sensitive to the choices that others make 
and to the information given to us by others (Baron et al, 1971; Clark & 
Crockett, 1971; Rockloff & Dyer, 2007). Through social learning, we adopt 
heuristics or rules that are generally adaptive (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002). 
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Cultural preferences, even if arbitrary, can therefore influence economic 
decisions. While human social learning involves many biases, such as payoff-
bias, that work to maximise the probability of adopting adaptive behaviour, 
social learning can also in theory result in the adoption of maladaptive 
behaviour (Boyd et al, 2011; Franz & Matthews, 2010), further emphasising that 
economic behaviour may not simply be the result of rational optimisation.  
 
Institutions and norms 
 Over the last few decades, institutions have been established as the 
central influence that determines what economic behaviours are adaptive 
(North, 1990). Institutions are codified rules that regulate human behaviours 
(Ostrom, 2000). Human capacity for communication, negotiation and co-
ordinated goal setting enables us to create rules that change the nature of our 
interactions and economic activity by shifting the costs and benefits of our 
behaviour (Powers et al, 2016). Institutions shape behaviour in a similar way to 
ecological factors. As we have seen in the case of food security, in different 
environmental conditions, some behavioural strategies secure lower levels of 
natural resources and/or risk survival compared to others, and these will be 
abandoned in favour of more profitable strategies.  Institutions involve systems 
or bodies that inflict social costs on behaviours that violate created rules, and 
commonly encourage particular behaviours that may be beneficial for the 
society as a whole (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). For example, a range of societies 
from traditional to developed have converged on similar solutions to managing 
common-pool resources such as irrigation systems. This typically involves some 
degree of centralisation, where allowances for use are agreed upon, monitors 
can share information about peoples’ obedience, and the costs of sanctions for 
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violators such as fines or ostracism can be shared (Casari, 2007; Ostrom, 
1990). This changes the fitness consequences of different behaviours. 
Institutions can therefore create the conditions for higher individual- and group-
level payoffs than those possible without institutions.   
The economic and evolutionary literature commonly equates institutions 
with third-party, centralised bodies that specialise in enforcing laws. Humans 
are highly motivated to punish as third parties (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; 
Henrich et al, 2006) and this type of punishment is effective at maintaining 
cooperation (Gurerk et al, 2006), but it is also a cooperative dilemma itself as 
individuals who do not punish others save personal costs (Boyd et al, 2003; 
Henrich & Boyd, 2001). Dedicated enforcement bodies can regulate behaviours 
at a much larger scale than any individual, but these enforcement bodies are 
also costly and require investment by individuals to maintain. While this 
presents another cooperative dilemma, the scale of beneficial cooperation 
made possible by centralised institutions make individually costly systems such 
as taxation, which are necessary to support the institution, possible and 
sustainable. One example of this process is the conversion to Islam that 
occurred in parts of Africa. Most of these conversions were voluntary as it was 
in the interest of individuals to do so. Islam has high entry costs in terms of 
religious and other commitments, but overcoming these allowed access to a 
shared legal structure which enabled the use of credit, which made it ultimately 
beneficial to pay the costs, allowing Islam to spread (Ensminger, 1997). 
Similarly, paying taxes to gain access to a network of large-scale cooperation 
and trade is ultimately beneficial, which allows institutions to overcome the 
cooperative dilemma inherent in the administration of third-party enforcement.  
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 Another important type of culturally-inherited information that shapes 
economic behaviours are norms (Keefer & Knack, 2008; Tabellini, 2010). 
Norms are like institutions in that they regulate behaviour, but instead of being 
relatively formal and codified laws, they are broad expectations and conventions 
of what constitutes acceptable behaviour (Ehrlich & Levin, 2005; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004). The sanctions that are administered by institutions in 
response to violators tend to be formal, consistent and economic penalties. In 
contrast, sanctions for violating social norms are more social, such as damaging 
the offender’s reputation or excluding them from subsequent interactions 
(Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Ostrom, 2000). 
 Many social norms are learned socially, but their benefits are continually 
reinforced by the social, institutional or ecological environment. Therefore, 
norms are most able emerge and persist if they encourage behaviours that are 
beneficial for the individual or society. For example, norms that permit 
indiscriminate cooperation with those outside of your kin or ethnic group only 
tend to emerge in specific ecological or institutional conditions, such as when 
interactions are governed by formal laws (Hruschka & Henrich, 2013a, b). 
Societies with weak enforcement and legal institutions tend to limit contracting 
relationships to kin and ethnic groups. If they do not do so, they risk the costs of 
being exploited by the other party (Fafchamps, 2000).   
 However, due to their heritable nature, norms can persist through social 
learning despite changing conditions, leading them to provide no observable 
advantage. For example, experimental evidence illustrates that individuals can 
learn to expect particular economic outcomes, which over time are perceived as 
fair, even though they are particular to one group (Roth, 1987; Binmore et al, 
1991, 1993). A real-life example of arbitrary norms in economic scenarios is 
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sharecropping contracts. These informal arrangements determine the fractions 
of harvest owned by landowners and labourers and are widely used in 
agricultural societies (Stiglitz, 1974; Young, 1996). Within villages, there is very 
little variation between these contracts. Despite different parties, soil qualities, 
plot sizes and crops, all of which feed into the relative risk that must be 
accepted by the landowner and labourers, the vast majority of sharecropping 
involved a single form of contract (Bardhan, 1984). Most often, contracts took 
the form of a 50-50 split between labourers and landowners, despite nothing in 
classical economic theory predicting this outcome given the asymmetric 
positions of the parties (Young, 1996). These contracts also vary substantially 
between villages, implying that sharecropping contracts are shaped by 
culturally-inherited norms that follow the boundaries of social interaction.  
Institutions and norms are both inherited in a similar way, through social 
learning. Migrant studies demonstrate how individuals gradually assimilate 
normative behaviours and other cultural traits of their new societies (Algan & 
Cahuc, 2010; Rustagi & Veronesi, 2016). Moreover, societies borrow 
institutional forms and rules from other societies wholesale, such as the many 
Chilean political reforms that were adopted in Bolivia, Mexico and El Salvador 
(Ferguson, 2012). In both of these instances, social learning is payoff-biased. It 
benefits individuals to adopt norms specifying who one can cooperate with as it 
can prevent opportunism, and societies mainly copy institutions from others if 
they are associated with economic benefits.  
 Institutions and norms can be inherited over many generations. Once an 
institution is created, it is less costly to maintain it than to build a new institution 
from scratch, meaning that aspects of institutions can persist for long periods of 
time (Paik, 2010). Moreover, social norms are considered to be very slow 
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moving (Roland, 2008) as they are embedded in how we socialise members of 
society from a young age (Nisbett, 2003; Nunn, 2012). Although it should be 
noted that in certain circumstances (the precise details of which are not yet 
clear), norms can rapidly change. Outbreaks of civil conflict decrease trust in 
others and increase the salience of group differences (Rohner et al, 2013a, 
2013b) and long-standing traditions in which merchants police their own 
transactions are swiftly replaced when state-backed policing becomes possible 
(Greif, 2000; Greif et al, 1994). This evidence suggests that selection can 
override persistence.  However, norms regulating social and economic 
behaviours in Central and Eastern European countries altered little with the 
advent and fall of communism (Roland, 2008), and East and West Germany still 
maintain cultural differences (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Heineck & 
Süssmuth, 2013) after reunification, despite changes in governance often 
resulting in changes in norms.  
  
History  
Biological evolution shows us that history is important in shaping traits. 
The structure and form of existing adaptations constrains what subsequent 
adaptations can be. For example, the position and structure of legs reflect their 
origins as repurposed fin supports (Anapolitanos et al, 1998). Biological 
adaptations can also be shaped by historical cultural events. For example, 
lactase, the enzyme responsible for the digestion of the milk sugar lactose, 
decreases in production after weaning in most mammals. However, in human 
populations with histories of herding, lactase production persists into adulthood. 
This trait would offer fitness benefits for such a population whose cultural niche 
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provides milk as a major source of nutrition, and its distribution has been traced 
to historical genetic changes associated with herding (Gerbault et al, 2011). 
A similar process affects the diversity in cultural traits. Cultural 
information can be inherited between generations with relatively high fidelity 
through vertical social transmission. Consequently, historical events that affect 
cultures of previous generations can continue to have effects on modern day 
cultural diversity. As economic decisions are shaped by such heritable cultural 
information, modern economies are influenced by history. The most well-known 
application of this theory was to Italy, the northern regions of which are 
wealthier in the present day than the southern regions. The north has a history 
of democratic rule, mutual trust between citizens and high political engagement, 
while the history of the south is characterised by more autocratic rule and 
feudalism (Englebert, 2000; Putnam, 1993). This historical division is said to 
have persisted in the contemporary populations of these regions due to vertical 
cultural inheritance of cultural traits from northern and southern ancestors, 
driving differences in how the populations behave in circumstances affecting 
economic growth, such as their confidence in institutions and contracts. 
Since then, more examples of the effect of a range of historical events on 
various cultural traits associated with economic development have been 
identified. Societies whose ancestors were herding populations instead of large-
scale agriculturalists have stronger propensities to defend personal property 
and reputation in the modern day (Cohen et al, 1996; Grosjean, 2014); societies 
whose ancestors were governed by regimes that had particularly strong and 
effective centralised bureaucracies ~200 years ago have more confidence in 
governments (Becker et al, 2015), stronger governments (Bockstette et al 2002; 
Paik 2010), and different political ideologies (Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya, 2013) to 
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other societies; and populations with histories of slavery have lower levels of 
trust in others (Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011). Furthermore, the density of roads 
built by Roman populations in a given European region strongly correlates with 
the region’s modern-day economic prosperity (Dalgaard et al, 2018), reflecting 
how even investments in infrastructure made ~2,000 years ago can have 
persistent economic effects.   
 Importantly, it is not only the occurrence of such historical events that 
shapes culture. It is the timing of these events. Longer histories of particular 
social or ecological selective pressures imply more time for the emergence and 
spread of cultural adaptations that are responses to these pressures. For 
example, societies that adopted statehood and agriculture (Putterman, 2008; 
Putterman & Weil, 2010) earlier seem to have different economies to those that 
adopted statehood and agriculture later, as these two changes involve 
experimentation with new institutions and norms that govern appropriate 
behaviours. This experimentation takes time to optimise, which results in 
societies that adopted statehood and agriculture at different times being at 
different stages of experimentation. Generally, societies that have had the 
longest time to experiment with systems like statehood are likely to have 
devised more effective adaptations for living in and governing with states. 
These adaptations are likely heritable, enabling modern societies to benefit from 
the experiences of their ancestors. This particular mechanism has been found 
to be the case with democracy,  as analysis of historical and contemporary 
ethnographic data shows that societies comprised of more individuals who have 
longer histories of electing leaders by consensus have greater levels of 
democracy today (Giuliano & Nunn, 2013).  
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 Another way in which history shapes cultural and economic diversity is 
population divergence and common ancestry (Moore 1994a, b). Over time due 
to factors such as pressure for space or resources, populations split into 
subgroups. Splits are often associated with migration or a decrease in contact 
between the resulting subgroups. This can generate cultural variation (Tehrani 
& Collard, 2002). Subgroups may migrate to different ecologies which select for 
different cultural adaptations; and errors in social learning within the subgroups 
can cause cultural traits that were inherited from the original combined 
population to change in one subgroup and not another. If there is limited contact 
between the subgroups, this cultural variation will not spread between the 
groups, so overall cultural similarity will diminish. Laboratory experiments in 
language evolution exemplify this process, showing that slight variations in 
initial ways of communicating particular ideas or concepts can over time create 
distinctly different languages that are only comprehensible by specific groups, 
as each group refines its own articulation (Caldwell & Smith, 2012; Faye et al, 
2010; Garrod et al, 2007). General cultural variation, which includes variation in 




  Explaining what causes people to cooperate with others instead of 
acting selfishly is a key question in cultural evolution (Rand & Nowak, 2013). 
Humans, at a scale greater than any other species, help others outside of their 
kin group, even if it is economically beneficial to be opportunistic (Delton et al, 
2011). This is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective, as conferring benefits 
on unrelated others incurs a personal cost with no immediate personal benefit. 
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Several different approaches have been used to tackle this question, from 
simulating individuals and populations (Fu et al, 2008) to conducting 
behavioural experiments in traditional societies (Gachter & Herrmann, 2009; 
Henrich et al, 2005; Herrmann et al, 2008) to performing large-scale secondary 
data analyses of modern and historical data on societal development (Nunn, 
2012). In any economic transaction, parties have the opportunity to take 
payment and withhold promised goods, or withhold payment for goods. 
Contracting and exchange are therefore forms of large-scale cooperation that 
are vitally important for the development of economies, which makes cultural 
evolution an informative framework to use to shed light on the variation in 
economies.  
 A vast literature of experimental research shows that traditional 
economic assumptions about how individuals behave break down in 
cooperative games. For example, in games that take the form of a prisoner’s 
dilemma, pairs of players both receive moderate payoffs if they both cooperate 
and both receive poor payoffs if they both defect, but if one player defects and 
the other cooperates, the cheater receives maximum payoff and the co-operator 
receives a poor payoff. Much like in economic contracts where one can withhold 
payment to receive goods at no cost, the rational strategy for any individual in 
this game is to defect, as this maximises their payoff whether the other player 
chooses to cooperate or defect. However, humans repeatedly and pervasively 
cooperate in these games, under a variety of conditions designed to minimise 
any potential economic benefit to cooperating, such as making the games 
single-shot (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). 
 A large body of research has been dedicated to asking why individuals 
cooperate in these conditions. Two prominent theories are direct and indirect 
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reciprocity (Roberts, 2008; Nowak, 2006). Direct reciprocity suggests that 
people cooperate with people who have cooperated with them in the past and 
do not cooperate with those who have cheated them. This enables populations 
of co-operators to emerge and grow because they can freely receive payoffs by 
interacting with other co-operators while ensuring that they do not give 
defectors any payoffs (Delton et al, 2011; van Veelen et al, 2012). Indirect 
reciprocity argues that cooperation is directed towards people who are known 
for cooperating, which provides people with incentives to cooperate in order to 
maintain a reputation that invites cooperation from others (Milinski et al, 2002; 
Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). These theories, while helpful for explaining some 
cooperative behaviours, cannot explain why individuals still cooperate even 
when they are anonymous and know that they will not interact with the same 
person again.  
 Institutions and norms are further explanations for cooperation (Ostrom, 
2000). Many institutional rules are universally applicable to all members and 
seek to ensure fairness in transactions, as well as offering recourse for 
violations. This increases the scale of cooperation by enabling everyone to act 
according to common principles, which makes behaviour predictable and allows 
individuals to put themselves in vulnerable positions (such as offering a good) 
without fear of being cheated (not receiving payment) (North, 1991). A society’s 
ability to enforce rules, often through third parties such as legal systems and 
police forces, is related to its members’ propensities to cooperate at a large-
scale (Greif & Tabellini, 2010; Masten & Prüfer, 2014). Experimental evidence 
not only shows that third-party punishment increases cooperation dramatically, 
but also that individuals preferentially migrate to conditions in which third-party 
punishment is available and effective (Gurerk et al, 2006), suggesting third-
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party enforcement would likely outcompete alternative systems for maintaining 
cooperation.  
Social norms offer a solution to the dilemma of human cooperation 
primarily by providing obligations towards helping some people but not others 
(Greif & Tabellini, 2010). Societies vary in their norms regarding with whom it is 
acceptable to cooperate, such as those in need, family and group members, or 
all members of the society (Tabellini, 2008, 2010). This variation is largely 
attributable to the existence of other social or ecological conditions that alter the 
prospects for reciprocation and opportunism. For example, when survival threat 
is high, helping those in need might secure reciprocal aid when personal need 
is high in future. Furthermore, while cooperating with everyone may maximise 
the scale of exchange, preferentially interacting with kin or in-groups is often the 
best way to increase inclusive fitness and avoid cheaters (Hruschka et al, 
2014). I will explore in further detail the conditions determining the relative 
payoffs of these strategies in later sections. 
 Research on differences in cooperation between societies shows that 
norms are closely related to institutions. When institutions are non-existent or 
weakly enforced, individuals cannot cooperate indiscriminately. Therefore, they 
revert to norms that govern with whom it is permissible to cooperate to avoid 
being exploited (Ahlerup et al, 2009; Hruschka et al, 2014). This is part of the 
mechanism of reciprocity, supporting people to channel their cooperation 
towards those who are invested in maintaining good relations with oneself, such 
as kin or community members (Tabellini, 2010). For example, in the 1950s and 
1960s, nepotism and corruption were rife in Hong Kong and China. Since then, 
Hong Kong has developed institutions inspired by aspects of effective overseas 
governments, such as an independent commission against corruption (Khatri et 
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al, 2006). This has enabled its citizens to rely more on binding contracts and 
universal rights, removing their reliance on social norms to avoid being 
exploited. China, by contrast, has continued to rely on pervasive in-group 
preferences (Khatri et al, 2006; Sun, 2001; Yao, 2002). Such relationships 
appear to be bidirectional, as social norms also determine the kinds of 
institutions that individuals create. In the US, property rights institutions 
established in the 19th century reflected the morals of individualism, reward for 
effort and respect for property that individuals held (Zerbe & Anderson, 2001). 
In other comparisons of China, Italy and North Africa, societies with long 
histories of collectivist, kinship-based moral ties where reputation is highly 
important were shown to have weaker and more nepotistic institutions today 
(Grief, 1994; Greif & Tabellini, 2010).  
 
Combining economics and cooperation to explain the 
development of economies 
 Supporting large-scale cooperation and developing economies involve 
the same challenges. The cooperation games used in the evolutionary literature 
to evaluate the roles of norms, institutions and reciprocity are simplified 
abstractions of real economic transactions, such as when paying parties have to 
trust that they will receive the goods they paid for, or when individuals use credit 
to pay for goods. In real life, taking payment without providing goods or buying 
something using credit but not repaying the debt secures all the benefits without 
incurring any costs in economic terms. Therefore, explaining why people use 
money objects that are valueless tokens of debt and why people uphold 
contracts requires us to investigate the factors that encourage cooperation, 
such as institutions, norms and reciprocity.  
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 For money at its origin, institutions, norms and reciprocity are likely to be 
important underlying mechanisms for the following reasons. Establishing and 
enforcing rules that prohibit defaulting on debts and creating a system to track 
the movement of debts allows anyone to use any token as money. The debt 
that the token signifies is guaranteed to be repaid due to the existence of these 
rules, which means that accepting the token in exchanges is not accompanied 
by the risk that one has given away one’s goods for a valueless object that will 
provide no benefit. In the absence of the ability to create such rules, social 
norms may emerge that determine that individuals should accept tokens from 
others on the basis of their reputations for repaying their debts. This creates an 
incentive for people to repay their debts as well as allowing individuals to avoid 
being cheated by limiting the parties they exchange with to those who are likely 
to repay.  This mechanism requires some means of tracking information about 
people’s reputations as well as a way of recording who owes what to whom.  
 Norms and reciprocity underpin broader, society-level economic 
performance in a similar way to how they affect money use. In the absence of 
legal institutions, individuals invest mostly in their in-group (Hruschka et al, 
2014). This is because in-group members are invested in maintaining good 
relations with other in-group members, not least because one increases one’s 
inclusive fitness by investing in closely-related others (Hamilton, 1964). While 
this maintains some economic activity, it drastically limits the scale of this 
activity, reducing the potential for economic growth. Institutions also have a 
similar effect on economic growth as on money use. Enforcing contracts allows 
individuals to exchange with anyone without fear of opportunism, which 
drastically increases the scale of economic activity.  
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Institutions also affect a further cooperative dilemma at the heart of 
economic performance, which is the abuse of power (Wahl, 2014). Economies 
are supported by public goods such as centralised governments and 
infrastructure that require investment. For any given individual, not investing in 
these enables one to receive the benefits they provide without paying costs. In 
addition, when individuals do contribute to these public goods, elites then have 
to ensure that these resources are allocated in a way that maintains important 
infrastructure. In the absence of checks on elites, these resources can be 
allocated inappropriately, often to the personal benefit of privileged elites 
(Tabellini, 2008). The ability of a society to enforce rules that control corruption 
correlates strongly with the quality of their infrastructure, their ability to enforce 
contracts and the effectiveness of their bureaucracies (Tabellini, 2008). 
 As norms and institutions change in their effectiveness and scope, the 
payoff structure of cooperative dilemmas central to the development of 
economies varies. Different ways of acting in economic situations are 
legitimised, and the extent to which activities such as money use and 
anonymous exchange can take place is determined. I aim to investigate the role 
of these various conditions, which can be social, historical or ecological, in the 
development of economies and the emergence of money.  
 Specifically, there are a number of questions as of yet unresolved that I 
seek to answer. The first question is to what extent historical and ecological 
variables affect economic performance directly compared to through their 
influence on cultural traits such as institutions and norms. The second concerns 
to what extent shared cultural history explains modern day variation in 
economic development, and whether this demands a change in how cross-
country modelling is conducted. The third question is whether societal variation 
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in token money use is explained by institutions and norms, or other factors that 
affect cooperation such as food stress. This informs further questions about 
whether the emergence of token money is associated with particular conditions 
and whether the debt theory of money is viable. The fourth question is whether 
specific social systems like indirect reciprocity that are known to underpin 
cooperation can drive the emergence and maintenance of money systems 
based of valueless tokens. These outstanding questions are the focus of the 
thesis.  
 
Outline of thesis 
 The thesis will be structured as follows: I will next present a broad 
methods section outlining the methodological approaches and statistical 
techniques used in my analyses. In this section I will introduce experimental and 
cross-cultural comparative approaches, discuss their advantages and 
disadvantages, and explain how I use a combination of them both to address 
the aims introduced in the literature review. I will then present four analysis 
chapters, which will each contain individual literature reviews, methods, results 
and discussion sections. The first two analysis chapters will compare 
hypotheses for cross-national diversity in economic performance and the latter 
two will test hypotheses for the emergence and use of token money. “Long-run 
historical and ecological determinants of economic development 
mediated by the cultural evolution of effective institutions” seeks to 
evaluate the relative contributions of history, ecology, norms and institutions to 
economic performance, and the causal pathways through which they exert their 
effects. “Assessing the importance of shared history in shaping patterns of 
modern day socioeconomic development” specifically tests the role of 
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shared history in economic performance. “The cultural evolution of token 
money” explores the effects of institutions, norms, ecological factors and 
societal organisation on the probability that traditional societies use token 
money. “An experimental test of the tokens-as-debt theory for the 
evolution of money” investigates the roles of reciprocity and social information 
in token money use. The Discussion chapter that follows these analysis 
chapters will contextualise my findings within the broader literature, bring my 
different analyses together to make more general conclusions, and suggest 























Chapter 2: Methods  
In this methods chapter, I will set out the methodological and statistical 
approaches that are used in the thesis. I will first introduce the two broad 
approaches that are used in this thesis: cross-cultural comparative methods and 
experiments. I will discuss their strengths and weaknesses and explain how I 
use them to test the hypotheses I have developed in a cultural evolutionary 
framework. I will then introduce two statistical techniques that feature 
prominently in the thesis: structural equation modelling and multilevel modelling. 
I will describe their main features and explain how these features make them 
well-suited to the questions addressed in this thesis. I will also introduce the 
broader information-theoretic approach that informs all my statistical analyses.  
Cultural evolution is a broad theoretical framework, involving different 
ways of asking questions and finding evidence. Some studies focus on the 
selection component of cultural evolution, using cross-sectional data to evaluate 
whether certain ecological or social conditions are associated with cultural traits. 
Other studies concentrate on inheritance, using experimental studies or 
longitudinal data to investigate changes in traits over time. I use a combination 
of these approaches, using cross-sectional analyses, historical data and an 
experiment. 
 
Cross-cultural comparative analysis   
Cross-cultural comparative studies are central to anthropology and 
cultural evolution (Nunn et al, 2006). Comparing the cultures, social systems, 
environments and histories of different societies allows us to generate ideas 
about whether there are common influences that predict similar outcomes. 
Some conditions may reliably co-occur with a particular cultural trait, while 
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variation in other conditions may not be associated with the existence of the 
trait. This enables us to see whether various cultural traits are distributed in 
ways consistent with hypotheses about how they evolve. This approach has 
commonalities with the comparative approach used in biology, in which the 
comparison of different species (whether living or fossilised) is used to draw 
inferences about the conditions underpinning the emergence of particular 
adaptations (Nunn, 2011). 
 Inferences from cross-cultural comparative study are strongest when 
they are based on a well-chosen and diverse sample of cultures that is 
appropriate for the questions being addressed. Databases such as D-Place 
(Kirby et al, 2016; Murdock, 1967) that compile various ethnographic atlases 
contain data from a large range of traditional societies that vary drastically in 
their environments, cultures and locations. This means that when consistent 
associations are found when comparing these societies, they are highly 
suggestive of functional relationships. These databases also contain large 
numbers of variables, which enables considerable control over confounding 
influences and allows one to isolate relationships of interest. This also allows 
the comparison of multiple competing hypotheses. A related strength of cross-
cultural comparative study is that it is well-suited to analysing features at a 
societal level, where variation between cultures is predominant rather than 
variation within cultures. Some variables, such as institutions, economic 
systems and norms are features of the relationships between individuals and 
are commonly measured and explained at the societal level. For example, the 
emergence of religions (Sanderson & Roberts, 2008) and mating traditions 
(Ember et al, 2007) has been the subject of much study that uses the cultural, 
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ecological and historical diversity within the ethnographic atlases to test a range 
of evolutionary hypotheses.  
 The limitations of cross-cultural comparative study are primarily related to 
their data (Hartung, 1983). The data are normally from ethnographic studies 
that sought to codify behaviours into categories that are comparable across 
societies. At the very least, such codifying reduces the sensitivity of the data, 
concealing behaviours and practices that did not fit easily into pre-existing 
categories. Furthermore, many topics are described poorly in the ethnographic 
literature, or not described at all. Variables of interest may not exist, 
necessitating the use of proxies rather than direct measures which complicates 
the interpretation of any findings. Related to this is the fact that most 
ethnographic data are cross-sectional and therefore do not show change over 
time. Therefore, this makes it more difficult to draw definitive conclusions about 
the causal relationships between variables. We can only identify when the 
evidence is consistent with a hypothesis concerning the influence of one 
variable on another.  
 Another weakness of cross-cultural comparative methods is that it is 
difficult to distinguish whether cultural traits emerged independently, were 
inherited from ancestral societies, or were borrowed from other societies. 
Therefore, we cannot know whether cultural traits are functionally related to 
other cultural, environmental or historical factors, or if they happen to have been 
inherited or borrowed by societies in those conditions. This is made even more 
problematic by the fact that the societies that are likely to borrow ideas from one 
another are likely to be close in proximity and to have a relatively recent 
common ancestor (Currie et al, 2016), which means they share many cultural, 
ecological and historical traits. As I will elaborate in chapter 4, this can result in 
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repeated co-occurrences between a cultural trait and a particular ecological 
factor being interpreted as multiple instances of the same process in which the 
trait emerged as an adaptive response to the ecological pressure. In reality, this 
is only one of several explanations. It could be that societies facing similar 
pressure borrowed the trait instead of having it emerge endogenously, or it may 
also be that closely-located societies share the cultural trait by virtue of their 
recent common ancestry, and share the ecological pressure due to their 
location. In this latter case, the co-occurrence is present in the absence of any 
functional relationship between the ecological factor and the cultural trait.  
 In a later section of this methods chapter, I introduce the specific 
statistical techniques I use to overcome these difficulties with the cross-cultural 
comparative approach. Structural equation modelling takes steps towards 
finding firmer evidence regarding the directions of relationships, while multilevel 
modelling and sampling strategies like that used in the SCCS allow us to 




 Experimental approaches complement cross-cultural approaches by 
providing a more controlled test of a specific relationship. Cross-cultural 
approaches seek to capture and account for many of the complexities of 
societies to establish which variables are related to others. Experimental 
approaches instead isolate relationships artificially, by creating conditions that 
systematically remove potential influences and allow the manipulation of only 
specific variables. As alluded to, the biggest strength of the experimental 
approach is control. Tightly restricting the factors influencing behaviour and the 
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behaviours people can make allows tests of the ways in which very specific 
changes alter how people behave. For this reason, experiments have high 
internal validity, meaning that the findings are highly likely to be attributable to 
manipulations made by the experimenter as opposed to any other source.  
 The primary limitation of the experimental approach is the external 
validity of its findings. Peoples’ behaviours in artificial and highly controlled 
situations may not be particularly representative of how they behave in the real 
world where other influences and options are available to them. In many cases, 
this means that experiments are informative about the effects of variables in 
unrealistic conditions, but do not apply to any other situation. For example, at a 
fundamental level, participants change their behaviour when they know that 
their behaviours are being scrutinised (Levitt & List, 2007), which has been 
found to cause considerable differences in public goods contributions (among 
other behaviours) in laboratory and field conditions (Benz & Meier, 2008; 
Gneezy et al, 2004).  
 Using both cross-cultural and experimental approaches to address the 
same question can reduce the impact of their respective limitations. One can 
use an experimental approach to identify the specific mechanism by which 
variables are related, and then identify whether this relationship plays out in the 
real world using a cross-cultural comparative method. This combined approach 
uses cross-cultural comparative methods to clarify whether an experimental 
finding is representative, while at the same time using experimental approaches 
to provide potential explanations for observed relationships in cross-cultural 
samples. I use this combined approach to investigate the origins of token 
money in chapters 5 and 6. In the absence of any previous experimentation into 
token money that provides an explicit test of hypotheses for the emergence of 
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token money, the findings of any cross-cultural comparative analysis about 
money are difficult to conclusively explain. Therefore, I conduct such an 
experiment, seeking specifically to identify a mechanism by which token money 
can be used based on social information. I can then evaluate the plausibility of 
my interpretation of my cross-cultural findings in light of this underlying 
mechanism.  
 
Structural equation modelling, multilevel modelling and the 
information-theoretic approach 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the most commonly-used 
technique for statistically analysing the relationship between one or more 
independent variables and a dependent variable. It is the predominant tool used 
in cross-national analyses. In short, OLS regression estimates the relationship 
by producing the linear function that minimises the error between the actual 
values of the dependent variable and those predicted by the function. OLS 
regression is suited to the identification of direct relationships, as OLS 
regression evaluates the relationship between pairs of variables while 
controlling for other influences. 
Cultural traits are not uniformly distributed around the world. Cultural 
evolutionary theory proposes that patterns of cultural similarity and difference 
are the result of inheritance and selection of cultural traits. Environmental and 
historical factors are important in shaping what cultural adaptations can emerge. 
Not only do they directly determine the success of specific traits, they shape 
sequences of cultural adaptations by determining the distribution of traits such 
as institutions or social norms that have knock-on effects on other traits. OLS 
regression is not well-equipped to deal with these networks of direct and indirect 
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effects. There are also more general processes underpinning patterns of 
cultural diversity. Some societies are more similar than others due to borrowing 
of ideas and recent common ancestry. In OLS regression however, 
observations of the error term are assumed to be independent, meaning that 
one society’s score on a measure is not related to another’s score on the same 
measure. If this assumption is violated, the clustering of scores resulting from 
non-independence can inflate estimates of the significance of relationships 
between variables. Multilevel models can account for these patterns of non-
independence, while structural equation models can explicitly model indirect 
and direct relationships.  
While these types of models have begun to gain traction in the 
evolutionary literature, their justification is often theoretically weak and there is 
no established protocol for their use. For indirect effects and non-independence 
in turn, I introduce them as problems for existing statistical approaches and as 
issues of interest for cultural evolutionary theorists. I then propose a statistical 
approach based on information-theoretic ideas to guide the usage of multilevel 
models and SEMs to answer evolutionary questions. 
 
Structural Equation Modelling 
Indirect effects in evolutionary theory 
The social environment in which humans live and behave is 
hierarchically structured. Everyday social interactions are located within 
population-level legal and regulating systems and social norms. These are all 
seated against an overarching ecological and historical background. Many 
hypotheses for how these different factors interact and shape one another have 
been put forward in the evolutionary literature. The environment is considered 
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one of the central sources of selective pressure on cultural traits, determining 
the most successful subsistence strategies, social norms and social institutions 
(Nettle, 2009). Climate, agricultural productivity and disease all have roles in 
shaping differences in human culture. Historical events can also shape what 
subsequent innovations are likely and/or possible. For example, the industrial 
revolution changed the nature of production and labour in ways previously 
unthinkable. Existing theories about the roles of historical and ecological factors 
in cultural diversity assume that the most important relationships are direct. 
Specific factors such as disease levels are directly associated with the 
prevalence of a particular trait, such as collectivism.  
Cultural evolutionary hypotheses, however, are becoming increasingly 
interested in sequential relationships involving more than two variables. 
Historical and ecological conditions provide the selective environment for 
certain cultural traits, the diversity in which then feeds into the likelihood of 
subsequent cultural adaptations (Leung & van de Vijver, 2008; van de Vijver et 
al, 2007). For example, polygyny is influenced by variation in a society’s sex 
ratio, and a society’s sex ratio is shaped by ecological factors (Nettle, 2009). In 
this case, it is theoretically important to recognise that the emergence of 
polygyny is ultimately a reflection of ecological factors. Separating when 
ecological or historical factors are associated with a given cultural trait directly 
or indirectly by shaping another aspect of culture is key to investigating a range 
of evolutionary hypotheses and understanding cultural diversity.  
 
Structural equation modelling: 
 Structural equation modelling (SEM) is one way to separate direct and 
indirect effects. SEM is a statistical technique that combines several multivariate 
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procedures: factor analysis, path analysis and multiple regression. It is 
characterised by its visualisation as a graphical path diagram that represents 
the complex network of relationships between observed variables and the 
unobserved factors that underlie them. The technique has a wide range of 
applications, and has several key advantages over OLS regression.  
 SEM’s path analysis component enables the user to test hypotheses 
about causal relationships by creating models that make direct and indirect 
relationships explicit (Figure 2-1). The ability to simultaneously estimate how 
much a variable influences another variable directly, through a relationship with 
a third variable, or both directly and indirectly is in contrast to OLS regression. 
Mediation analyses in which one tests whether two variables are related directly 
or through an intermediary variable are possible using OLS regression, but this 
is a multi-stage process that involves several separate analyses. Multiple 
comparisons are a known problem in statistics, as null-hypothesis significance 
testing commonly accepts 5% as the probability that a given finding is a false 
positive resulting from sampling error, which means that as the number of tests 
increases, the expected number of false positives increases (Benjamini & 
Hochberg, 1995). Consequently, SEM’s ability to simultaneously estimate 
parameters makes it an attractive technique to test between direct and indirect 












Single-headed arrows represent relationships between a predictor variable and 
an outcome variable. Double-headed arrows represent covariances that do not 
distinguish predictor and outcome variables.   
 
 Separating direct and indirect effects using SEM avoids one common 
issue with interpreting the results of an OLS regression that emerges when 
indirect effects exist in the system under study. OLS regression is only 
concerned with direct effects, so it interprets weak coefficients as an indication 
that the predictor variable is not important for explaining variation in the 
outcome variable. By contrast, SEM can distinguish between a weak coefficient 
that is the result of no relationship between a predictor and an outcome, and a 
weak coefficient that is the result of the predictor variable affecting the outcome 
by producing changes in another predictor. Therefore, while OLS regression 
simply rejects hypotheses concerning the importance of predictor variables 
based on weak direct relationships, SEM captures when predictor variables are 
still part of the explanation despite not being directly associated with the 
outcome variable. 
Furthermore, OLS regression cannot explicitly account for specific 
relationships between different predictor variables. In OLS regression, 
relationships between a given predictor and the outcome variable are presented 
as having controlled for the variance in other independent predictors. In SEM, 
you can explicitly specify the covariation between different predictor variables. 
Effects of x1 on y: 
Direct effect d 
Indirect effect through z b*f 
Indirect effect through x2 a*e 
Indirect effect through x2 and z a*c*f 
Total indirect effect (b*f)+(a*e)+(a*c*f) 
Total effect (b*f)+(a*e)+(a*c*f)+d 




This enables the user to construct a model that takes into account a relatively 
high level of detail about the variables involved, and estimate parameters based 
on all the available information.  
SEM has been used to investigate a range of questions, including what 
factors affect fitness in plant populations (Iriondo et al, 2003), the pathways 
through which hormones affect aggressive behaviour in lizards (Yang & 
Wilczynski, 2002) and the precise ways in which coping strategies predict 
positive and negative emotions in humans (Roesch et al, 2010). These and 
other studies have deployed SEMs in different ways. Some are relatively 
exploratory, creating detailed models involving every known direct and indirect 
pathway and evaluating the relationships that are estimated (Iriondo et al, 
2003). Others are interested in how accounting for the network of relationships 
between different predictor variables influences the direct relationships between 
those predictor variables and the outcome variable (Roesch et al, 2010).   
 
Information-theoretic approach to testing hypotheses 
 Increasingly, researchers are taking an information-theoretic approach 
(see Figure 2-2 for a summary) (Burnham & Anderson, 2010) to SEM. This 
approach broadly involves the comparison of multiple candidate models in 
terms of their relative uncertainty. This enables explicit testing between multiple 
competing hypotheses, as opposed to the approach of null hypothesis 
significance testing which compares the likelihood that a finding supports a 
single hypothesis or that there is no effect at all. Using the information-theoretic 
approach, I can also use the valuable information that poorly-supported models 
provide to improve parameter estimates, as opposed to simply rejecting them. 
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Aggregate parameter estimates can be created by combining all the estimated 















In the case of SEM, an information-theoretic approach first involves the 
construction of several different models that correspond to the expectations of 
different hypotheses in advance of analysis. These models capture different 
hypotheses by including different combinations of indirect pathways, direct 
pathways and predictor variables. These models are then compared using 
indices of model fit. Such indices include the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), 
which is a likelihood function that is penalised for the number of parameters 
estimated. The likelihood value is derived from calculation of the likelihood of 
finding the observed parameters given the distribution of the data. The penalty 
Figure 2-2: Schematic of the information-theoretic approach 
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related to parameter numbers generally causes a preference for simpler models 
over complex ones in terms of the number of parameters estimated.  
 For example, competing hypotheses about whether a particular 
ecological or historical factor has a direct influence on behaviour or influences 
behaviour by changing social norms can be tested by comparing the AICs of 
models with and without the indirect pathway (Figure 2-3). This approach has 
the advantage of being necessarily hypothesis-driven, allaying recent concerns 
about dredging, stepwise approaches and uninformative comparisons so 











Comparing the fit of models A and B would inform whether the effect of x2 on y 
is mostly direct through pathway e or indirect through pathway c. Comparing A 
and C would inform the importance of a direct effect of x1 on y through pathway 
d. 
 
Worked SEM Example: 
Figure 2-4 shows a worked example of hypothesis testing using an 
information theoretic approach to SEM. The pathogen stress theory claims that 
the frequency of pathogens in the environment influences social behaviour and 
in particular, the extent of collectivism. A high prevalence of infectious disease 






introduces risks to communicating with outgroups because they may harbour 
novel diseases the contraction of which would be costly to fitness. Global 
correlations between pathogen prevalence and collectivism have been reported 
(Fincher & Thornhill, 2012) and disputed (Currie & Mace, 2012; Hackman & 
Hruschka, 2013). I show how accounting for theoretically-driven mediators 
enables me to conclude that disease does not directly influence collectivism, but 
instead helped to shape the global distribution of European populations who are 














 In panel A, I present a baseline SEM containing simple hypotheses. 
Disease (and my other predictor variables) is modelled as directly influencing 
collectivism and as varying with latitude. The remaining panels present the 
hypothesis test. In panel B I introduce an alternative hypothesis, in which 
disease shapes patterns of European migration. Accounting for this pathway 
A B 
AIC: 1031.11 AIC: 979.85 
C 
AIC: 980.09 
Figure 2-4: An information-theoretic model comparison using SEM 
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greatly improves model fit. In panel C, I show that removing the direct pathway 
from disease does not substantially worsen the fit of the model in panel B. 
Comparison of these models supports the idea that disease has a meaningful 
influence on European descent, which has knock-on effects for collectivism, but 
less support is shown for the importance of a direct pathway between disease 
and collectivism.   
 
Table 2-1: Method of computing Akaike weights from AICs in the example 
model comparison 
 
 From such a model comparison, one can compute Akaike weights, 
Akaike importance values and weighted parameter estimates. Akaike weights 
are derived by scaling the difference between the AICs of each model and the 
best-fitting model between 0 and 1 to provide a measure of the probability that a 
given model is the best-fitting model among the candidate models (Table 2-1). 
In the right-hand column of Table 2-1, I show that model A is extremely unlikely 
to be the best-fitting model, while models B and C are highly likely with model B 
being the most likely. Summing the weights for all the models that include a 
given variable gives the Akaike importance value for that variable, which 
provides an indication of whether the variable tends to appear in the best-fitting 
models or worse-fitting models, and therefore the likelihood that the variable 
contributes to the explanation of variation in the outcome. Finally, the parameter 
estimates provided by a given model can be weighted by the probability that the 
model is the best-fitting model (the Akaike weight) which enables the creation of 
 
Model 
AIC Δi (AIC-lowest 
AIC in sample) 
exp(-0.5*Δi) wi (exp(-0.5*Δi)/sum(exp(-
0.5*Δi) for all models) 
A 1031.11 51.26 <0.001 <0.001 
B 979.85 0 1 0.53 
C 980.09 0.24 0.89 0.47 
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parameter estimates that take into account differences in model fit (Table 2-2). 
In Table 2-2, I show that this model comparison approach allows one to account 
for when strong coefficients tend to be found in poorly-fitting models. Any of the 
coefficients found in model A do not contribute much to the weighted parameter 
estimate, as model A was very unlikely to be the best model. Parameter 
estimates from models B and C contribute more to the weighted parameter 
estimate as they were highly likely to be the best model. In this case, European 
descent had its strongest parameter estimate in one of the best-fitting models, 
which suggests that European descent is likely to be an important predictor. In 
general, the averaging process involved in computing these statistics aims to 
account for uncertainty about the best model. This is unlike null hypothesis 
significance testing, which can only conclude that a single model is preferable to 
no model, and accept the parameter estimates of the former model on this 
basis. It should be noted that this is an overly-simplified and unrealistic example 
of a model comparison, as most model comparisons with so few variables 
should have a balanced set of models where all variables appear the same 
number of times. This balance allows researchers avoid bias in their findings, as 
it prevents the artificial inflation or deflation of weighted parameter estimates 
that may occur when variables only appear in the best or worst fitting models.  
 
Table 2-2: Method of calculating weighted parameter estimates from the 
example model comparison 
Outcome 
Predictor 
Model A Model B Model C Weighted 
estimate 
Ingroup bias     





-0.06 (-0.03) -0.13 (-0.06) -0.09 
Numbers in brackets represent the parameter estimate multiplied by the Akaike 
weight of the model shown in Table 2-1. The weighted estimate is the sum of 




Non-independence in evolutionary theory 
 Indirect effects are one expectation that emerges from a cultural 
evolutionary framework. Another is that some societies are more similar than 
others in measurable ways. Phenomena at different scales such as individual 
behaviours, local norms, broad ecological factors and shared historical events 
have traditionally been analysed independently due to statistical convenience 
and a history of independently-working disciplines (van de Vijver et al, 2007). As 
such, studies of human behaviour have been predominantly single-level, 
meaning that they are concerned with sources of variation only at the level of 
the individual or country, for example, but not both.  
 Another important reason for the dominance of single-level methods is 
the statistical assumption of independence. Commonly-used techniques such 
as OLS regression assume that an individual or society’s score on a measure is 
not related in any way to another individual or society’s score on the same 
measure. Recognising that different individuals come from the same 
geographical region, and that these regions are grouped within the same 
country violates this assumption, which encourages researchers to focus on a 
single level of analysis and ignore potential groupings at other levels. 
Statistically, independence is an important assumption that is made to avoid 
finding spurious relationships. If observations are similar by virtue of some 
dependence between them, they do not provide different pieces of separate 
information in the same way observations that are completely independent 
would. If several dependent observations are treated as independent data 
points, their clustering on measures of interest can strengthen the extent to 
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which certain variables appear to covary with one another, leading to erroneous 
inferences about existing relationships. This is known as Galton’s problem.  
 While the assumption of independence aims to exclude any systematic 
similarities and differences between individuals or societies from the analysis, 
these cultural similarities and differences are of interest to cultural evolutionary 
theorists. Many evolutionary hypotheses are specifically concerned with the 
processes that make some societies more similar than others. The likelihood of 
sharing ecologies or cultural traits is associated with the recency of shared 
cultural history. Over time, populations diverge to form new populations that 
share most or all of the cultural features of the original population. Repeated 
bouts of this divergence, along with cultural innovation in daughter societies, 
leads to cultural phylogenies analogous to the evolutionary trees used to 
explain biological diversity. Outside of all other influences, societies that 
separated more recently will be more similar than those that separated longer 
ago. These sources of statistical non-independence between individuals and 
societies mean that we need a different method to recognise and adjust for the 
fact that some data points are more similar than others. 
 
Multilevel modelling 
 Multilevel models are designed to account for hierarchical structure in a 
dataset. These models separate predictor variables on the same scale as the 
outcome variable (fixed effects) from grouping variables at a different level that 
categorise observations into different groups based on theories for why some 
groups of observations might be more similar to each other than to others 
(random effects). This enables potential relationships between observations to 
be accounted for, as opposed to assuming independence for statistical 
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convenience. While OLS regression can have similar controls by including 
categorical grouping variables as predictors, there are statistical and theoretical 
reasons to prefer multilevel modelling. In OLS regression, imbalances between 
the numbers of members of different groups can compromise statistical power, 
and grouping variables are treated as another parameter to estimate. In 
multilevel models, groups can have any number of members, and the groups 
are considered a general underlying source of variability in the outcome variable 
rather than having a directional effect on it.  
Multilevel models are being used increasingly in the behavioural 
sciences. Schools, countries and other variables have been used to group 
observations in ways that capture similarities in their behaviour (Kreft & de 
Leeuw, 1998). Analyses using multilevel models have revealed that several 
well-publicised theories are based on spurious relationships that reflect 
pseudoreplication of non-independent observations rather than associations 
between two variables. For example, the global relationship between infectious 
disease and collectivism is non-existent within geographical regions (Currie & 
Mace, 2012), reflecting the fact that Western European countries that are both 
individualist and have effective health services were inappropriately treated as 
independent data points despite being very closely related.  
Despite these statistical advantages, accounting for the hierarchical 
structure of a dataset increases model complexity relative to a single-level OLS 
regression and therefore requires detailed justification. The extent of non-
independence between observations and how best to account for it is an 
empirical question, especially as observations simply being close in space or 
time does not necessarily entail similarity (Schank & Koehnle, 2009). The 
grouping variables used to account for the hierarchical structure of data 
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therefore need to be as theoretically motivated as any other variable included in 
the model. As of yet, there is no precedent that has established what particular 
causes of non-independence are most important to account for. Many analyses 
use convenient grouping variables to capture non-independence, such as states 
or zip codes (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017). But they tend not to justify the 
theoretical reasons why these particular grouping variables should cause 
scores on variables of interest to cluster. They also often fail to establish, in the 
absence (and presence) of all other effects, whether there is any clustering at 
the level of the grouping variable and therefore whether the grouping variable 
can correct for non-independence in the data.  
Cultural evolutionary theory provides a theoretical framework that can be 
used to identify meaningful sources of non-independence in models of human 
behaviour. Shared ecology, shared history and shared social ties predict 
cultural similarity and delineate the boundaries of idea-borrowing. Broad 
grouping variables can be used as random effects to capture these sources of 
non-independence. For example, continents delineate broad regions of 
ecological similarities (within which cultural traits may have been more readily 
borrowed), language families offer a measure of the recency of societies’ 
common ancestry and shared religions provide an indication of communication 
and borrowing between populations. These different sources of non-
independence also span different timescales. Ecological differences between 
the modern-day continents have existed for millions of years, the diversification 
of human languages began on the order of tens (to hundreds) of millennia ago 
(Dediu & Levinson, 2013), and different organised religions have spread 
between human societies for the last few millennia.  
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Language families can be used as a proxy for cultural inheritance 
because they capture instances of cultural diversification. As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, population splits are associated with the onset of cultural 
differentiation due to ecological changes resulting from migration of subgroups 
and errors in social learning of existing cultural traits within subgroups. These 
errors in learning can also affect aspects of language. This leads to linguistic 
differences between groups that co-occur with the emergence of cultural 
differences. In other words, societies that share the same language likely 
maintain language similarity through communication and sharing of culture. 
Those that differ in their languages are likely to have separated a sufficiently 
long period of time ago to allow cultural differences to accumulate, which also 
means that those that separated longer ago have had more time for greater 
cultural differentiation to take place. In support of this cultural evolutionary 
mechanism, the diversity in political systems (Currie et al, 2010), subsistence 
strategies (Mace & Holden, 2005) and material culture designs (Tehrani & 
Collard, 2002) (among other cultural traits) have all been found to be related to 
linguistic differences between societies. Many of these studies have used 
detailed phylogenetic comparative methods in which the data on linguistic or 
cultural traits are used to generate a most-likely phylogenetic tree of societies, 
which is argued to represent their shared ancestral relationships. However, 
modern countries are comprised of numerous populations and so it is not 
straightforward to represent the relationships between countries using a 
phylogenetic tree. Using language families as random effects is one way of at 
least partially tackling this issue by grouping countries based on features of their 
populations. Therefore, in chapter 4, I seek to develop a protocol for using 
language families to adjust for statistical non-independence between countries 
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and to partition the variation in cultural traits between modern societies and 
historical groups based on shared history that can be easily adopted in 
subsequent research. Consequently, I focus on the use of language families as 
a random effect as opposed to using phylogenetic comparative methods.  
Like SEM, multilevel modelling can be undertaken using an information-
theoretic approach. The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) is a measure of 
the variation in the outcome variable explained by the grouping variable. 
Examining changes in the ICC and changes in the estimates of fixed effects 
between models that include or exclude a random effect and have different 
combinations of fixed effects offers two insights. First, it tells us how much 
variation is being captured by the grouping variable; and second, it indicates 
whether any of the variation explained by the fixed effects is independent of the 
variation captured by the grouping variable. This second insight provides 
information about how pseudoreplication that is now being accounted for by the 
grouping variable had been contributing to observed relationships. If including a 
random effect reduces the strength of the relationship between two variables, 
this suggests that the relationship was in part caused by the underlying 
structure of the data in which some observations cluster together. Including 
random effects can also increase the strength of relationships, which indicates 
that the grouping variable correlates more strongly with the residuals of the 
fixed effects model than with the raw outcome variable itself.  
 
Worked Multilevel Model Example 
 Social norms such as collectivism are said to be associated with 
ecological conditions, historical events and the composition of a society’s 
population, particularly with regard to immigration of relatively individualist 
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Europeans (Eisenberg & Hayes, 2011). In addition to these influences, societies 
that diverged more recently are likely to be generally more similar in their social 
norms, including collectivism. Below I present an example analysis using 
multilevel modelling that emphasises the importance of accounting for this 
general similarity before evaluating the role of any other predictor variables.  
 






With random effect (language 
family) 








Disease 0.44*** 0.25* 




AIC 262.17 230.99 
Coefficients represent standardised coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 
 Table 2-3 shows that my example illustrates the important outcomes of 
accounting for variation in collectivism that is the result of clustering in the 
dataset. Accounting for the clustering using language families improves model 
fit and it causes meaningful changes in parameter estimates. If I fail to account 
for the structure of the data, my model leads me towards state history, the 
timing of agriculture and disease as important predictor variables. Once I take 
the data structure into account, my interpretation changes to include effects of 
European ancestry and a much-weakened effect of disease. The ICC value 
illustrates the reason for this, showing that there is substantial variation at the 
level of the language family (39%) which is driving patterns of variation. 
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 In summary, SEM and multilevel models can be used to address two 
long-standing issues in cross-cultural research. SEMs can account for detailed 
networks of direct and indirect effects, and multilevel models can establish and 
control for the extent of statistical non-independence in the data. These issues 
are particularly important from a cultural evolutionary perspective, which 
anticipates that some societies are more closely-related than others, and that 
many ecological (and cultural) changes may have indirect effects on many 
aspects of culture and behaviour by shaping behaviour-regulating mechanisms 
such as traditions, norms and institutions. In the next chapter, I show how SEM 
and multilevel modelling can be combined to simultaneously investigate 
networks of direct and indirect effects while controlling for statistical non-
independence.  
 The following four chapters will be my analysis chapters. The first three 
will be secondary data analyses and the last one will be an experiment. Each of 
these chapters contains their own specific methods sections. In these sections I 
will provide greater detail on the specific variables and statistical tests of my 
secondary data analyses, and elaborate on the design and testing of my 
experiment. The information-theoretic and multilevel approach will be adopted 









Chapter 3: Long-run historical and ecological determinants of 




A huge number of hypotheses have been put forward to explain the 
substantial diversity in economic development. There is growing appreciation 
that cultural evolutionary processes may have played an important role in this 
emergence of this diversity. Historical factors such as the length of time 
societies have had experience with centralized political governance, or how 
long they have employed agricultural subsistence strategies have been 
presented as explanatory factors that have contributed to present-day economic 
performance. However, it is not clear whether duration of agriculture and 
ancestral statehood have exerted a direct effect on modern productivity, or 
whether they influence economies indirectly by shaping the evolution of norms 
or formal institutions. Here I use structural equation modelling and a global 
nation-level dataset to test between hypotheses involving a range of direct and 
indirect pathways. I show that the historical timing of agriculture predicts the 
timing of the emergence of statehood, which in turn affects economic 
development indirectly through its effect on institutions. Ecological factors 
appear to affect economic performance indirectly through their historical effects 
on the development of agriculture and by shaping patterns of European 
colonization. These results support the idea that cultural evolutionary processes 
have been important in creating effective institutions that enable large-scale 





Economic development is not equally distributed around the world. In 
2017, the total GDP of the top 6 countries in the world exceeded the total GDP 
of the remaining countries (IMF, 2018). Economists and other researchers have 
long debated the proximate causes of development in terms of the technological 
and policy factors that create economic growth. In the last few decades, 
institutions that encourage the participation of more of the population in 
economic affairs, enable markets and provide incentives have become the 
central explanation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Milgrom et al, 1990; North, 
1990; Rodrik et al, 2004). More recently, researchers have sought to 
understand how historical (e.g. Bockstette et al, 2002; Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou, 2013; Putterman, 2008; Putterman & Weil, 2010; Spolaore & 
Wacziarg, 2013) and geographical (e.g. Bonds et al, 2012; Hibbs & Olsson, 
2004; Sachs & Malaney, 2002) factors have shaped the development of 
societies and their institutions. However, the causal pathways through which 
historical processes have shaped economic development are heavily disputed.  
Here I employ cultural evolutionary theory (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; 
Henrich, 2016; Mesoudi, 2011) as an organising framework to examine how 
these alternative explanations fit together and to test between competing 
hypotheses. My cultural evolutionary approach is complementary to existing 
approaches in economics and economic history, helping us to understand the 
general processes of how factors affect economies over time (Currie et al, 
2016; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013; Wilson, 2002). Employing an evolutionary 
approach helps us to distinguish between the features of current societies that 
affect economic growth (proximate explanations) and the processes that have 
occurred in the past that have shaped the modern day situation (historical 
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explanations) (Currie et al, 2016; Tinbergen, 1963; Wilson & Gowdy, 2013) 
(Table 3-1). Within the historical explanations I distinguish between events or 
factors that have directly shaped modern day economic outcomes from more 
indirect pathways where historical processes have shaped the evolution of 
proximate determinants (e.g. modern institutions are themselves shaped by 
previous institutions and the social and ecological conditions in which past 
societies evolved). Indirect effects have featured in previous theories of 
economic development (Rodrik et al, 2004; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013), but 
these theories are yet to be matched with statistical techniques specifically 
designed to identify the importance of indirect effects relative to direct effects. 
Consequently, the relative importance of the different causal pathways in Table 
3-1 remains unclear.  
 
Proximate Explanations 
 A number of different factors have been argued to be important in directly 
determining economic development. I can divide these into the features of the 
populations themselves (endogenous factors) and the external context in which 
populations are situated (exogenous factors). Theories involving these 
proximate factors tend to be short-term in focus, arguing that changes in culture 
or the ecology will have immediate knock-on effects for economic performance.  
 
Endogenous  
Social rules (institutions) and norms govern social interactions and 
enable cooperation between individuals and organisations (Bowles & Gintis, 
2011; Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich & Boyd, 
2001; Hruschka & Henrich, 2013a, b; Ostrom, 2000; Powers et al, 2016; 
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Table 3-1: Hypothesised pathways through which endogenous and exogenous 
factors can influence the global distribution of economic development and its 
determinants. These factors can directly influence GDP, or can shape the 
evolution of other endogenous factors 
  Factors 


























 Institution quality allows 
large-scale cooperation 
and provides incentives for 
labour and skill 
accumulation. 
 In-group preferences 
introduce risks of 
opportunism in certain 
scenarios and nepotism. 
 Human capital knowhow 




 Institution quality 
determines the need for 
in-group preferences 
(and vice versa). 
Direct  
 Disease affects labour 
productivity and 
investment. 





















 Longer histories of 
statehood (“state 
history”) give a head-start 
to development. 
 Earlier transitions to 
agriculture (“timing of 
agriculture”) give a head-
start to development.   
 
Indirect 
 Longer histories of 
statehood (“state 
history”) gave societies 
more time to develop 
effective 
institutions/norms and to 
build-up human capital.  
 Earlier transitions to 
agriculture (“timing of 
agriculture”) lead to 
earlier evolution of states.  
Direct 
 Natural endowments of 
resources give a head-








 Favourable ecological 







Richerson & Henrich, 2012), and are central to the function of markets and 
governments; enabling contracts to be enforced, providing checks on potentially 
predatory elites, and shaping incentives for investment and improvement  
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Aoki, 2001; Greif, 2006; North, 1990; Rodrik et 
al, 2004). Such institutions can be supported by social norms such as trust 
(Ahlerup et al, 2009; Fukuyama, 1996; Greif, 1994). On the other hand, some 
social norms such as in-group preferences can lead to opportunism and 
corruption, which stymies economic activities (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2011; 
Kyriacou, 2016). In addition to institutions and social norms, the more general 
body of knowledge, education and technology known as human capital may 
also be important in enabling economies to grow (Easterly & Levine, 2012). 
 
Exogenous  
The latitudinal patterning of economic development around the world is 
potentially suggestive of the importance of exogenous effects on economic 
performance. Countries nearer the equator are generally poorer than those at 
temperate latitudes. Environmental factors such as rainfall, temperature, and 
soil type may influence economic development due to their effects on the types 
of crop grown and productivity of agriculture (Lanzafame, 2014; Mayshar et al, 
2015). Infectious disease may also be a major contributor, as high rates of 
disease reduce labour productivity and raise uncertainty (Sachs & Malaney, 
2002). A recent example of this was the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic, which 
drastically cut the income growth estimates of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, implying forgone income of $1.6 billion for the countries combined 






Longer-term, historical events and the experiences of ancestral societies 
may exert persistent effects on the economies of their descendants. The fact 
that some societies developed agricultural forms of production (herding and 
cultivation), centralised states or industrialisation earlier than others may have 
provided a head-start to those societies (Diamond, 1997; Putterman & Weil, 
2010) and may have given them an advantage over other societies by allowing 
them to establish and maintain favourable positions in networks of interactions. 
For example, some European countries profited from establishing colonies in 
other parts of the world that extracted resources and exploited native 
populations (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Nunn, 2008).  
 
Indirect  
Another possibility is that historical processes such as the development 
of agriculture and the emergence of states have influenced the evolution of 
modern institutions, norms, technology and human capital. Cultural traits such 
as norms and institutional rules are inherited across generations and are 
shaped by those that preceded them (Currie et al, 2016). Complex collective 
action problems may not be easy to solve directly through conscious forward 
planning. Instead they may require long periods of experimentation and 
progressive refinement in order to develop the kinds of norms and institutions 
that lead to positive economic outcomes (Henrich & Richerson, 2012; Currie et 
al, 2016). For example, democratic traditions in ancestral societies predict how 
effective the democratic systems of their descendants will be (Giuliano & Nunn, 
2013). In a similar way, the development of institutions that allow more people 
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to participate in economic and political activities such as the rule of law may 
lead to the development of further such inclusive institutions (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012).  
Owing to these cultural evolutionary processes, features of states may 
contribute to the development of traits associated with economic success in a 
number of ways. The centralization of institutions is thought to be an important 
mechanism for facilitating cooperative interactions and enabling the 
coordination of individuals over large geographical areas (Mattison et al, 2016; 
Powers et al, 2016; Spencer, 2010; Turchin et al, 2013; Turchin & Gavrilets, 
2009) and is argued to be a key feature that supports inclusive institutions 
(Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). A long history of statehood may also reduce 
lower-level in-group biases and lead to the emergence and spread of impartial 
social norms. States also create public goods and infrastructure that lead to 
increases in human capital and facilitate technological innovation and 
production (Murtin & Wacziarg, 2014; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000).  
Another pathway to consider is that the management of crops leads to 
sedentism, specialisation of labour, increased population densities and more 
complex forms of political organisation and eventually the evolution of 
‘bureaucratic’ states (Johnson & Earle 2000; Mattison et al, 2016). These 
features may in turn be advantageous in competition between groups and give 
some societies a head-start (Turchin et al, 2013). Furthermore, the earlier 
societies developed agriculture and state-level organisation the more time they 
have had to develop institutions and culturally-inherited social norms that can 
help solve collective action problems and set the foundations that facilitate 
economic development. Variation in the timing of the development of agriculture 
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and the emergence of states may in turn be influenced by environmental 
factors.  
 Another indirect pathway involving environmental factors that has been 
studied involves the processes and effects of European colonialism. Broadly 
speaking, Europeans settled in large numbers in regions where existing 
populations were at low density with less complex forms of socio-political 
organisation and where there was less exposure to unfamiliar diseases (i.e. 
North America, Australia, New Zealand) (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; 
MacNeill, 1977; Diamond, 1997). As they settled they transplanted their 
domestic institutions and human capital. In colonies where large-scale societies 
had already existed (e.g. Central America, Peru) or where disease burdens 
were high (e.g. malaria in West Africa (Crosby, 2004)), Europeans settled in 
smaller numbers, normally as an elite, and established institutions that 
extracted labour and resources from the native populations. The larger, more 
inclusive colonial societies and/or the human capital that settlers brought with 
them are thought to be more conducive to economic growth than the kinds of 
societies settled only by an extractive elite. Under this view environmental 
differences shaped economic development indirectly by affecting the evolution 
of institutions and culture.  
 
Testing Alternative Hypotheses using Structural Equation Modelling 
 The discussion above demonstrates that there are a number of 
alternative hypotheses and a number of different causal pathways through 
which different factors may affect economic outcomes. In order to make all of 
these hypothesised pathways explicit I employ SEM. SEM allows the 
construction of models that contain both direct and indirect pathways, making 
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numerous candidate models possible given the same set of variables. Unlike 
multiple regression, SEM clarifies how much of a given variable’s effect on 
another is through a different variable and estimates direct and indirect effects 
simultaneously, allowing me to evaluate the relative importance of different 
pathways involved in economic development.  
Using SEM, I focus on whether state history and the timing of agriculture 
affect economic development (GDP) directly or indirectly through institutions 
and in-group bias. To do so I compare all combinations of these pathways. 
Before this comparison I use standard linear models to establish important 
relationships between other variables that need to be accounted for throughout 
my comparison. I use GDP as my measure of economic development, cross-
national survey data of institution quality and in-group bias, historical 
economists’ estimates of state history, agriculture timing and European 
ancestry, and estimates of historical disease prevalence from ethnographic 
atlases (see Methods). 
 
Shared History 
 Another insight that cultural evolutionary theory provides is that societies 
may share features in common because they have inherited them from a 
common ancestral society (Mace & Pagel, 1994). For example, common 
elements of social and political organisation across many Pacific Ocean 
societies can be traced back to an ancestral Polynesian society that existed 
~3000 years earlier, and which subsequently diverged into separate, but related 
populations (Kirch & Green, 2001). For economic issues, this is important in 
understanding how societies come to possess traits that lead to positive 
economic outcomes. Even in cases where traits are borrowed from another 
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society, traits may spread more readily to societies that are more closely related 
historically as they share other aspects of culture in common that make the new 
traits more effective (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009). This is important for practical 
purposes as cross-country analyses often fail to account for shared cultural 
history and treat societies as independent data points. However, clustering due 
to shared history violates the assumptions of standard statistical techniques 
such as ordinary least-squares regression, and can inflate parameter estimates, 
leading to spurious inferences (Felsenstein, 1985; Harvey & Pagel, 1991). For 
example, Fincher and Thornhill (2012) find a correlation between in-group 
assortativeness and parasite stress across countries. However, examination by 
Currie and Mace (2012) revealed that there was strong cultural-geographic 
clustering in the data and that relationships between these variables 
disappeared when looking within clusters.  
 To address such issues cross-cultural comparative researchers have 
incorporated knowledge of historical relationships between societies in the 
same way that biologists use knowledge of evolutionary relationships between 
species when conducting comparative analyses (Holden & Mace, 2005; Currie, 
2013). Here I apply a multilevel modelling approach (Acerbi et al, 2017) to my 
SEM framework, and designate countries as belonging to a wider historical 
grouping (following other studies in cultural evolution I base these groupings on 
being members of the same language family). Taking this approach, I estimate 






 I conduct secondary data analysis of cross-national measures of 
historical, social, ecological and economic variables. I investigate the network of 
direct and indirect pathways between these variables using SEM, seeking in 
particular to establish the pathways through which state history and the timing 
of agriculture affect modern-day GDP.  
 
Variables 
Table 3-2 describes the data, their sources and any statistical 
transformations that took place prior to my analyses. My GDP, institution 
quality, in-group bias, disease and latitude variables have commonly been used 
in previous analyses. Due to their relatively strong correlation (see Appendix 1-3 
for multicollinearity checks), I provide more detail on the data sources for the 
institution quality and in-group bias variables. My institution quality variable is 
ultimately sourced from the World Bank. They aggregated 32 different data 
sources measuring perceptions of governance and assigned them to six broad 
categories. My institution quality variable concerned the category ‘Rule of Law’, 
which measured perceptions of confidence in the rules of society, contract 
enforcement, courts and the police. My in-group bias measure is taken from 
Van de Vliert (2011), who used data on compatriotism, nepotism and familism 
from three different sources (the World Values Survey, the World Economic 
Forum and the GLOBE study respectively) to calculate an estimate of in-group 
bias.  
The World Values Survey and the GLOBE study are independent of the 
World Bank data on institution quality. Although the World Economic Forum 
data is one of the 32 different data sources used by the World Bank, the 
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nepotism component is assigned by the World Bank to the category of 
‘Corruption’, a category that is separate to the ‘Rule of Law’. Therefore, the in-
group bias and institution quality variables are informed by different measures 
and measured different things.  
 
Table 3-2: Descriptions and sources of the variables included in the analysis 
Variable Source Description Transformation 
(if applicable)* 
GDP World Bank 
(2011)  













Perceived confidence in rules of 
society, including quality of 
contract enforcement, property 






Cross-national survey data on 
compatriotism, nepotism and 
familism aggregated to a single 





Puga (2012)  
Percentage of population in year 
2000 descended from people who 
resided in Europe in 1500. 
Calculated from Putterman & 






Aggregation of scores for the 
extent to which there existed 
governance beyond the tribal level 












Estimation of the year when the 
first region within present-day 
countries underwent a transition 
from hunted food to cultivated 







Disease Murray & 
Schaller 
(2010) 
Infectious disease prevalence data 
compiled from various historical 
ethnographic atlases. 
 
Latitude Nunn & 
Puga (2012) 
Latitude of the geographical centre 
of the country.  
 




 European ancestry captures the percentage of a country’s population 
that is descended from people who resided in Europe in 1500. This variable 
serves a dual function as it is able to capture two variables, which is particularly 
valuable because SEMs estimate a large number of pathways and therefore do 
not have many spare parameters free to estimate. Firstly, it allows me to control 
for the influence of colonial activity on economic development. Secondly, it has 
been argued that the main thing Europeans brought to their colonies was 
human capital (Easterly & Levine, 2012; Glaeser et al, 2004), and as such the 
variable European ancestry also captures variation in human capital. I 
recognise that using a proxy for human capital such as education is a possibility 
but would impede my ability to control for colonial activity, whose impact on 
economic development is considerable.   
 I also conducted an ancestry adjustment procedure on the state history 
and timing of agriculture variables. In previous study, nation-level estimates of 
state history and the timing of agriculture were derived from the geographical 
locations of historical states and agricultural societies (Putterman & Weil, 2010). 
This was problematic because it did not account for large-scale migration. For 
example, state societies appeared relatively late in the geographic regions of 
North America and Australia and are associated with the arrival of Europeans 
rather than being native developments. Therefore, assuming that experience of 
statehood is in some sense a heritable trait, their modern populations have 
longer state histories than their geographic locations alone suggest. Following 
Putterman and Weil (2010), I transformed state history and agriculture timing 
scores based on the country of origin of the foreign nationals in every nation. 
Specifically, Putterman and Weil (2010) provide data on the state history and 
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timing of agriculture for modern nations, and for each of these nations I found 
the proportion of different nationalities that comprise its population, then 
combined each of the state history (and timing of agriculture) scores for each of 
these nationalities, weighted by their representation in the nation’s population.  
 
SEM 
There are a large number of potential combinations of variables and 
pathways that could be tested using SEM. Therefore, as a practical step, I 
conducted a two-stage analysis. First, I tested each hypothesised pathway in 
linear models. In separate models, economic development (GDP) and its 
potential mediators were the outcome variables, and their hypothesised 
determinants were predictors. From this, I constructed an SEM that only 
contained the significant pathways found in these linear models. This captured 
the important relationships between each of the variables and allowed me to 
reject unimportant pathways that would compromise model fit before testing my 
hypotheses.  
 I used this SEM as a foundation to test my hypotheses. Keeping the rest 
of the pathways the same, I created different SEMs that included every 
combination of pathways from state history and the timing of agriculture to GDP. 
These were direct and indirect through institution quality and in-group bias. In 
the case of the timing of agriculture, I also included an indirect pathway through 
state history. Through model comparison (Burnham & Anderson, 2010), I 
evaluated if a given pathway or combination of pathways improved the fit to the 
data.  
 Figure 3-1 illustrates my SEM foundation and the pathways I 
manipulated for my hypothesis testing. The pathways in black represent those 
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that were supported by the first-stage linear models, and therefore appeared in 
every single SEM I conducted. The pathways in red were those relating to my 
main hypotheses about whether the effects of state history and the timing of 
agriculture are direct or indirect. My model comparison was a comparison of 
SEMs that always included the black pathways, and had every different 













This diagram does not present the results of any SEM: the thickness of the arrows is 
constant. 
 
Language families were used as random intercepts in every linear and 
structural equation model to account for shared history. I used the linguistic 
affiliation of the majority of the population of a nation as the nation’s language 
family. I recognise that this is a more difficult exercise in nations that contain 
several language families (e.g. Chad) compared to more homogeneous nations 
(e.g. Japan). But I argue that it is the simplest way to capture important features 
of the shared cultural history of as much of the economically-active population 
Figure 3-1: Path diagram highlighting the pathways that were manipulated 
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as possible. In the case of the Indo-European family, I used sub-families. This is 
because the over-representation of the Indo-European languages in my dataset 
compromised its ability to capture meaningful patterns of non-independence 
(my findings are not influenced by the decision to use subfamilies: see 
Appendix 1-7 for models conducted with the Indo-European family instead of 
subfamilies).  
 
Results and discussion 
Despite several variables showing correlations with GDP, the only 
significant direct predictor of GDP when including all variables in a linear model 
is institutional quality (Table 3-3). This result provides evidence against many of 
the hypotheses that propose a direct effect of certain factors on economic 
development. There is no support from these analyses for direct effects on GDP 
of in-group bias, European ancestry, state history, agriculture timing, disease 
and latitude. The strong relationship between institution quality and GDP leaves 
little variation that can be explained by these other variables. This guides me 
towards potential indirect relationships, as I can turn my attention to which 
variables explain the variation in institution quality, and in turn, step further back 
to examine what factors explain variation in those variables.  
 
Table 3-3: Linear models testing individual stages of hypothesised pathways. 
Each outcome variable was assessed in separate models including all the 
predictor variables listed alongside it 
Outcome variable Predictor variable Coefficient p 
GDP Institution quality 0.56 <0.001** 
 In-group bias -0.09 0.23 
 European descent 0.14 0.09 
 State history 0.04 0.52 
 Agriculture timing 0.11 0.09 
 Disease -0.09 0.26 
 Latitude 0.03 0.60 
79 
 
Institution quality In-group bias -0.54 <0.001** 
European descent 0.25 0.02* 
State history 0.15 0.04* 
Agriculture timing 0.06 0.45 
 Latitude -0.05 0.49 
In-group bias Institution quality -0.56 <0.001** 
 European descent -0.17 0.13 
 State history -0.02 0.84 
 Agriculture timing 0.12 0.17 
 Disease 0.09 0.34 
 Latitude 0.01 0.93 
European descent State history 0.06 0.24 
Disease -0.17 0.03* 
Latitude 0.17 0.002** 
State history Agriculture timing 0.55 <0.001** 
 Latitude 0.07 0.47 
Agriculture timing Latitude 0.38 <0.001** 
Coefficients represent standardised coefficients. p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 
 Higher quality institutions are predicted by lower levels of in-group bias, 
higher proportions of European descent, and longer state histories. This offers 
support for 1) the suggestion that strong institutions and in-group biases reduce 
the benefits of one another and 2) the hypothesis that institutions are among the 
cultural traits that European populations transmit. It also supports the theory 
that longer histories of statehood provide more time for the development of 
effective institutions. State history, in turn, is strongly related to the timing of 
agriculture but not latitude. This is consistent with the idea that sedentism and 
increased population density historically led to changes in political organisation. 
The timing of agriculture is related to latitude, in line with the suitability of 
agricultural subsistence being dependent on climatic and other ecological 
factors. I find no support for a relationship between disease and in-group bias, 
suggesting that disease does not influence GDP by creating avoidant norms. 
However, disease is associated with European ancestry, in line with the 
hypothesis that the extent of settlement by colonists was dependent on the 
















Red arrows represent negative correlations and black arrows positive 
correlations. Line widths are proportional to the Akaike weighted coefficients of 
the pathways (see key). The dotted pathway from timing of agriculture to GDP 
was non-significant in the linear models but was supported in the SEM model 
comparison. 
  
Based on the results of these linear models I ran a series of SEMs to 
assess the importance of different pathways using model comparison 
techniques. Figure 3-2 summarizes the direct and indirect pathways that receive 
support from these analyses. For state history, an indirect pathway to GDP 
through institution quality has greater statistical support than an indirect 
pathway through in-group bias or a direct pathway (Table 3-4). Comparing the 
Akaike importance scores (by dividing the Akaike importance score for one 
pathway by another) shows that a pathway from state history to institution 
quality is 2.93 times more likely to be in the best model than a pathway from 
state history to GDP. This provides evidence for the theory that state history has 
Figure 3-2: Pathways which receive statistically significant support in model 
comparison of alternate SEMs 
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a persistent effect on economic development because it shapes the evolution of 
institutions instead of providing a direct head-start.  
 I also found that a pathway from the timing of agriculture to state history 
was highly important, and this pathway appeared in all of the best-fitting 
models. Indirect pathways from the timing of agriculture to in-group bias and 
institution quality were not supported by my analysis. Surprisingly, I found 
support for a direct pathway between the timing of agriculture and GDP in my 
model comparison, despite little evidence for this pathway in my linear models. 
Supplementary exploration of this direct relationship suggests that it should not 
be interpreted as support for the head-start hypothesis, because the direction of 
the relationship between the timing of agriculture and GDP is inconsistent 
across different geographical regions (e.g. there is a negative relationship 
between these variables within Europe; Olsson & Paik, 2013; see Appendix 1-
8). 
My model comparison reveals the pathways through which ecological 
factors do and do not influence GDP. From these analyses there is no evidence 
for direct effects of the ecological variables on GDP. Instead they appear to 
affect GDP through indirect effects on mediating variables. Latitude and disease 
both appear to influence European ancestry, which in turn affects GDP by 
shaping institution quality. Latitude also strongly predicts the timing of 
agriculture. 
A relatively robust finding in my SEMs is that the effect of state history on 
economic development is mostly indirect, through its relationship with institution 
quality. Similarly, although there is some weak evidence for a direct effect of the 
























Values represent standardised coefficients taken from the specific SEMs. All Akaike statistics were calculated using the SEMs in the 95% 
confidence set of SEMs. 
 
   Variables 
Predictor Institution 
quality 
State history Timing of agriculture 











        
1511.15 0.13 0.67 - 0.21  -0.12  0.14  - - 0.58  
1511.31 0.12 0.67 - 0.16  - 0.14 - - 0.58  
1512.76 0.06 0.67 - 0.17  - 0.14  - -0.06  0.58  
1512.93 0.05 0.67 - 0.19 -0.12  0.14  0.04  - 0.58  
1513.07 0.05 0.67 - 0.14 - 0.14  0.05  - 0.58  
1513.09 0.05 0.67 0.02  0.21 -0.12  0.13  - - 0.58  
1513.15 0.05 0.67 - 0.21 -0.12  0.14  - 0.003  0.58  
Akaike Importance 0.95 0.29 0.85 0.44 0.79 0.32 0.29 0.95 
Weighted Parameter 
Estimate 
0.62 0.01 0.15 -0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.52 
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to be indirect. This contrasts with previous research that shows that historical 
conditions, including state history, exert direct effects on economic development 
(Putterman & Weil, 2010). These findings are consistent with the idea that 
culturally transmitted rules and norms that facilitate large-scale organization 
develop in a cumulative manner (Currie et al, 2010; Henrich et al, 2010; 
Spencer, 2010). This evolutionary process takes time and the emergence of 
centralised governance may be characterised by cycles of success and 
collapse as innovations are attempted and abandoned (Currie et al, 2010; 
Gavrilets, Anderson & Turchin, 2014; Richerson & Boyd, 2001; Turchin et al 
2018; Wright, 2006). My findings suggest that societies that exhibit effective 
institutions in the modern day do so, at least partly, because the societies from 
which they have descended had more time in which to the develop the social, 
economic and political conditions from which these institutions have emerged.  
 These findings highlight the insights that can be gained from the 
methodological approach of using SEMs to bring together all direct and indirect 
effects simultaneously. SEMs estimate a realistically complex network of 
pathways as opposed to a collection of direct effects on the same outcome. 
Unlike multiple regression, this allows a distinction to be made between 
variables that are not influential and those that appear not to be influential 
because their effect is indirect. Given this it is unsurprising that previous 
analyses using multiple regression (Hibbs & Olsson, 2004; Putterman & Weil, 
2010; Sachs & Malaney, 2002) have found that historical and ecological factors 
have strong direct effects, while my SEMs find that indirect effects are more 
important.  
In my SEM and model comparison approach I explicitly acknowledge 
different potential explanations and different routes by which variables may 
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exert an effect (Currie et al, 2016; Platt, 1964; Dunbar, 1995). By pre-specifying 
my hypotheses of interest I avoid making too much of spurious relationships, 
and by calculating weighted parameter estimates across the range of models I 
take into account the fact that multiple sets of hypotheses might be equally 
plausible given the data. It should be noted, however, that although I tested 
meaningful combinations of variables and pathways, other variables and 
combinations that reflect different theoretical interests are possible. For 
example, in Table 3-1 I specified natural resource endowments as a direct, 
exogenous, historical factor. However, this is not a hypothesis I tested, and the 
only ecological variables I included were disease and latitude. It is possible that 
the inclusion of other variables could reveal different effects on economic 
development than I have identified. Indeed a general limitation of my SEM 
approach is that estimating a greater number of pathways comes at the cost of 
limiting the number of variables that can be analysed.   
It is also possible that broader conclusions concerning the roles of social 
norms and human capital may be different with different measures of such 
factors. Measures that unambiguously distinguish between the effects of 
institutional rules, social norms, and human capital are difficult to find in practice 
(Diamond, 2014). The variables I have employed in this study are best thought 
of as culturally-inherited factors that are proposed to have some causal 
influence on economic development rather than pointing towards strong 
statements about the relative importance of institutions versus human capital, 
for example. Other practical considerations in relation to variable choices also 
have to be considered. For example, I justify the use of European ancestry both 
as a proxy for human capital and as a variable that gives some control for 
colonial activity, because it helped to minimise the already high number of 
85 
 
parameters the SEMs estimated. I recognize, however, that several other 
proxies for human capital or social norms exist, and these may give more 
specific insights into what aspect of human capital or non-institutional aspects of 
culture are important in economic development.  
Another issue is to recognise the possibility of reverse causality in 
interpreting the relationship between institution quality and GDP. However, my 
analysis follows a long history of other lines of evidence establishing institutional 
quality as causally precedent (Rodrik et al, 2004). Furthermore, I conducted 
supplementary instrumental variable analysis using settler mortality data 
following Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and the results were consistent with 
this interpretation (see Appendix 1-10). Perhaps more importantly, the strong 
correlation between institution quality and GDP points to a more general 
statement about institutions and economies: namely that strong institutions and 
successful economies are connected features of societies that are 
characterised by large-scale cooperation. Indeed, strong institutions are a 
marker of societal development regardless of GDP, and perceptions of personal 
freedom, safety and societal safety nets feature in developmental indices that 
explicitly exclude economic variables (e.g. Social Progress Index).  
In summary, I show that indirect pathways associated with cultural 
evolutionary processes are important in explaining why historical and ecological 
conditions are associated with modern GDP. The evolution of modern 
institutions is shaped by historical experience of statehood, which is in turn 
associated with how early the transition to agriculture took place. This chain of 
pathways provides an explanation for why historical variables exert persistent 
effects on economic development. I demonstrate how a methodological 
framework for testing alternative evolutionary hypotheses reflecting multiple 
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causal pathways and patterns of shared cultural history can be adapted to 
address a range questions concerning how ecological, geographical, and 
historical factors have shaped the world we live in today. Questions of economic 
development have generally not been a major focus for researchers working in 
the field of cultural evolution (but see Henrich, 2016; Wilson & Gowdy, 2013), 
yet this is an area to which cultural evolutionary theory and methods can have 
important insights and add to existing approaches (see Spolaore & Wacziarg, 
2013). Cultural evolutionary research can benefit from further incorporating 
theory, methods, and data from researchers work in economics, political 
science, and related fields. More generally, the theoretical framework of cultural 
evolution can help connect insights and findings from across a range of 
disciplines involved in investigating economic and social development (Currie et 
al, 2016) as well as connecting to important practical applications in areas such 

















Chapter 4: Assessing the importance of shared history in 
shaping patterns of modern day socioeconomic development 
 
Abstract 
Numerous explanations have been put forward for why nations vary so 
substantially in their socioeconomic development. Many hypotheses concern 
modern-day factors such as ecological differences and social norms, but there 
is growing interest in more ‘ultimate’ explanations that view modern-day 
economic diversity as an outcome of cultural evolutionary processes acting over 
many generations. Societies may share many cultural features in common 
because they have either: 1) inherited features from a common ancestral 
society from which they have diverged; or 2) borrowed featured from others. 
Whether these processes also explain patterns of economic similarity and 
difference is not clear. Here I use multilevel modelling and a global nation-level 
dataset to partition the variation in development between modern-day factors, 
and historical and social factors that reflect patterns of shared history. I group 
countries based on: 1) language families to reflect deep common ancestry; 2) 
world religion to reflect more recent contact and borrowing; and 3) continent to 
reflect contact and borrowing within regions of ecological similarity. I show that 
grouping societies based on their language families explains more than half of 
the variation in modern-day economic development, even when controlling for 
other factors. Religion as a grouping variable explains about 40% of the 
variation, but continent does not explain any variation once country-level 
predictors are included. These findings are consistent with the idea that 
processes of cultural inheritance have shaped the distribution of socioeconomic 




The world today shows a high degree of economic inequality. Many 
different factors have been argued to be important in determining economic 
development including: the presence of institutions for enabling large-scale 
market activity and providing checks on executives (North, 1990; Rodrik et al, 
2004), in-group bias (Kyriacou, 2016), disease (Sachs, 2003), and human 
capitals such as specific technologies and bodies of knowledge (Easterly & 
Levine, 2012; Glaeser et al, 2004). Patterns of global economic inequality also 
appear to be highly persistent. Historical estimates of GDP suggest the same 
eight regions (China, India, Japan, USA, France, Germany, Italy and Britain) 
have together accounted for around 60% of the world’s economic productivity 
from 1AD to the present day (Maddison, 2007). Researchers have begun to 
argue that the present-day distribution of economic development may be, at 
least partly, the result of longer-term historical factors.  
Historical explanations of economic development have often been tied to 
specific events. Perhaps most well-known is the industrial revolution, in which 
technological breakthroughs created previously impossible economic 
opportunities and propelled Western Europe and North America to a new level 
of economic production. Research in economic history has since shifted focus 
to less recent historical events. Estimates of the date at which agriculture (Hibbs 
& Olsson, 2004) and statehood (Putterman & Weil, 2010) emerged in a 
society’s history predict its modern day economic performance (see chapter 3; 
Flitton & Currie, 2018). Similarly, the societies that adopted important 
technological innovations earlier in their history are the richest today (Comin et 
al, 2010).  
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The specific reasons for these long-term effects are still debated. Cultural 
evolutionary theory provides a general framework with which to develop, 
integrate, and test hypotheses about the historical processes that may explain 
the present-day distribution of socio-economic development (Currie et al, 2016; 
Spolaore & Wacziarg 2013; Wilson, 2002). Cultural evolutionary theory argues 
that the diversity in cultural traits is explained by evolutionary processes 
analogous to the evolution of biological adaptations, in which inheritance occurs 
through social transmission and selection is driven by ecological and social 
conditions that shape the success of different behaviours.  For example, the fact 
that certain key innovations or events (such as the development of agriculture) 
happened earlier in some parts of the world has given some societies more time 
to subsequently develop and retain cultural adaptations (particular institutions, 
norms or technologies) that are beneficial in agricultural societies. If these 
adaptations are also important for developing economies, this would have given 
some societies a head-start over others and a competitive advantage that 
persists to the present day (Bockstette et al, 2002; Putterman & Weil, 2010). 
Here I examine the idea that the extent to which societies share common 
history may have important consequences for explaining the present-day 
distribution of economic performance. Societies may be culturally similar due to 
convergent cultural evolution towards similar solutions to similar adaptive 
problems. For example, domestication of plants and animals happened 
independently in several places around the world during the Holocene 
(Richerson et al, 2001). Long-term historical analyses of societies from around 
the world show that in response to the need to deal with increasing population 
size societies have developed similar functional solutions, such as establishing 
hierarchical organization, increasing division of labour, developing specialized 
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political offices, and creating accurate recording systems (Turchin et al, 2018). 
However, the institutions, norms, or other socio-cultural factors that countries 
possess are often not independent innovations but rather share a common 
origin with institutions, norms etc. from other countries. These similarities can 
come about due to two aspects of shared history: ancestry and contact.  
Shared ancestry results from the process by which populations diverge 
to form new populations. Although the new populations may seek to 
differentiate themselves in terms of their identity, they will tend to share the vast 
majority of features of the original population as many ways of living are 
persistent and slow to change (Mace & Holden, 2005). Repeated bouts of 
population divergence over time, along with cultural innovation or ‘mutation’ in 
daughter societies, at least partly explains the broad-scale patterns of cultural 
diversity we see in the world today. The process is analogous the emergence of 
biological diversity, and means that societies are more similar to some societies 
than others in terms of the socio-cultural traits they possess (Currie, 2013; 
Mace & Holden, 2005; Mace et al, 2005). The relatedness between species can 
be represented in the form of phylogenetic (or evolutionary) tree and the shared 
ancestral relationships between human societies can also be represented using 
phylogenetic trees. Empirical work shows that the extent of this shared ancestry 
between societies predicts their similarity across a large and diverse range of 
cultural traits (Dow & Eff, 2008; Dow, 2007; Guglielmino et al, 1995; Hewlett et 
al, 2002, Mace & Jordan, 2011), and may potentially explain some of the 
variation in economies and the ways in which economies develop (Matthews et 
al, 2016; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009; but see Sookias et al, 2018).  
 Societies may also share cultural traits due to contact with other 
societies. Neighbouring groups may borrow key innovations from each other, or 
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other traits may diffuse between groups (Rogers, 2003). Packages of several 
traits may also be transmitted together such as when a society adopts the 
religion of another society. For example, the introduction of Islam into many 
regions of Africa brought a new money system, an accounting system and a 
legal code for adjudicating contracts (Ensminger, 1997). Groups may also 
dominate or subjugate other groups leading them to adopt many traits of the 
victor (occasionally the victorious group may take on the traits of the defeated 
group, for example the Mongol emperors of China—specifically the Yuan 
dynasty—adopted many aspects of Chinese political culture and political theory, 
as well as religion (Khan, 1995)). In general, this kind of contact is expected to 
occur between societies that are closer together in geographical space, and 
geographical proximity has been shown to be a good predictor of cultural 
similarity (Dow & Eff, 2008; Dow, 2007). Although as transport has technology 
has improved over the years this form of transmission can occur over 
increasingly longer distances. 
 The processes of shared ancestry and contact are not mutually exclusive 
and may interact in interesting ways. For example, Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2009) argue that traits are likely to be borrowed more easily between groups 
that are more closely related (i.e. have a higher degree of cultural ancestry) as 
they will fit in the existing cultural traits of the receiving society. Using cross 
national data, they show that differences in historical and contemporary income 
between societies correlate with the genetic distance between them, even if the 
societies are geographically close together (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009). As 
genetic differences in separated populations accumulate over time, genetic 
distance is closely related to how recently societies diverged. Spolaore and 
Wacziarg (2009) suggest that therefore, genetic distance proxies for cultural 
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differentiation and the existence of cultural barriers to the diffusion of traits that 
shape income. Others have argued that societies may also exchange or borrow 
cultural traits more frequently and easily from societies within the same 
ecological region as these are more likely to be relevant to the socio-ecological 
environment (Diamond, 1997). To the extent that culturally transmitted traits 
affect development it is possible that processes of shared history may help 
explain global patterns of economic performance we observe in the world today.  
Many quantitative studies of the causes of economic development are 
conducted using country-level data. However, the above discussion indicates 
that variation between countries across a range of variables including socio-
economic development and its predictors may be shared between countries. An 
outstanding question is to what extent shared history explains variation in 
development independently of country-level variation in institutions, culture or 
ecology. Furthermore, in practical terms, commonly used techniques such as 
Ordinary Least-Squares multiple regression assume that the data points have 
no underlying structure and that the residuals are statistically independent. 
Shared history may violate this assumption. At worst, this can lead to the 
appearance of spurious relationships because closely-related societies are 
effectively pseudoreplicated data points (i.e. Galton’s problem (Mace & Pagel, 
1994); see chapter 2). Not controlling for this issue could lead to predictors in 
such models being estimated poorly, meaning that parameter estimates could 
fluctuate or even reverse in their effect (e.g. Olsson & Paik, 2013). 
 I seek to address the following questions in this chapter: 1) to what 
extent variation in economic development and its potential predictors is shared 
across countries due to shared history? and 2) does accounting for potential 
sources of non-independence due to shared history provide affect estimates of 
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the relationships between economic development and its predictors? I address 
these issues by analysing a global level dataset of information on economic 
development and several of its hypothesized predictors. I examine the variation 
in these measures as falling either: between modern countries, or between 
groupings of countries based on shared cultural history. I then explore whether 
accounting for these potential sources of non-independence affects inferences 
about the predictors of economic development.  
 
Methods 
 I conduct secondary data analysis, using multilevel models to estimate 
the proportion of variation in modern-day economic development attributable to 
country-level factors and higher-level groupings based on deep common 
ancestry (based on language family affiliation), more recent historical contacts 
(based on religious affiliation), and contact based on geographical proximity 
(based on shared environments). My aim is to establish how much variation in 
economies is due to shared cultural history, which will inform both to what 
extent cultural evolutionary processes shape economies and the degree to 
which previous single-level analyses have been compromised by non-
independent data.  
 
Variables 
 The nation-level variables used in this chapter were largely the same as 
those used in chapter 3, but with two additional variables and other 
transformations to make the models tractable and interpretable. As this chapter 
investigates the variation in economic development attributable to shared 
history, it is not concerned with evaluating specific hypotheses about factors 
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driving variation at the country-level. Country-level variables are only included to 
ensure that all the variation in economic development attributable to country-
level factors is being accounted for appropriately, so that it is not misattributed 
to shared history. Therefore, I performed two principal components analyses 
(PCA) to extract one factor that captures general country-level variation in the 
ecology (62% of the variance), and another factor that captures country-level 
variation in the timing of important historical events (79% of the variance). To 
create a robust ecology factor, I included two new country-level variables: 
precipitation levels and the degree of tropical climate (Nunn & Puga, 2012). The 
ecology and history factors will be included in my models as country-level 
predictors of variation. I also include European ancestry at the country-level, as 
this covaries with cultural norms, bodies of knowledge and technologies. I also 
performed a PCA to create the outcome variable capturing economic 
development which combines institution quality, GDP and social norms for in-
group bias (83% of the variance) (Figure 4-1). The causal pathways between 
these variables are multiple in terms of both number and direction, and my 
current analysis is concerned with explaining the more general societal 
development they characterise, not with disentangling their causal relationships. 
Each of these PCAs used the PRCOMP function from the Stats package in R 
which uses eigenvector decomposition to derive variance-maximising principal 
components. It calculates the most informative factors and provides values for 









Numbers represent factor loadings. 
To evaluate the role of shared history, I also identified and 
operationalised three general factors that may lead different countries to share 
history. The first is cultural relatedness due to shared ancestry. This is generally 
proxied using linguistic affiliation: languages show hierarchical (i.e. tree-like) 
patterns of relatedness and are grouped into language families. These patterns 
of similarity are thought to be the result of ancient population expansion and 
divergence. The second is more recent historical relationships due to 
substantial contact and the spread of packages of cultural traits across a 
number of groups. Here I focus on one prominent form of such relatedness that 
applies to large parts of the world: religion, particularly the spread of so-called 
world religions (Norris, 2015; Norris & Inglehart, 2004). It is important to note 
that such relationships could also come about for a number of other reasons 
such as incorporation into a large empire, or the spread of political ideologies 
such as communism. The third is geographical proximity: societies from the 
same geographical region are likely to be in closer contact with each other and 
borrow cultural traits. This will be amplified if these regions are also similar 








Figure 4-1: The factors used in the analysis. The economic development factor 







Figure 4-2 illustrates how these different historical processes may give 
rise to clusters of societies that share many features in common. For each of 
these three general factors I select a proxy variable. Following much recent 
work in cross-cultural comparative analyses I use linguistic relationships as a 
proxy for shared cultural ancestry. Specifically, I classify countries according to 
the language family to which the majority language spoken in that country 
belongs. Given the size of the Indo-European family, I divided it into 
subfamilies. I also conducted additional analysis to classify South and Central 
American countries. Owing to population movements and colonialism, countries 
from this region are particularly difficult to classify into individual linguistic 
groups. Many have considerable indigenous populations, while others are 
predominantly of European descent. In chapter three, I categorised countries 
based on their largest language family. However, this may obscure important 
differences both between European and South American populations and 
between populations within South America. To address this, I created a dataset 
compiling the various populations in these countries using Putterman and Weil’s 
(2010) population matrix. Indigenous language families are rarely the largest in 
South American countries, but often exceed a third of the population. Therefore, 
in this analysis, I categorised countries as their indigenous language family if 
members of this language family comprised over a third of the country’s 
population. Supplementary robustness checks using the original language 
Figure 4-2: Schematic of the ways in which different sources of shared history 
create patterns of non-independence between modern societies 
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family classification used in chapter three showed that changing this 
classification had no effect on the results (Appendix 2-2).  
For more recent sources of shared history, I use historical religion, 
classified as the predominant religion of a country’s population (Norris, 2015; 
Norris & Inglehart, 2004).For shared history due to shared ecology and 
geography, I use continents. Continents are considered natural barriers to the 
diffusion of information (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009) and demarcate broad 
ecological differences. I consider Europe and Asia different continents as 
factors such as crop differences are useful for demarcating distinct cultural 
regions (Kitayama et al, 2016) (robustness checks in Appendix 2-3 indicate that 
different assumptions about definitions of continents made little qualitative 
difference to the findings). As Figure 4-3 illustrates, these general factors may 
overlap (language families may be distributed predominantly within a particular 























Panel A shows the categorisation of major language families; Panel B shows 
continent groupings; and Panel C shows religious groupings. Different colours 
represent different groups in each case.  
 
Multilevel models: 
Multilevel models allow me to estimate country-level predictors of 
economic development as fixed effects, while simultaneously modelling the 
expected co-variation between countries within groupings as a random effect. 
Multilevel models can therefore provide an estimate of the relationships 
between country-level predictor variables and economic development given the 
underlying structure to the data that is the result of patterns of shared history.   
For my analysis, using multilevel models to account for grouping 
variables is preferable to the alternative method of including grouping variables 
as fixed effects. Conceptually, I do not consider specific language families, 
continents or religions to have unique effects on economies or institutions, and 
so it is consistent with my theoretical expectations to treat grouping variables 
not as another parameter to estimate, but as a more general underlying source 
of variability in scores. Furthermore, as a practical consideration, language 
families, continents and religions vary in the number of countries they have as 
Figure 4-3: World maps of our grouping variables 
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members, and imbalances between groups compromise the statistical power of 
fixed effects models.  
I compare seven models. For each of the three general factors, I conduct 
two separate multilevel models. Each of these two models contains the general 
factor as a random effect, but one contains no country-level fixed effects while 
the other includes all of the fixed effects. Comparing these models enables me 
to evaluate both how much variation is explained by the different general 
factors, and whether the general factors explain variation that is not attributable 
to any country-level variable. I also present a single-level OLS-regression model 
with all of the fixed effects but no general factor, to investigate whether including 
shared history is justified considering the extra model complexity it introduces.  
 
Results and discussion 
My model comparison (Table 4-1) shows that even though they increase 
model complexity, proxies for shared history largely improve model fit by 
accounting for variation that is not explained by any country-level source. 
Before including fixed effects, language families account for 63% of the 
variation in socio-economic development. Only a small proportion of this is 
because language families proxy for variation in the ecology, history or 
European ancestry of different countries, as over half of the variation in 
development is still explained by language families even after fixed effects are 
introduced. The variation in the development between continents, on the other 
hand, is entirely due to continental differences proxying for differences in 
country-level variables such as European ancestry. After accounting for 
country-level variation, development does not differ between continents. 
Religion presents a similar but weaker overall picture to language families, 
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consistently accounting for a large amount of variation in development that is 















Black bars refer to null models with no country-level predictor variables 
included. Grey bars refer to full models with all country-level predictors included. 
 
Including continents as a general factor weakens model fit relative to a 
single-level model. This is because continents do not explain any variation in 
development that country-level variables cannot, so the variable does not 
provide any benefit to model fit that would justify the extra model complexity it 
introduces. Including religion does improve model fit relative to a single-level 
model, suggesting that it accounts for variation that country-level variables 
cannot. The same can be said for language families, the inclusion of which 
improves model fit the most.  
 
Figure 4-4: Bar chart presenting the proportion of variation in socioeconomic 
development attributable to the general factors in different models 
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Table 4-1: Model comparison 
 Grouping Variable 
 None Language family Continent Religion 
Predictor of 
development 
       
European 
descent  
0.82*** - 0.54*** - 0.81*** - 0.65*** 
History 0.10 - 0.18* - 0.09 - 0.25** 
Ecology -0.13 - -0.13 - -0.13 - -0.14 
ICC - 0.63 0.52 0.48 0.00 0.39 0.40 
AIC 336.69 302.54 290.06 352.11 338.69 349.90 304.02 
Cells contain parameter estimates. Coefficients represent standardised 
coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 
Although I am not concerned with specific country-level hypotheses in 
these analyses, my model comparison illustrates the effect of assuming 
independence between countries on parameter estimates. The single-level 
model, which is a simple OLS regression such as those commonly used in the 
scientific literature, overestimates the direct role of European ancestry and 
underestimates the role of history when compared to the best-fitting model that 
properly accounts for shared history using language families.  
 I find that the language family to which a society belongs predicts how 
similar the society is to other societies in terms of socio-economic development. 
Membership of the same language family can reflect common ancestry going 
back several thousand years. However, the emergence of modern forms of 
political governance and economic systems is generally thought to have 
occurred much more recently and after the divergence of different cultures (i.e. 
these traits have emerged near the tips of a phylogenetic tree rather than at 
some point deeper in the past). The findings indicate that it is the presence of 
other aspects of culture with much longer time depth that may partly explain 
modern economic performance. This follows evidence that the diversity in many 
cultural traits, from subsistence strategies (Mace & Holden, 2005) to systems of 
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marriage and inheritance (Cowlishaw & Mace, 1996) to traditional political 
systems (Currie et al, 2010), exhibit a phylogenetic signal (i.e. patterns of 
similarity or co-occurrence can be explained by linguistic relatedness). Traits 
such as these may have facilitated the emergence, adoption or successful 
implementation of modern political and economic institutions and led to shared 
patterns of economic growth seen in the data. At the moment it is unclear what 
features of shared history are actually important or the precise mechanism by 
which this occurs, and this remains an important avenue for future research.      
The analyses demonstrate that both deep cultural ancestry and more 
recent shared history could be important in explaining similarities in modern 
economic development. Examining the AIC and ICC values indicates that 
language family explains more of the variance than does shared world religion. 
However, there may an overlap in membership within categories between 
language families and world religions (e.g. countries associated with Germanic 
languages tend also to have Protestant religions) such that both classifications 
may be proxying for the same mechanism. Attempts to include both groupings 
in the same model (see Appendix 2-6) found that this improved model fit even 
further, which suggests that language families and religions are capturing 
different sources of variation. However, caution must be exercised with the 
interpretation of such models, as they used these groupings as fixed effects as 
well as random effects, which increases the risk of biased parameter estimates 
due to the imbalanced levels of the variables. Further insight into this question 
has been made by previous study showing that changes in linguistic affiliations 
correlate with changes in political institutions, and that linguistically-related 
societies are likely to experience cultural change in concert (Matthews et al, 
2016). This potentially indicates that language families are related to cultural 
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variation because they demarcate the boundaries of information transmission. 
In my analysis, I used religions as a proxy for these boundaries, indicating that 
there may indeed be some overlap between the categories. However, I did also 
find that language families explain more variation than religions. To the extent 
that religions are effective proxies for the limits within which ideas tend to be 
borrowed, this suggests that there may be an additional mechanism by which 
historical linguistic affiliations shape modern cultural variation. Therefore, 
teasing apart the relative importance and mechanism by which different 
historical factors may affect modern day economic outcomes is an important 
area for future research.    
 I also find that continents do not account for any variation in socio-
economic development that cannot be explained by society-level differences. 
This may be because continents do not easily capture networks of past 
interactions based on shared environments, as there can be substantial within-
continent variation in ecological factors. For example, Asia contains tundra, 
desert and tropical ecosystems. Future work could explore this issue more by 
creating classifications based more explicitly on ecological similarity (e.g. the 
WWF’s Biome classifications of terrestrial ecosystems (Olson et al, 2001)). 
Another solution could be to examine measures of geographic distance or 
connectivity (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009). My finding regarding continents may 
in fact further illustrate that it is the deepness of shared history that is 
particularly important. Many continents were populated relatively recently due to 
large-scale migration. For example, Oceania contains countries with large 
native populations such as Papua New Guinea, as well as countries like 
Australia which are made up predominantly of migrants originally from 
European countries. Therefore, continents can contain numerous societies 
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whose divergence occurred relatively early. Continents have been used as a 
control variable in economic studies (e.g. Ashraf & Galor, 2013) as well as other 
types of cross-national study (e.g. Fincher & Thornhill, 2012), however the 
findings from the present chapter suggest that it may not be the most relevant 
factor for understanding socioeconomic development.  
 My analysis has other important implications for cross-national statistical 
analyses. These analyses are common in numerous disciplines and mostly use 
single-level OLS regression models that assume that all the data points are 
independent from one another. I show that the best-fitting models are multilevel, 
containing appropriate controls for shared history. In addition to being the best-
fitting models, these models produce different parameter estimates to single-
level models which change the nature of the results. Through my comparison, I 
show that language families explain a substantial degree of variation in culture, 
and attributing this variation to shared history as opposed to society-level 
predictors is an important part of generating accurate estimates of the effects of 
other variables. Similar effects of multilevel correction on models of economic 
development have been demonstrated in the past, but at different scales. For 
instance, multilevel analyses are typically conducted on individuals nested 
within countries, and illustrate how country-level variation affects individual 
economic circumstances (e.g. Given & Jorgenson, 2011). In my analysis, I 
show that a similar process must be considered to occur at the country-level, 
and that modern nations, just like individuals, cannot be considered in isolation 
of their broader context. Specifically, comparisons of modern nations must 
account for the fact that different patterns of shared history create relationships 
between the populations that comprise nations, which means that modern 
nations are ‘nested’ within broader cultural groupings.  
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 My analysis has a number of limitations. One limitation of using language 
families as a grouping variable is that it does not fully account for patterns of 
shared ancestry within language families. Having a more fine-grained 
description of ancestral relationships in the form of phylogenetic trees (e.g. 
Currie et al, 2010) would help in this respect and is a priority for future research. 
This task is not straightforward however, due to the fact that countries may be 
home to multiple languages and cultures, and there is sometimes significant 
mixing of cultures such as in the case of creole languages (Swigart, 1994). 
 Furthermore, as I am not concerned with evaluating hypotheses about 
country-level predictors in these analyses, I conducted PCAs to create variables 
that would capture ecological and historical variation. These variables ensured 
that I did not misattribute variation to shared history that should be attributed to 
country-level predictors. However, using factors necessarily results in some 
variation not being accounted for. The factors explained between roughly 60-
80% of the variance in the variables that comprised them. Despite this concern, 
supplementary analyses showed that using raw variables instead of factors 
made no change to the results, suggesting that my use of factors did not drive 
the results (see Appendix 2-4). 
 Although applicable to most modelling analyses and virtually impossible 
to fully resolve, another potential issue is omitted variables. As my main aim is 
to appropriately partition variation between different levels, it is important that I 
do not omit relevant country-level variables. Doing so leads to the possibility 
that variation I find to be attributable to language families or religions is actually 
explained by country-level variables that I have not included, and is therefore 
not representative of shared history. This would cause me to overestimate the 
role of shared history. I minimise this risk by including a diverse range of 
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variables covering history, ecology and demography. My findings are also 
robust to changes in the variables I use (Appendices 2-4 & 2-5). This suggests 
that in line with my hypotheses about the role of shared history, language 
families and religions will always account for variation that cannot be explained 
by the kinds of society-level variables that have been commonly invoked in 
previous comparative studies of economic development.  
 Another limitation concerns the construction of my religion variable. The 
dataset used to categorise countries by their religion collapsed various mostly 
African societies into a single “Other” category, reflecting the fact that their 
religions are not one of the major religions (Norris, 2015). In this case these 
countries are modelled as if they share a single religion, which is not the case. 
However, their religions are diverse and the linkages between them are difficult 
to identify. I modelled this by not grouping any of these religions with any other. 
It is important to re-emphasise that I used religions in this study to proxy for 
systematic patterns of contact and transmission of ideas, norms and institutions, 
rather than focusing on the content of these religions. By categorising these 
religions as distinct in this way, my analysis therefore assumes that these kinds 
of contacts were not present in this region and that any similarities between 
religions are due to deeper shared ancestry. There is therefore a possibility of 
missing more recent contact and shared history in this region. However, 
supplementary analyses show that using “Other” religions as a single category 
does not give me different results (see Appendix 2-7), which suggests that the 
results are relatively robust to such modelling assumptions.  
 It is important to note that the types of relationships between societies 
that I used religion to proxy for can occur for a number of other reasons. The 
spread of political ideologies such as communism or of empires across 
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societies also implies transmission or exchange of ideas, institutions and other 
cultural traits. These may spread in different directions to religion, indicating that 
religion alone misses many societal relationships. One particularly important 
reason why I used religion as the proxy for borrowing between societies is 
because large, multi-national studies have shown that the content of different 
religions does not appear to have any clear systematic effect on economic 
development (Durlauf et al, 2012). This is unlike communism, which does 
appear to influence economic growth in various ways (Harrison, 2012). 
Consequently, variation in socio-economic development that is attributable to 
religion is likely to be related to the ability of religion to proxy for shared history, 
while variation attributable to communism may be confounded by the effects of 
communism itself on economies.   
This study also potentially has implications for improving economic 
development in poorer countries. Rather than indicating that societies are 
trapped at a certain level of economic performance due to their historical 
relations with other societies, my findings highlight that attention has to be paid 
to the broader cultural and institutional context in which institutions play out. 
These findings suggest that attempting to introduce ideas or policies from other 
countries directly may not be successful if they do not match well to existing 
practices. This insight chimes well with arguments from socio-ecological 
systems which state that this “blueprint thinking” is ineffective in natural 
resource management, and that consideration needs to be paid to local 
conditions (Ostrom et al, 2007). In order to understand these processes further, 
future comparative studies could examine more explicitly cases when 
institutions are transmitted between societies and the extent to which existing 
traits and practices affect their adoption or their effectiveness.  
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 In summary, I show that understanding shared history between countries 
is important in explaining patterns of diversity in modern-day socioeconomic 
development. Although further work is required to tease apart the specific 
causal mechanisms and relative importance of deep cultural ancestry and more 
recent contact, the study highlights the ways in which cultural inheritance 
extending over potentially thousands of years may have persistent effects on 
how societies develop, adopt and enact policies that shape economic systems. 
More broadly, this study further demonstrates the value of cultural evolutionary 
theory in bringing together different perspectives in order to develop and 
systematically test hypotheses about how the world in which we live today has 
















Chapter 5: The cultural evolution of token money 
 
Abstract 
The origin and diversity of money systems is one of the oldest questions 
in the field of economic history. Traditionally, money systems were seen as 
founded on the principle that intrinsically-valuable objects were desired by 
everyone, and so could be used as money in any exchange. Recently, an 
alternative theory that money originated as valueless tokens of debt has gained 
traction in the literature. An unresolved question about this theory is what 
prevents people issuing tokens to acquire goods and then defaulting on their 
debts, which would remove the perceived value of tokens of debt and threaten 
their sustainability as a money system. The cultural evolutionary literature 
argues that social sanctioning and enforcement systems such as institutions 
maintain this kind of cooperation, while more traditional ideas focus on factors 
such as access to markets as the most important explanations for money use. I 
use a model comparison approach and a database of diverse traditional 
societies to evaluate what factors affect the variation in token money use. I find 
that sanctioning institutions are the strongest predictor of token money use. This 
is consistent with the idea that token money use involves a cooperative 
dilemma, as well as the more fundamental claim that early money systems were 
based on tokens of debt instead of intrinsically-valuable commodities. These 
findings show that cultural evolutionary processes are central to explaining the 
diversity in money use among traditional societies, and that these processes 
offer valuable insights into the mechanisms that likely enabled the emergence 





Money has featured in human societies for millennia. There is 
considerable diversity in the types of money systems that different societies 
have adopted. While some societies have not adopted any money system, 
many traditional societies use commodities as money, while others, including 
modern nation states, use tokens that have no intrinsic value (Einzig, 1966; 
Graeber, 2011). Various environmental and social factors predict the utility of 
exchange and the use of money, such as markets and ecological pressure 
(Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989; Smith, 1776/1976). But the puzzle of how some 
societies come to use valueless tokens in exchange for costly goods and 
services is unresolved. Recent theory argues that token moneys emerged from 
credit relationships, as a means of signalling outstanding debts (Graeber, 
2011). But an unresolved dilemma of this theory is that tokens are not costly to 
issue as they have no intrinsic value, and also do not give the issuer any 
obligation to repay the debt they signify. Taking a cultural evolutionary 
perspective, I propose that this makes token money use a cooperative dilemma 
that is vulnerable to exploitation, as there is an incentive to issue tokens in 
exchange for desired goods and never repay the debts, unless there is some 
additional mechanism enforcing repayment. Here I investigate how the cultural 
evolution of certain social norms and institutions may have resolved this 
dilemma.  
 
Exchange of goods   
To fulfil individual or societal needs such as defence, ceremony or 
subsistence, societies extract or create commodities, tools and other objects 
(Dorward, 1976). However, due to geographical variation in resources, or a lack 
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of skills, knowledge or facilities, creating desired objects is often not possible. 
This creates diversity among the goods and services different societies can 
offer, and means that in many circumstances, exchange between societies is 
the only mutually beneficial way to acquire desired goods and services (Einzig, 
1966; Quiggin, 1979) (conquest and plunder being the non-mutually beneficial 
alternative). For example, a notable early economic relationship was the supply 
of horses from Turkic populations to China in exchange for silk. Their respective 
ecologies generated this pattern of supply and demand, as steppe 
environments were more conducive to livestock breeding than agriculture, while 
the contrary was true for most of the environment in China (Beckwith, 1991).  
  
Commodity money 
While exchange exists everywhere (Earle, 2002), the nature of this 
exchange varies.  In direct exchange, what matters is that an individual is able 
to locate another party who both offers desired goods and wants goods that the 
individual can offer. As the exchange is instantaneous, it can take place 
between anyone provided they both want what the other has. This mutual 
fulfilment of needs is called the ‘double coincidence of wants’, and has been 
central to traditional theories of money that have been established for several 
centuries (Smith, 1776/1976). A central dilemma with direct exchange is that the 
goods that parties desire and those that they can offer fluctuate over time. This 
means that more often than not, one party wants what the other does not have, 
which precludes any exchange. Alternatively, in reciprocal exchange, 
exchanges can involve a time delay, where a party can give a good to another 
party on the promise that they will receive something in return in future. This 
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requires some level of social relationship between the parties, so they can keep 
track of who owes them repayment.   
Maximising the probability of two parties wanting what each other has 
was the fundamental motivation for the emergence of commodity money 
according to much traditional theory (Jevons, 1897). Objects such as metal 
rods, cattle, horses, clothes and medicines are of sufficient intrinsic value to be 
consistently desired by many parties. Consequently, these commodities can be 
used in exchanges even if they are not desired by the parties involved, as the 
parties can be confident that the commodities can be exchanged in subsequent 
exchanges for items that they do directly desire (Bohannan, 1955; Kiyotaki & 
Wright, 1989; Sillitoe, 2006). This is the fundamental mechanism by which 
commodity money works.  
As commodity money emerges to resolve the double coincidence of 
wants, it is likely that the frequency of attempted exchanges that fail due to the 
absence of the double coincidence of wants drives the need for commodity 
money (Jevons, 1897). Therefore, explaining the variation in money use 
requires us to consider the ecological and social conditions that affect the 
frequency of general exchange behaviour. Three such conditions I will consider 
are 1) ecological threat or food stress; 2) nomadism; and 3) market 
development. 
The frequency and severity of threats to survival caused by food 
shortages increases the pressure that individuals face to secure usable 
commodities and resources to buffer themselves against fluctuations in food 
(Minnis, 1985). Exchange is one of the four major categories of strategies 
human societies use to cope with food stress (the others being diversification of 
resources, migration and storage) (Halstead & O’Shea, 1989). Increasing the 
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size of their network of trading partners allows an individual to use exchange to 
acquire the resources they need to survive.  For example, records of the 
strategies of North Alaskan Iñupiat populations up until 1800 show that inter-
regional trade became common during episodes of severe food stress, despite 
inter-regional contact being in defiance of normal social boundaries, as it gave 
them access to resources they could not secure by themselves (Mine & Smith, 
1989). Although there are no previous studies specifically examining how food 
stress predicts the emergence of money, its effect on exchange makes it an 
important variable to consider in explaining money use.  
However, it should be noted that archaeological evidence has 
emphasised the importance of storage over exchange, and it has been 
suggested that low food security may lead to intergroup violence and territorial 
defence with the aim of conserving and protecting resources (Broughton et al, 
2010). Therefore it may be the case that low food security actually shifts 
priorities away from exchange. This conclusion is perhaps expected from 
archaeological study given that it is easier to demonstrate storage over 
exchange in the archaeological record, and this survivorship bias makes it 
difficult to establish whether exchange or storage is a more common response 
to food stress. Consequently, the effect of food stress on money use is unclear.  
Another condition shaping the utility of commodity money is nomadism. 
In the absence of commodity money, individuals need to accumulate stocks of 
tradeable goods to ensure they can satisfy the potential wants of an exchange 
partner. Nomadism may limit the extent to which individuals can accumulate 
such possessions as they must transport all of their belongings (Shultziner et al, 
2010). Indeed, there is evidence that sanctions against the accumulation of 
personal possessions are common in such societies (Woodburn, 1982). When 
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societies adopt commodity money, individuals who are only carrying limited 
commodities can still participate in exchange by using money. Therefore, 
commodity money may be adopted preferentially by nomadic groups.  
However, it should be noted that there are some notable exceptions to 
the claim that nomadism limits the accumulation of goods, such as pastoral 
nomads who use pack animals to transport resources. For example, the 
Beritanlı of Eastern Turkey transport many possessions that are used to provide 
living conditions for 40-50 people, including tents, hearths and cauldrons (Cribb, 
2004). This makes it difficult to conclude that nomadic groups would be more 
likely to adopt commodity moneys than other groups. Moreover, permanent 
settlement is a precursor of economic specialisation (Svizzero & Tisdell, 2016). 
There is evidence that this specialisation motivates individuals to engage in 
exchange with others to a greater extent, in order to acquire specific goods 
(Kaiser & Voytek, 1983). Therefore, the extent to which sedentism or nomadism 
drive the emergence of money is also unclear. It must also be considered that a 
society’s nomadism may be related to its ability to escape or produce enough 
food to survive famine, indicating that an interaction between fixity and famine 
may confound any independent effect of either variable (Testart et al, 1982). 
 It is similarly unclear whether societies that have market-based 
economies are more likely to use money. Markets are dedicated locations 
where individuals offering different goods and services congregate, and using 
markets implies a greater frequency and breadth of exchanges. Societies vary 
in their engagement with markets, with some trading in markets that cover large 
geographical regions and others using more localised markets or not trading in 
markets at all. Traditionally, it has been argued that access to larger-scale 
markets would increase the utility of commodity money as without it an 
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individual would need an ever-increasing stock of tradeable goods to satisfy the 
needs of the large number of parties they exchange with (Kiyotaki & Wright, 
1989). Therefore, large-scale market-based economies are considered 
predictive of the adoption of commodity money. However, it could also be 
argued that larger-scale marketplaces increase the likelihood of there being 
more individuals who possess desired goods. This creates more opportunities 
to exchange with people for desired items directly, and therefore reduces the 
need for intermediary commodities. Consequently, it remains an empirical 
question whether market engagement is important in explaining money use.  
 As mentioned in chapter three, another variable that is important to 
consider when seeking to explain the variation in economies and cultures is 
latitude. Latitudinal patterns in many traits including economic development 
have been said to reflect the covariation between ecological factors with latitude 
(Bonds et al, 2012) or the covariation between latitude and patterns of societal 
division, spread and differentiation (Olsson & Paik, 2013). These relationships 
suggest that latitude may be associated with money use. As mentioned, there is 
evidence that money use is shaped by ecological factors. Furthermore, as there 
is evidence that money systems can be inherited from other societies (Comaroff 
& Comaroff, 2005), a society’s distance from a money-using society in terms of 
latitude may capture its likelihood of using money, because this implies a more 
distant common ancestor or relatively limited communication. Although the 
nature of the effect of latitude prevents me from making specific hypotheses 
regarding its role in money use, latitude is at the very least a useful control 
variable to isolate the effects of the more specific hypotheses of interest from 





While many of the theories seeking to explain the origins of money focus 
on commodity money, most modern societies (and many traditional ones) do 
not use commodities as money. Instead, they use tokens that have no intrinsic 
value. Clay tablets and metal ingots that were used several thousands of years 
BC, tally sticks in the late Middle Ages, and modern coins and notes are all 
examples of objects that were used in exchanges as money despite the fact 
that they have no use or value (Graeber, 2011). The use of these objects as 
money cannot be explained by the commodity money theory that people accept 
money objects because they will eventually be of use to other parties in 
subsequent exchanges.  
 The use of token money in exchanges is puzzling as in doing so, 
individuals give up objects that have intrinsic value in exchange for those that 
have no intrinsic value. Recent theory however, suggests that these tokens 
acquire value by signifying outstanding debts. Debt represents an alternative 
way of resolving the double coincidence of wants (Peebles, 2010). An individual 
who does not have goods desired by others can receive the goods they desire 
by becoming indebted to the other party, and signalling this debt with the 
transfer of a token. The token signifies the existence of an outstanding 
repayment, and can therefore be offered to others in subsequent exchanges 
(Graeber, 2011; Mitchell-Innes, 1914; Wray, 2004). As the token simply signals 
debt, the token itself is immaterial, allowing objects such as tally sticks, notes 
and clay tablets to be used as money. The use of token money is more closely 
related to the category of reciprocal exchange than direct exchange, as it is a 
social system involving the maintenance of social relationships to keep track of 
exchanges rather than immediately fulfilling the double coincidence of wants.  
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 There is a growing body of evidence in support of this debt theory. 
Archaeological study shows that the tablets, ingots and tally sticks mentioned 
earlier always detailed the names of creditors and debtors, as well as the 
amounts owed, consistent with the idea that they signified the existence of 
outstanding debts (Graeber, 2011; Mitchell-Innes, 1914; Sahlins, 1974). 
Another historical example is the use of written notes as payment in 17-19th 
century West African trading posts (Stiansen & Guyer, 1999). Initially, traders 
were hesitant to accept such documents from Europeans due to the potential 
for repayment to be withheld, but after social relations strengthened and trust 
was created, notes replaced cowries as the most used money object. A more 
recent example is the circulation of cheques during the Irish bank strikes (1966-
1976). Although these cheques were unable to be cashed and therefore had no 
monetary value, they were accepted as payment as long as they were signed 
by an individual whose reputation suggested they would be able to pay in future 
(Graeber, 2011). Furthermore, Rai stones that were used as currency in 
Micronesian islands also demonstrate the importance of debt over the money 
object itself. These stones circulated as tokens in exchanges but their history of 
ownership was maintained through gossip. Due to their size, the stones 
themselves were rarely moved. Indeed Rai stones that had been lost in the 
ocean were still used in exchanges (Frisby, 2014). As the stones simply 
signalled who owes what to whom, whether the stones themselves were 
retrievable was unimportant.  
 While the debt theory is consistent with how past and present 
populations all over the world have used money, the assumptions of the theory 
require further investigation.  Evolutionary signalling theory places great 
importance of the reliability or honestly of signals (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999). If 
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signals are easy to fake, they lose their ability to signal an underlying trait. As 
tokens of debt have no intrinsic value, they can be issued at no cost to secure 
desired goods, and also do not intrinsically give the issuer any obligation to 
repay the debt they signify. This creates an unlimited incentive to issue tokens 
and not repay debts, which would eliminate the value of the tokens as money by 
disconnecting the acquisition of a token from any kind of payoff (Shubik, 1986). 
Therefore, understanding money use requires examination of why debts are 
accepted and why individuals decide to cooperate by repaying debts instead of 
defaulting. This introduces three additional factors that may keep money stable: 
reputation, enforcement and taxation. 
 
Social mechanisms that enable cooperation and the cultural evolution of 
token money 
 The cooperative dilemma introduced by the potential for exploitation in 
token money use offers links to the evolutionary literature. Research into the 
evolution of cooperation has proposed many mechanisms by which cooperation 
can occur (Nowak, 2006). Most cooperative behaviours tend to be attributed to 
either kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity or institutions. Kin 
selection proposes that natural selection can favour increasing the fitness of 
others at a cost to oneself if the recipient’s genetic relationship to the giver is 
sufficient to mean that reproduction by the recipient passes on genes 
possessed by the giver, thereby increasing the giver’s fitness (Hamilton, 1964). 
However, this cannot explain money use as money use occurs between 
unrelated individuals. Direct reciprocity is based on the idea that one’s actions 
towards another influence how they will act in future. Specifically, one may 
cooperate with individuals who have cooperated in the past, but cheat those 
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who cheated (Trivers, 1971). One difficulty with this explanation is that 
decisions about whether one should cooperate with a given person depend on 
remembering what they did in the past. Therefore, direct reciprocity cannot 
easily account for cooperation in populations that are too large to allow 
individuals to remember how everyone else has behaved in the past. Below I 
outline and explain potential explanations for money use based on indirect 
reciprocity and the emergence of third-party institutions that change the payoff 
structures for individuals and therefore facilitate cooperative outcomes via the 
use of money.  
 
Reputation: 
 A potentially important mechanism for maintaining cooperation is indirect 
reciprocity. If individuals are able to channel their cooperation towards those 
who are known for cooperating, not only do they personally avoid free-riders, 
but they create incentives for individuals to cooperate in order to develop a 
good reputation (Fu et al, 2008; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004). The extension of 
credit similarly relies upon reputations for repayment. As individuals are not 
obliged to exchange goods with others, they can selectively exchange with 
parties who are invested in maintaining a reputation for repaying their debts. 
This ensures that the tokens of debt they receive will secure repayment in 
future. It is for this reason that in many traditional and developing societies, 
credit relations tend to be extended between individuals or populations that are 
sufficiently connected to allow knowledge about their reputations to be shared 
(Fafchamps, 1997, 2000; Pospisil, 1958; Sahlins, 1974; Shubik, 2001). Indeed 
the Irish bank strike mentioned earlier illustrates this reputation-based system, 
as it was people’s confidence in the ability of the issuing individual to repay that 
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determined whether or not the cheque had any value. The importance of 
reputation in token money use sets it apart from the direct exchange mentioned 
earlier. Direct exchanges concern the fulfilment of the needs of the two parties 
involved, without affecting other exchanges. The indirect reciprocity that is likely 
important for token money use involves more than two individuals, as the 
reputation one acquires in trading with one individual transfers to subsequent 
interactions with others. 
 One of the major ways in which information about one’s reputation is 
transmitted and managed is through gossip (Dunbar, 2004). Across different 
cultures, social topics account for approximately 65-78% of speaking time 
(Dunbar et al, 1997; Haviland, 1977). Much of this gossip is dedicated to 
keeping track of other individuals and policing free riders (Dunbar, 2004), which 
limits the spread of cheating and defaulting behaviour (Enquist & Leimar, 1993). 
Indeed, the quantity of gossip received about individuals’ reputations strongly 
predicts who cooperation is directed towards (Sommerfeld et al, 2008). This 
suggests that a society’s use of gossip is closely related to its ability to enforce 
cooperation using indirect reciprocity, and therefore, that gossip may be 
associated with token money use. 
 
Third-party institutions: 
 An important aspect of the reputation-based system is that it does not 
necessarily involve the administration of physical or financial punishment to 
those with a reputation for defaulting. Providing individuals who do maintain 
good reputations with access to exchange provides them with an incentive to 
ensure they repay their debts. An alternative way of maintaining cooperation is 
through third-party institutions that have the capacity to sanction individuals who 
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violate societal rules through fines or other dedicated punishment systems, 
such as police forces. These institutions remove incentives to infinitely issue 
token money by imposing costs on those who default on their debts. 
Consequently in many small-scale societies, ineffective law enforcement is 
considered the main reason for the failure of credit schemes (Znoj, 1998). 
Therefore, this invites the expectation that effective institutions may underpin 
the emergence and maintenance of token money.  
 
Taxation: 
 Reputation and third-party institutions illustrate that imposing costs on 
defaulters is one way of sustaining token money. Another way is to give the 
tokens a specific social value so they can circulate like they are a commodity. It 
is through this process that taxation may predict the emergence of money. If 
tokens are issued by centralised governing bodies and/or are accepted by these 
bodies as payment for taxes, the tokens have value to everyone as acquiring 
them enables the payment of tax (Bell, 2001). This means that potential 
cheaters cannot benefit by issuing a token with no intention to repay the debt, 
as giving away a token reduces their ability to pay tax and therefore introduces 
the potential for costly sanctioning. China’s IOU crisis (1992) demonstrates this 
idea. In this period, the state used IOUs (“white slips”) in lieu of cash to pay 
farmers for commodities. However, the state that issued these tokens could not 
guarantee their value: they were only accepted by state-run stores at 
substantial discounts. As a consequence, the IOUs did not take on the status of 
a token that could be used in exchanges, which ultimately drove many farmers 




 Despite being a topic of long-standing interest, there have been no 
systematic, quantitative comparative analyses of the cultural evolution of token 
money. Consequently, empirical evidence for the debt theory of money is 
lacking, as is an examination of the conditions that shape the emergence of 
token money. Here I attempt to evaluate the relative importance of reputation, 
third-party punishment, and taxation as drivers of the cultural evolution of token 
money. In evaluating these hypotheses I also assess the potential role that the 
ecological factors of food stress and mobility, and the presence of markets may 
have had in creating the need for money in exchanges more generally. Table 5-
1 sets out the different hypotheses indicated in the above discussion and the 
predictions that follow from these hypotheses. In order to test these ideas I 
conducted secondary data analysis of a cross-cultural database using model 
comparison to investigate which variables predict the presence of token money 
use.   
 
Table 5-1: Hypothesised pathways through which social and ecological 
variables influence the probability of money use 
Hypothesis Prediction Predictor variable 
(levels) 
Reputation and gossip 
ensures that tokens of 
debt have value by 
making defaulting costly 
More gossip  greater 
probability of token 
money use 
Extent of gossip (scale 
0-4) 
Third-party enforcement 
institutions ensure that 
tokens of debt have 
value by making 
defaulting costly 
Greater sanctioning 
power of third-parties 
greater probability of 
token money use 
Extent of enforcement 
and sanctioning power 
(none, for restricted 
decisions, for any 
decision) 
Taxation backs the value 
of tokens, allowing them 
to be treated as 
commodities 
Existence of taxation 
systems  greater 
probability of token 
money use 
Political hierarchy (zero, 
one or two, three or 
greater) 
Food stress shapes 
preferences for 
exchanging with others 
Greater famine 
frequency  change in 
probability of money use 
Occurrence of seasonal 
famine (low, medium, 
high) 
Money allows nomadic More fixed territory  Settlement fixity 
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populations to trade 
without needing to 
accumulate stocks of 
tradeable goods 




Market places suggest 
more exchange, which 
indicates either easier 
double coincidence of 
wants or more 
opportunities to use 
money 
Use of marketplaces  
change in probability of 
money use 
Locality of marketplaces 
(none to regional, supra-
regional) 
 
Control variables that predict the greater exchange (and therefore the need for 




 The variables used in this chapter (Table 5-2) are taken from the 
Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS), which was sourced using the online 
D-Place database (Kirby et al, 2016). The SCCS is a database of the 186 
societies from Murdock’s (1967) ethnographic atlas for which there are the most 
records. The sample was designed to be representative of all world regions, in 
an attempt to control for statistical non-independence between the sampled 
societies. The SCCS is comprised of observations by ethnographers of various 
pre-industrial societies, quantified into nominal categories or ordinal scales to 
enable comparison of different societies on the same measures. From this 
database I use measures of money use, political structure, institutional 
enforcement, gossip, market use and environmental factors. As these variables 
differ in their coverage of different societies, our analysis is limited to 60 
societies. 
 






Money use (not used, 
used) 
Collapsed usable objects, tokens, foreign 
coinage/paper currency, indigenous 
coinage/paper currency into the “used” category. 
Extent of gossip (scale 0-
4) 
 
Extent of enforcement and 
sanctioning power (none, 
for restricted decisions, for 
any decision) 
Collapsed no sanctioning power and no or few 
means of sanctioning into the “none” category.  
Political hierarchy (zero, 
one or two, three or 
greater) 
Collapsed one and two levels into “one or two” and 
three and four levels into “three or greater”. 
Occurrence of seasonal 
famine (low, medium, high) 
Collapsed very low and low into “low” and very 
high and high into “high”.  
Settlement fixity (nomadic, 
semi-nomadic, permanent) 
Collapsed semi-nomadic, rotating, semi-sedentary 
and impermanent into “semi-nomadic”. 
Locality of marketplaces 
(none to regional, supra-
regional) 




 The SCCS’ money use measure is a categorical variable capturing 5 
different kinds of money: none, objects that are usable, and three kinds of token 
money: tokens, foreign coinage or paper currency and indigenous coinage or 
paper currency. The distribution of data between these variables is that most 
societies use some form of token money, closely followed by no money. Only 
few societies have usable objects as money. As the sample is relatively small, 
having 5 separate categories for an outcome variable would likely cause issues 
with model convergence and the robustness of model estimates. Consequently, 
I collapse the variable into two categories for the analysis: money and no 
money (I also conducted analyses breaking the variable down further into 
foreign and indigenous tokens, and dropping the usable articles category 
entirely, neither of which changed my findings (see Appendix 3-2 & 3-3).  
 The institutional enforcement variable is an ordinal variable capturing 4 
different extents of sanctioning possible within the societies: no formal 
enforcement or sanctioning power available, no or few means of coercion, 
125 
 
means of coercion restricted to certain types of decisions, and coercive means 
to enforce all decisions. Again, for statistical tractability, I collapsed categories 
that were not distinguishable with respect to how I expect them to affect the 
outcome. Specifically, I combined the societies with no formal sanctioning 
power and no or few means of coercion into one category.  
 The SCCS contains few variables that pertain specifically to taxation. 
However, as the SCCS is an amalgamation of different ethnographic atlases, 
some different variables may be available for many of the same societies, while 
some variables will only cover societies that other variables do not. Most of my 
variables cover the same societies, allowing me to maintain a relatively large 
sample given the size of the database. However, there is relatively little data on 
taxation for many of the societies. This introduces a trade-off between 
substantially reducing the sample to use a variable relatively more specific to 
my hypothesis, or maintaining the sample and using a theoretically-informed 
proxy for taxation. Given the relative complexity of my models due to the 
categorical nature of the variables, I opted for maximising the sample and using 
a proxy. The consolidation of resources through tribute or taxation is associated 
with political hierarchy. Maintaining a system in which governing power is 
centralised requires the continual investment of resources from the population 
to a centralised authority. This can be achieved in several ways, such as by 
coercing others to invest as a form of submission, or through tribute 
arrangements where surplus production is passed up the hierarchy (Flannery, 
1976; Smith, 2004). This latter system may take the form of taxes, where 
payment to a centralised authority is framed as funding and enabling access to 
resources and institutions under the authority’s control, such as contracting law, 
sanctions and accounting systems (Johnson & Earle, 2000; Smith, 2004; 
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Sokoloff & Zolt, 2007). Generally, societies with fewer levels of hierarchy than 
chiefdoms have no such centralisation of resources; chiefdoms are associated 
with tribute; and states are associated with taxation (Carneiro, 1970). Political 
hierarchy was a variable in the SCCS that allowed me to maintain my full 
sample, so it was taken as a proxy for taxation. The variable itself featured 5 
categories: no levels, one level, two levels, three levels and four levels. 
Following the commonly-used categorisation of societies into small groups, 
chiefdoms and states, I collapsed this variable into three categories: no levels, 
which represents small groups; one to two levels, representing chiefdoms 
(“simple” and ”complex”); and three and over levels, representing states 
(Carneiro, 1981; Flannery, 1999; Wright, 1977).  
 The market exchange variable captured the extent to which societies 
accessed and engaged with trading posts, and the geographical scale of the 
parties with whom they traded. The categories of this variable were particularly 
imbalanced, with many societies engaging in trade with the highest level of 
geographical reach. Consequently, I recategorised this variable into limited 
market engagement (all types of trade up to restricted local trade) and extensive 
engagement (trading with the largest supra-national region).  
 The SCCS’s settlement fixity variable originally contained 6 categories, 
from completely migratory, to several types of semi-nomadism such as rotating 
and periodically moving, to permanent. The distinction between nomadic and 
permanent is of the most theoretical importance, so I collapsed the different 
semi-nomadic categories together to produce three categories: nomadic, semi-
nomadic and permanent.  
 The famine measure was the SCCS’s occurrence of seasonal famine 
variable, which originally contained 5 categories: very low, low, moderate, high 
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and very high. These variables were imbalanced, with the categories “low” and 
“high” having few cases. Given this and their similarity to the categories “very 
low” and “very high”, I combined these variables to produce three categories: 
low (containing very low), moderate and high (containing very high). 
 Finally, I did not transform the gossip variable .This variable is an ordinal 
ranking scale capturing the extent to which members of the societies share 
information about other members’ behaviours. Debate concerning the treatment 
of ordinal variables as continuous in linear models continues (Long & Freese, 
2006; Pasta, 2009; Williams, 2018), with the trade-offs between interpretability 
and potentially erroneous statistical assumptions being contended. On the one 
hand, treating ordinal variables as continuous requires the strong assumption 
that the categories are equally spaced. On the other, it has been argued that 
the effects of violating this assumption are marginal, and that treating ordinal 
variables adds much needed parsimony and interpretability (Williams, 2018). 
Ultimately, the effect of treating ordinal variables as continuous depends on the 
data itself, as categories may be more or less equally spaced. Therefore, the 
simplest way to ascertain whether this treatment is driving results is to compare 
separate analyses, one that treats the variable as continuous and one that 
treats it as categorical. Appendix 3-4 shows that for my models, treatment of 
gossip as continuous or categorical had no meaningful effect on the results. 
Consequently, for interpretability, below I report results from modelling that 
treats gossip as a continuous variable.  
  
Modelling 
 Models in previous chapters have sought to account for non-
independence statistically, using appropriate controls to capture hierarchical 
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structure. The SCCS, however, has taken non-independence into account by 
sampling disparate and largely separate societies from all over the world. For 
example, many societies are the only members of their specific language 
subfamilies, suggesting that they diverged sufficiently long ago to prevent any 
meaningful relationships that could drive my results. However, some analyses 
have shown that autocorrelation is still present for some measures in the SCCS 
data (Dow, 2007; Eff, 2004).I conducted checks using multilevel models 
including language families as a random effect, but found that my variables 
leave little variation that can be attributed to language families or other proxies 
for shared history (see Appendix 3-5). Consequently, the analyses presented 
below are single-level. 
 I used binomial logistic regressions for my analysis, using a model 
comparison approach. Initially, I conducted bivariate logistic regressions to 
evaluate the baseline effects of the predictors on token money use before 
including other predictors that would compete for the variation. The models I 
compared range from full models containing every variable to models containing 
single variables. I created models using a primarily top-down approach, where I 
assumed a full model containing all the predictors and evaluated the effect of 
dropping individual variables. I also used the same top-down protocol but 
removed categories of variables as opposed to individual variables, such as 
political constructs (sanctions and hierarchy), exchange mechanisms (markets 
and sanctions) and the ecology (latitude and famine). I calculate Akaike weights 
and importance scores to evaluate relative model fit and the contribution of 
each of the variables to model fit. Furthermore, I report Nagelkerke’s effect size 
estimations to ensure that the findings are ecologically valid. Without these 
estimates, there is the risk that the best model is only the best relative to other 
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models, and that it actually explains a small proportion of variation in money use 
in absolute terms. Nagelkerke’s effect size is commonly used for logistic 
regressions. It is derived from log likelihoods and is consistent with more 
traditional R2 effect size estimations in the sense that it is interpretable as the 
proportion of explained variation in the outcome variable (Nagelkerke, 1991).  
 
Results and discussion 
 My initial logistic regressions (Table 5-3) show that the third-party 
enforcement, hierarchy, fixity and latitude variables all have significant 
associations with money use. Societies with restricted and greater means of 
enforcing decisions have a significantly greater probability of money use than 
societies with no such enforcement. Societies with the ability to enforce any 
decision are 16.5 times more likely to use money than those with no 
enforcement. Societies with greater than one level of hierarchy also have a 
significantly higher probability of using money relative to societies with no 
hierarchy. Societies that are permanently settled have a significantly higher 
probability of using money compared to nomadic societies, although semi-
nomadic societies are not more or less likely to use money compared to 
nomadic societies. My regressions also suggest that there is a slight but 
significant latitudinal gradient to money use. Market activity, famine and gossip 
do not correlate significantly with money use. The log odds for each of these 
variables are greater than one, suggesting that they have some impact, but to a 
much lower degree than the other variables.  
 
Table 5-3: Bivariate logistic regressions for each predictor variable and money 
use 



















Gossip 0.01 1.01 60 0.96 
















Market activity (reference 
category: local-regional) 
0.98 2.65 60 0.07 


































Latitude 0.04 1.04 60 0.01 
 
Figure 5-1 uses the predicted probabilities from these initial logistic 
regressions to illustrate how the probability of money use changes with different 
levels of the predictor variables. It shows that even restricted ability to enforce 
decisions drastically increases the probability of money use, although there is 
some variation in the probability of societies with restricted enforcement using 
money. In contrast, societies that have the ability to enforce all decisions have a 
very high probability of using money and very little variation in this probability.  
My model comparison (Table 5-4) shows that third-party enforcement is 
the strongest predictor of money use. This variable appears consistently in the 
best-fitting models, with models containing only this variable appearing 
relatively high in the ranking of model fit. More generally, complex models fit the 
data better: of the two models within 2 AIC of the best-fitting model, the best 
model contains every variable but famine, and the second-best contains every 
variable but hierarchy. At first glance this suggests that these two variables are 
not necessary to create a model that fits the data well. However, as the AICs 
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are very close together, Akaike weights are necessary to provide a better 
estimate of the average contribution of these variables across the comparison.  
 The Akaike weight values suggest that the best model is 2.2 times more 
likely to be the best model than the second best model, giving me confidence 
that this is the best-fitting model in the comparison. The Akaike importance 
scores confirm the importance of enforcement, as this variable has the highest 
importance score. These scores also show that fixity and latitude feature in 
many of the best models. Moreover, despite hierarchy being excluded from the 
second-best model, it appears in many of the best-fitting models, giving it a 
relatively high importance score. Famine has the lowest importance score, as it 
















Figure 5-1: Boxplots (mean, se) showing the predicted probabilities of 









Table 5-4: Model comparison for different combinations of predictor variables 
AIC Effect size 
(Nagelkerke) 
Enforcement Gossip Levels of hierarchy Market Fixity Famine Latitude Akaike 
















66.06 0.64 4.37 3.57 0.83 1.83 5.58 1.46 0.10 1.89 - - 1.05 0.35 
67.61 0.62 4.79 6.89* 0.78 - - 1.35 0.09 2.21 1.12 0.92 1.05 0.16 
68.33 0.64 4.19 3.22 - 1.97 7.96 1.30 0.12 1.69 1.46 0.97 1.04 0.11 
68.35 0.64 4.05 3.63 0.86 1.82 5.65 - 0.13 1.86 1.43 0.94 1.05 0.11 
69.47 0.45 3.76 6.69* - 3.90* 4.04 - - - - - - 0.06 
69.72 0.59 - - 0.82 3.29 12.22 1.81 0.23 2.17 1.66 0.79 1.05 0.06 
70.19 0.64 3.82 3.16 0.85 1.86 5.79 1.39 0.14 1.87 1.41 0.97 1.05 0.05 
70.30 0.37 5.67* 13.99*** - - - - - - - - - 0.04 
72.09 0.38 5.25* 12.06*** - - - 1.37 - - - - - 0.02 
72.29 0.37 5.58* 13.41*** 1.06 - - - - - - - - 0.02 
72.52 0.34 - - - 6.38** 17.31** - - - - - - 0.01 
74.39 0.53 2.16 3.12 0.98 4.69* 6.05 1.51 - - 2.03 0.89 1.03 0.01 
76.69 0.85 3.92 2.63 0.96 1.82 8.48 1.57 0.08 INT 0.95 INT 0.36 INT 1.94 INT 1.05 0.002 
79.65 0.17 - - - - - - - - - - 1.03 <0.001 
80.01 0.21 - - - - - - 0.87 4.86* - - - <0.001 
82.23 0.20 - - - - - - - - 2.25 1.36 1.03 <0.001 
82.36 0.24 - - - - - - 0.94 4.59* 2.39 1.76 - <0.001 
84.75 0.07 - - - - - 2.57 - - - - - <0.001 
87.57 0.06 - - - - - - - - 2.71 2.07 - <0.001 
88.15 0.06 - - 1.01 - - - - - - - - <0.001 
Akaike importance 0.89 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.83 0.49 0.83  
Cells contain odds ratios. INT=interaction between fixity and famine included in model. Reference category for market variable: local-regional. Coefficients represent 
standardised coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
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The effect size estimates suggest that the best-fitting model explains 
over 60% of the variation in money use. This suggests that my findings are not 
simply an artefact of comparing a set of models that were not well-justified given 
existing theory and therefore generally poorly-fitting in absolute terms. 
The findings from the model comparison are reiterated by the predicted 
probabilities from a full model. These measure the probability a society that has 
a certain type of one variable, such as restricted means of enforcing decisions 
or two levels of hierarchy, uses money after controlling for all the other 
variables. Table 5-5 shows that societies with third-party enforcement or several 
levels of hierarchy are the most likely to use money, while societies that are 
nomadic or have undeveloped markets are among the least likely.  
 
Table 5-5: Predicted probabilities for money use calculated from results of the 
full GLM 
Variable Levels Probability of money use 
Enforcement None 0.45 
Restricted 0.76 
All 0.72 




4 (high) 0.37 
Hierarchy Zero 0.45 
One-two 0.60 
≥Three 0.83 
Market  None to regional 0.37 
Supra-regional 0.45 
Fixity Nomadic 0.31 
Semi-nomadic 0.06 
Permanent 0.45 




Predicted probabilities for a given variable are calculated with all other variables 




My analysis is the first attempt to generate and test hypotheses that 
investigate the logic of the debt theory of money. A cultural evolutionary 
framework views token use as a cooperative dilemma that requires conditions 
similar to the conditions that are required for large-scale cooperation. I show 
that societies that have effective third-party enforcement mechanisms and 
systems of taxation are the most likely to use token money.  Market 
engagement, gossip and fixity are less important predictors of token money use, 
and famine does not strongly predict token money use.   
My findings are consistent with the idea that the debt theory of money 
hinges on a cooperative dilemma. Valueless tokens can be issued in exchange 
for goods at no personal cost if the issuer has no intention to repay their debts. 
Because of this, social systems that make it costly to issue tokens without 
intending to repay the debt they signify are needed to support the emergence of 
token money. Enforcement achieves this by enabling the imposition of costs on 
individuals who default on their debts. Therefore, societies able to dedicate 
more resources to maintaining third-party bodies that impose sanctions can 
provide the conditions needed for token money to emerge. Importantly, my 
multivariate approach allows me to disentangle the role of enforcement from 
factors such as political hierarchy, giving me confidence that it is specifically 
enforcement and its function in cooperative dilemmas that predicts token money 
use.  
An additional component of my findings regarding enforcement is that 
there is no difference in token money use between societies that have third 
party enforcement of a restricted number of decisions in society, or enforcement 
of all decisions in society. A potential explanation for this could be that the 
decisions that are enforced by societies that can only enforce a restricted 
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number of decisions relate to debt and resource distribution, as these are 
important components of societal development. In this case, the categories 
restricted and all are equivalent with respect to how they support token money.  
My findings also support the idea that systems of taxation aid money 
use. Taxation supports the emergence of token money by giving the tokens 
intrinsic value (Bell, 2001). This makes it costly to give them away, which 
removes incentives to issue them infinitely. Taxation co-occurs with hierarchical 
political organisation as consolidating resources is necessary to support 
centralised governance. As the levels of hierarchy increase from local bands to 
chiefdoms to states, the need for taxation increases. This is consistent with my 
finding that states and chiefdoms are far more likely to have token money than 
societies that are not hierarchically organised. It should be noted that my use of 
hierarchy as a proxy for taxation in the absence of a well-defined measure of 
taxation could potentially introduce some noise into my interpretation. Hierarchy 
correlates with many societal developments, such as increased population size 
and greater investment in infrastructure (Turchin et al, 2018). These may 
independently play roles in supporting the use of money. However it should be 
noted that due to my multivariate approach, I can be confident that this noise is 
not confounding my interpretation of the role of other variables such as 
enforcement. A more explicit measure of taxation that has a comparable sample 
size to other variables in the SCCS would enable future research to make 
clearer conclusions about the role of taxation in the emergence of token money. 
 While gossip does not correlate with token money use in univariate 
analyses, it does contribute to model fit. But in these models, low levels of 
gossip predicted token money use. This finding contrasted with my hypothesis 
that gossip is a mechanism that supports token money systems and was 
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surprising given the evolutionary research illustrating the key role of reputation 
in maintaining cooperation (Dunbar, 2004; Enquist & Leimar, 1993; Sommerfeld 
et al, 2008). This negative correlation could reflect difficulties in quantifying and 
measuring gossip. The gossip variable was a composite score of the extent of 
gossip that occurs about a variety of subjects in the absence of a specific 
measure of gossip about people’s tendencies to repay their debts. Therefore, its 
relationship with cooperation is not clear. Furthermore, while the variable itself 
showed variation in the level of gossip, this variation may be overstated as 
societies that do not use gossip to track social standing at all are likely to be 
very rare. Consequently, the gossip variable may not be capturing the use of 
gossip to track reputation that is theoretically important for money use.  
However, this does not explain the observation of apparently systematic 
decreases in the probability of money use as gossip increases in more complex 
models. An alternative explanation for this negative correlation is that the 
societies that use token money tend to be hierarchical, sedentary and governed 
by third-party institutions, which suggests that they no longer need gossip to 
maintain cooperation. Several studies have illustrated the negative correlation 
between reciprocity- or reputation-based mechanisms for maintaining 
cooperation and formal institutional means of doing so, because the latter 
makes the former obsolete (Hruschka & Henrich, 2013a; Hruschka et al, 2014). 
In other words, decreases in gossip may be proxying for changes in an 
underlying, unmeasured variable relating to the scale of cooperation that 
correlates with money use.   
I find that societies with greater levels of market engagement are 
marginally more likely to use token money. This is consistent with traditional 
theory on money use, which claims that market exchange is the central 
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dilemma that money solves. This could be because larger markets enable 
individuals to take part in exchanges with a greater number of people. As this 
number increases, it becomes harder to exchange goods for goods, as the 
diversity in peoples’ preferences and possessions increases. When debt can be 
mobilised as payment using tokens, variation in preferences and possessions 
becomes relatively unimportant. However, given the correlative nature of my 
analysis, caution must be exercised regarding reverse causality in this 
relationship. An alternative explanation may be that the role money plays in 
increasing the efficiency of exchange facilitates the emergence of market 
activity. Although my analysis does not permit me to make firm conclusions 
about this direction, there is considerable evidence of market activity preceding 
the emergence of money (examples of which I introduced earlier), and most 
theory on the evolution of money considers money to be a mechanism that 
increases the efficiency of existing exchanges (Earle, 2002; Kiyotaki & Wright, 
1989; Smith, 1776/1976). 
I also find that permanently settled societies are more likely to use token 
money than nomadic societies. This is consistent with the idea that permanent 
settlement supports economic specialisation and exchange. However, I find that 
nomadic societies still have a relatively high probability of using token money, 
suggesting that the alternative idea that adopting money is particularly 
beneficial for nomadic societies that cannot easily transport stocks of tradeable 
goods may also play a role for these societies. It should be noted that I find that 
semi-nomadic societies have a very low probability of using money relative to 
both nomadic and permanent societies. It is unclear why this intermediary stage 
of sedentism should predict such a large change in money use, which suggests 
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that this finding is the result of my limited sample size and the distribution of the 
data across the levels of the sedentism variable.  
Famine has no real effect on the probability of token money use. 
Societies with low or high famine have equal probabilities of having token 
money. This could be indicative of a number of possibilities. Potentially, food 
stress does not predict increases in exchange, and therefore does not drive the 
adoption of money. This is consistent with the idea that food stress encourages 
territorial defence rather than expansion of one’s social network, and also 
follows a growing line of research showing that ecological factors are less 
important for economic behaviour than social factors like institutions and norms 
(Rodrik et al, 2004). On the other hand, it may be that food stress does predict 
increases in exchange, but only exchange of goods for other goods instead of 
exchanges that involve money. However it should be noted that there is limited 
evidence for the existence of any economy outside of modern prisons that is 
based on such direct exchange (Humphrey, 1985). Perhaps the most likely 
explanation is that responses to famine are highly variable between societies. 
Some societies become inactive and insular while others call in debts and 
expand their activity to secure provisions from any source (Dirks, 1980). In the 
context of there being no consistent effect of famine on economic or social 
behaviour, it follows that it would have no consistent effect on token money use. 
The primary limitations of my analyses relate to the data. In the SCCS 
there is much variation in the number of observations informing different 
variables. Consequently there is a trade-off between including many relevant 
variables to ensure that different hypotheses are separable and testable, and 
the size of the sample. The relatively small sample size means that my results 
could be affected by sampling error. However, I found strong effects, including 
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very high probabilities of money use across the sample when third-party 
enforcement institutions exist, which suggests that I can be confident in my 
findings. This confidence is strengthened by the fact that the SCCS is designed 
to contain unrelated and statistically independent societies from disparate 
locations around the world. That I found such strong effects across such a 
diverse sample suggests that my findings are representative. 
Another potential issue is my categorisation of money. In the SCCS, 
variation in a society’s money system is divided into several categories covering 
no money use, use of indigenous moneys and use of foreign moneys. I 
collapsed this variable into a binary between having no money and having 
money for statistical tractability given the number of categorical variables in my 
analysis. While most of the money used in these societies is token money, I 
nevertheless lose detail about the kinds of money systems that are used that 
may have affected my interpretation. For instance, societies that use foreign 
money may not be able to tell us about how money emerges endogenously in 
the same way that societies that use their own money can. However, 
supplementary analyses showed that categorising the money variable in 
different ways that accounted for the distinction between foreign and indigenous 
money made no difference to my findings (see Appendix 3-2). This suggests 
that my findings are not driven by the way I have categorised my data.   
 A broader limitation is that all of the variables were taken from 
ethnographic atlases and therefore are relatively subjective in how they were 
initially measured. This makes it difficult to test specific theoretical ideas. For 
example, the third-party enforcement variable distinguished societies that can 
enforce a restricted number of decisions or all decisions. What is captured in 
the restricted number is impossible to glean, which denies me access to specific 
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factors that may be of key importance for the emergence of money. Similarly, 
the market variable is concerned with the existence and geographical reach of 
market places that are used for exchange, which leaves out many details such 
as how many people engage in these exchanges, who they are and what kinds 
of things they exchange. With respect to my study, this makes my conclusions 
less specific and clearly defined compared to studies that use variables 
measured using standardised and reliable techniques. Adopting a more 
quantitative and comparative focus in future field studies may alleviate these 
limitations (Borgerhoff Mulder et al, 1985). Another potential solution may be to 
re-code the original data sources considering new theoretical ideas, but this 
does not resolve the fact that the original researchers collected their data with 
particular theoretical concerns in mind.  
 In summary, in the first explicit test of the debt theory of money, I find 
greater support for the debt theory compared to traditional commodity money 
theories. Institutional economics has so far focused primarily on modern day 
economies, overlooking the importance of cooperation during earlier stages, 
such as the adoption of token money. I show that in the same way that 
institutions support modern economies by enabling large-scale cooperation, 
institutions allow token money to be adopted by preventing individuals from 
defaulting on their debts. Institutions are therefore central to economic 
development from the inception of economies in small-scale societies to 
modern, globalised economies. In line with cultural evolutionary ideas about 
trees of cultural traits representing how different societies respond to different 
conditions, the importance of institutions for token money use suggests that the 
adoption of money is not an inevitable optimisation, but instead a potential 
adaptation to specific conditions. 
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Chapter 6: An experimental test of the tokens-as-debt theory 
for the evolution of money 
 
Abstract 
How money systems work and why societies use money are long-
standing questions in economic history. Evidence has been growing in support 
of recent ideas that money originated as tokens of debt, not intrinsically-
valuable tokens as traditionally thought. However, what is not yet clear is how 
these token-based money systems are sustained, given that parties could issue 
tokens to acquire goods then default on their debts to avoid paying any costs. 
The cultural evolutionary literature shows that reciprocity-based social 
sanctioning may be one mechanism that prevents this kind of non-cooperation. 
Here I conduct an experiment in which participants engage in a real-time 
multiplayer game based on exchanging real payoffs for valueless tokens, to 
examine how reciprocity may be used to sustain token money systems. I vary 
the amount of information participants have access to about parties with whom 
they are interacting, such as means of identification and details of past 
defaulting, to create conditions where reciprocity is more or less possible. I find 
that token money is used more successfully when parties can track who they 
are interacting with in a given exchange compared to when they are 
anonymous. Attempts (including failed attempts) to use token money in 
exchanges did not vary between the conditions, suggesting that people are 
more discerning about engaging in exchanges involving token money when 
they can track people’s past behaviours. This finding shows that social 
strategies shown in the cultural evolutionary literature to sustain cooperation in 
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general likely contribute to the emergence, maintenance and spread of money 


























Many societies use tokens that lack intrinsic value as money instead of 
commodities that have some utility. As we saw in the last chapter (and the 
introduction), it has recently been argued that tokens can signal debt and thus 
allow exchanges to take place when one party does not possess a good the 
other wants. While the tokens-as-debt hypothesis is consistent with some 
archaeological and anthropological evidence, the logic of this theory has not yet 
been scrutinised. An evolutionary perspective on this issue suggests that to 
keep tokens of debt meaningful, a system is required that prevents individuals 
from paying for goods using debts that they do not intend to repay. In other 
words, signals should be honest (Zahavi, 1977; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1999). 
Furthermore, monetary exchange can be viewed as a cooperative behaviour, 
and needs to occur between multiple non-related individuals. Indirect reciprocity 
is a potential mechanism by which such cooperative interactions could occur, 
with individuals needing to acquire and maintain reputation as a reliable 
cooperator who does not default on their debts in order to gain the long-term 
benefits of exchange (Roberts, 2008; Nowak, 2006). Although in chapter five I 
found that variables related to indirect reciprocity like gossip were not important 
in explaining money use, the role of indirect reciprocity is still unclear for two 
reasons. Firstly, the gossip variable in chapter 5 was not very well defined and 
therefore difficult to interpret. Secondly, the findings of chapter five do not rule 
out the idea that a reciprocity-based system may have provided the initial 
conditions for the emergence of money, after which other mechanisms such as 
institutions may have taken over to continue enabling cooperation. Here I adapt 
an experimental protocol that has previously been used to examine the use of 
tokens in a cooperative game. I extend this approach by adding different levels 
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Evolutionary theory argues that signals—such as tokens as signals of 
debt—need to be honest to be meaningful (Zahavi, 1977). Using the potential 
for future payment as immediate payment introduces risks of default. If an 
individual can receive the goods they desire by issuing a valueless token of 
debt, they can receive all the benefits without paying any cost if they do not 
repay the debt that the token signifies. This incentivises individuals to issue 
tokens with no intention of repaying the debt they signify, which limits the ability 
of tokens to reliably signal that a debt exists. This makes the use of tokens of 
debt a cooperative dilemma. Explaining why they are used requires us to 
explain why individuals choose to cooperate by not defaulting on their debts. 
Cooperation is one of the largest topics in the evolutionary literature. One 
well-studied explanation for cooperation is reciprocity, which can be direct or 
indirect (Nowak, 2006). Direct reciprocity is the formation of tit-for-tat 
relationships between two individuals. As long as individuals can keep track of 
who they are interacting with, they can exclude those who do not cooperate and 
cooperate with those who do (Rand et al, 2009). Indirect reciprocity is the 
channelling of cooperation towards those who have reputations for cooperating 
with others. This provides incentives for individuals to create and maintain 
reputations for cooperating (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). An important component 
of indirect reciprocity is that it requires individuals to be able to keep track of 
who they are interacting with, the past behaviours of these parties towards 
oneself, and their reputations (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). 
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Debts are a form of cooperative behaviour, and there is evidence that 
they are created and maintained using direct and indirect reciprocity (Ingham, 
1996). In many different societies, credit is mostly confined to specific networks 
of individuals (Fafchamps, 2000; Pospisil, 1958; Sahlins, 1974). These 
networks are typically comprised of people who are motivated to cooperate 
because they are kin or have existing reciprocal relationships exclusion from 
which would mean losing access to resources that may be necessary for 
survival (Sahlins, 1974). For example, a case study of Javanese and Rejang 
traders illustrates how extending credit to customers of one’s own ethnic 
affiliation can ensure repayment as the customers’ investments in maintaining 
good relations with their community motivates them to avoid defaulting on their 
debts (Znoj, 1998). Similarly, the extension of credit can be conditional upon 
sharing religions, as this ensures that defaulting is damaging to one’s standing 
in the religious community in which one is invested (Ensminger, 1997; Hopkins, 
1973). Historical study of early (Medieval-Renaissance) European governments 
suggests that individuals and institutions are reluctant to accept government-
issued money if the government has developed a reputation for defaulting on its 
debts, as this suggests that debts it issues will not be repaid (Wray, 2012). In 
another historical example, during the Peninsular war, Wellington was able to 
purchase supplies and secure local needs by paying with Bank of England 
notes that were readily accepted by the Spanish due to the bank’s 
creditworthiness. Napoleon, by contrast, had to pay in gold because Spanish 
merchants distrusted French currency (Wheatley, 2013). Study in Southern 
Africa populations further illustrates the functional similarities of debt systems 
across different societies. The Southern Tswana calculate all transactions in 
terms of cattle instead of coinage. This is because cattle are owned by specific 
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individuals who guarantee their value (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1990). Such a 
guarantee offers recourse for the parties in the exchange, as if the intrinsic 
value of the cattle is compromised, the issuer faces damage to their reputation 
unless they ensure that the debt is repaid. Coinage, by contrast, has no such 
ownership in these societies and no guarantee of value. Using them as money 
therefore introduces the risk of another party issuing money but never repaying 
the debt. 
The ability to spread information about debtors and creditors determines 
the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity and therefore likely plays a role in the 
emergence and stabilisation of tokens of debt. In small-scale societies debts are 
often preserved using gossip or more formal means of disseminating knowledge 
about defaults and payments. For example, elders may be responsible for 
maintaining and disseminating oral records of who issued what tokens to whom 
(Kocherlakota, 1998). Tokens themselves may also contain details of the 
issuers, which can be used to make information about outstanding debts public 
(Yudin & Pavlyutkin, 2015). This makes defaulting costly for one’s reputation. 
These reputation-based systems also exist in more developed economies. The 
cobrador del frac is a traditional means of collecting debts in Spain, using 
extravagantly-dressed individuals whose conspicuous presence damages the 
debtor’s reputation. Anecdotal reports suggest that this service has grown in 
popularity as the Spanish economy has slowed and unpaid debts have 
increased (Bloomberg, 2018; The Independent, 2008).  
 
The cultural evolution of tokens: an experimental approach 
 Previously, Camera et al (2013) developed an experiment that examined 
how individuals use intrinsically valueless tokens in exchanges. They found that 
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the introduction of tokens into an otherwise typical cooperation game increases 
the level of altruism that can be sustained across groups of different sizes, 
despite there being no obligation to use the tokens and no intrinsic benefit to 
possessing tokens (Camera et al, 2013). This finding indicated that when 
individuals developed trust in the idea that others will reciprocate help in 
exchange for a token, the token could be used as money. In other words, 
tokens acquire the value needed to be used as money if they have a real or 
perceived guarantee of being able to secure repayment (Read, 1959).  
One limitation of Camera et al’s (2013) approach is that it is unclear why 
individuals developed trust in these tokens. Importantly, the tokens could not 
have been reliable signals of debt. This is because participants were 
anonymous and there was no way for participants to tell who issued a token. 
Therefore, they could not use information about who issued a token to decide 
whether returning the token to the player who issued it was likely to result in 
repayment, which is central to the debt theory of money. When there is no 
obligation to accept or use a token, individuals can give their own tokens value 
by repaying their debt by cooperating with those who possess a token that they 
issued. Doing this encourages others to accept their tokens, because they can 
return them in exchange for real payoffs when they meet them again. Therefore, 
knowledge about a person’s past behaviours towards oneself and others is 
likely to influence expectations about whether a token they issue signifies a debt 
that will be repaid. Furthermore, it may be that it takes time for participants to 
realise that tokens can be issued in return for personal gain but do not place the 
issuer under any obligation to repay, introducing the question of how stable 
token use is over time. A related issue is also that tokens may have an effect in 
Camera et al’s (2010) game because the participants live in a money-based 
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society and thus already have an expectation that monetary tokens store value, 
even if this is explicitly denied in the context of the experiment. 
As of yet unknown is whether and to what extent social mechanisms 
known to maintain cooperation can shape token money use. Answering this 
question would inform how money systems emerge and provide evidence for 
the debt theory of money. I explore how direct and indirect reciprocity influences 
the likelihood of a money system emerging and spreading by testing if changing 
the information individuals can access about others influences how tokens are 
used. I predict that allowing participants to know who they are interacting with 
will enable them to gauge the value of tokens they receive from others and 
increase the use of tokens in cooperative exchanges. Furthermore, giving 
participants access to information about how every player acts in every round 
should give an even greater incentive to cooperate. More importantly, this 
should also provide more information about the value of tokens issued by 
certain participants, incentivising repayment to those to whom one has issued a 
token and therefore making the use of tokens beneficial. Therefore, cooperation 
and token use should be lowest when individuals do not know who they are 
interacting with, and should increase when individuals can keep track of who 
they are interacting with and how these other parties have behaved towards 
them and others in previous interactions. Predictions regarding any interaction 
between social information and the ability to use tokens are less clear. On the 
one hand, as token use is itself a cooperative dilemma, it should be affected by 
social information in the same way that a cooperative dilemma that does not 
involve tokens would be, which suggests no interaction. On the other hand, if 
tokens depend on social information, the introduction of tokens should 
differentially affect cooperation between social information conditions. 
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Consequently, my prediction regarding an interaction is two-tailed. I also predict 
that a participants’ cooperation will positively predict the extent to which their 
tokens circulate in the population.  
 
Methods 
 I conducted a laboratory based experiment investigating the role of social 
information in the emergence of money systems that use valueless tokens. The 
experiment replicates a previous study by Camera et al (2013) which tested 
cooperation in exchanges involving token money and real payoffs. I 
implemented changes to this original protocol that were designed to elicit 
whether different levels of social information about other players influenced the 
emergence of token money, and whether the ability to use tokens affects 
cooperation regardless of social information.  
 
Participants 
 I sampled 92 student participants from the University of Exeter Cornwall 
campus (40 female, 52 male; mean age=22.87 (SD=5.16)). 73 of the 
participants reported having no experience with cooperation games, 13 had 
played a cooperation game before, and 6 reported that they had experience of 
more than one cooperation game. They were randomly sampled using online 
advertisements circulated in departmental communications and on social 
media, as well as physical advertisements distributed around campus. 
Participants took part in the experiment in groups of 4. This group size was 
chosen because in Camera et al’s (2010) previous experiment, groups of 4 
were shown not to differ in their levels of cooperation when they had tokens and 
when they did not. Therefore, my findings should not be driven by group size. 
150 
 
Each participant was randomly allocated to a group with three other players, 
and only played the game once, within this group. This random allocation 
minimised the potential for variation between the experimental groups in the 
extent to which their members were familiar with each other and each other’s 
behaviour, as it was possible that, if not randomised, groups could have been 
comprised of individuals who knew one another which may have affected their 
behaviour. The experiment was double-blind, as each group was randomly 
allocated to be one of the six conditions and neither the experimenter nor the 
participants were aware of to which condition any given participant had been 
allocated (Table 6-1 shows the numbers of participants in each condition). 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were arranged in specific seating plans so that they could 
not see one another at their computers. Specifically, participants were arranged 
in corners of the same room, facing away from one another. Participants were 
first given an introductory presentation on the rules of the game, how to interact 
with the computers and ethical information (see Appendices 4-1 to 4-4 for 
materials). They then completed consent and participant information forms. 
During the experiment, participants were not allowed to communicate and 
chose their responses by selecting radio buttons that presented the options 
available to them each round on the computers. As the experiment was 
structured into rounds and multiple players were playing together in real time, 
participants often had short (10-15 second) periods of time between rounds 
while they waited for the participant they would play with next to finish their 
previous round. During these periods, the experimenter ensured that the 
participants did not communicate. After the participants completed the 
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experiment, their final score was presented to them on their own computer 
screen. Participants were debriefed and given forms to record qualitative 
feedback about their strategies and thoughts. Participants were then paid 
relative to their final score. It was ensured that the minimum possible winnings 
were not less than the amount specified in the University of Exeter’s participant 
payment guidelines as appropriate compensation for participants’ time. Each 
trial lasted approximately 20 minutes. However, there was some variation in the 
time each trial lasted as the game was multiplayer, which meant that the 
slowest participant dictated the speed of the game as other participants waited 











This screen is from the token and full social information condition, showing the 
payoff matrix, the tally of different tokens from different other players, the 
options available and the two tables, the first showing everyone else’s 
behaviours every round and the second recording the player’s choice, partner 




Figure 6-1: Screenshot of the interface participants used in the experiment 
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 My experiment involves a computer-based cooperative game that 
partially replicated Camera et al (2013). Their original game was comprised of 
repeated exchanges in which participants must decide whether to help a 
participant with whom they are randomly matched. Helping a participant 
increases the recipient’s real monetary payoff while reducing the helper’s (see 
Figure 6-2 for the payoff matrix used in the experiment). Participants were 
randomly allocated to be either a “consumer” or a “producer”, and were 
randomly matched with another participant who was allocated to be the other 
role. In the control condition, producers could choose whether to help the 
participant with whom they have been matched or not, while consumers could 
not make any decision. This simple choice of whether to help the other party or 
not was the extent of what the participants could do in the control condition. 
This presents a cooperative dilemma, because if everyone helps at every 
opportunity, payoffs for each individual (and the group as a whole) are 
maximised. This is because the payoff to the recipient of help is considerably 
larger than the payoff available to those who do not receive help. However, for a 
given producer in a given interaction, not helping is the most personally 
beneficial option. In the token condition, consumers were given the ability to 
give a token. This gave them the following options every round: do not give a 
token, unconditionally give a token, or only give a token if their partner gives 
help. Producers were also given an extra option, which was to only give help if 
their partner gives a token. Therefore, there was a distinction between 
unconditionally helping (giving help) and only helping if a token was offered 
(selling help). Tokens do not intrinsically add to the participants’ winnings, and 
participants are under no obligation to use tokens. I did not change these 














The values below the figures represent the payoffs each party received from 
each outcome. Each point was worth £0.02 in real money paid after the 
experiment. The shaded cells represent the possible choices in the control 
conditions. In the token conditions, every cell was possible.  
 
 I add three manipulations to the game. First, I give participants different 
amounts of social information. Second, I compare the effects of social 
information when tokens are able to be used and when they are not, to check 
whether any increases in cooperation are simply the result of the ability to use 
tokens. Third, I make tokens ‘signed’ by individuals, so participants know who 
issued the tokens they have and can use anyone’s tokens in exchanges with 
other parties. For example, if a player plays with participant A and this 
participant gives them a token, they will receive a token identifiable as being 
issued by participant A. They can then choose to give this token in subsequent 
exchanges with participant A or any other participant. 
These manipulations created a 2x3 between-participants factorial design. 
I had two between-participants independent variables: social information and 
token availability. The levels of the social information variables were: 1) no 
Figure 6-2: Payoff matrix used in the experiment 
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social information, in which participants did not know who they were playing 
with in any round; 2) partner social information, in which participants can only 
see the ID of the participant they are currently playing with in any round; and 3) 
all social information, in which participants can see every participant’s choice in 
every round, even if they were not playing with the participant themselves. The 
levels of the token availability variable were: tokens were available to use in the 
game and tokens were not available to use in the game. This created six 
conditions (Table 6-1). In three conditions, tokens were not included and the 
conditions varied in the extent of the social information provided. In the other 
three conditions, tokens were included and the social information was varied in 
the same way.  
Following Camera et al (2010), in which participants played an average 
of 17 rounds, the game consisted of 20 rounds, meaning that participants were 
matched randomly 20 different times, and made 20 decisions. This allowed the 
experiment to be relatively short in total length even with matching delays 
(discussed later). Importantly, considerations of reputation become substantially 
weakened if one knows that they are playing in the final round after which they 
will not play again (Selten & Stoecker, 1986), so participants were informed only 
of an approximate number of rounds that they would be playing. 
I collected demographic information for each participant (age, sex and 
prior experience of cooperative games) for the purpose of controlling for 
potentially important confounding variables in the analysis. I collected this 
information after the experiment using a short questionnaire. Another 
questionnaire given after the experiment also gave participants the opportunity 





Table 6-1: Combinations of social information and tokens variables that create 
6 conditions 















      
None X   X   
ID of 
partner 
 X   X  
Everyone’s 
behaviour 
  X   X 
Tokens       
Absent X X X    
Present    X X X 
 
Materials 
 The game was coded using oTree (Chen et al, 2016), which is an 
experimental software platform that enables the user to code custom 
experiments in Python and to set up servers for real-time multiplayer gameplay 
(see Appendix 4-5 for images of the screens participants saw in each 
condition). University networked computers were used for the experiment as 
they could all connect to the same local oTree server, allowing participants 
using different computers to play together simultaneously as long as they were 
connected to the university network. 
 
Ethics statement 
 This experiment received ethical approval from the University of Exeter 
ethics committee, and was funded by a student grant from the European 
Human Behaviour and Evolution Association. Participants gave informed 
consent before they took part in the experiment and were fully briefed and 
debriefed. All data were fully anonymised and participants did not provide any 
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identifying information alongside their response data. Responses were kept 
strictly confidential with all data being stored on secure university databases. No 




 I first conduct a between-participants factorial ANOVA to detect any main 
effects and interactions involving the token and social information conditions in 
the absence of other influences. This is to examine whether there is any raw 
relationship between the conditions and cooperation before I introduce other 
predictor variables. I then conduct comparison of generalised linear models 
incorporating demographic control variables and multilevel adjustment for 
potential between-session differences in performance. This is followed by 
further model comparison examining how an individual’s cooperation influences 
the extent to which tokens they issue go on to circulate in the population. This 
was achieved by including the frequency of cooperation by a given player and 
the number of times a token they issued was successfully transferred between 
any two parties in the population. Finally, the stability of cooperation across the 
rounds of the experiment in the different conditions was compared by including 
rounds as an interaction term in our multivariate models. 
 
Results and discussion 
Figure 6-3 illustrates that the inclusion of tokens shifts the distribution of 
cooperation, increasing the proportion of cooperative rounds. Social information 
does not seem to influence the distribution of cooperation to such a degree, 
although it appears to enable participants to reach 100% cooperation. Although 
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the token and social information conditions produce systematic patterns, it is 
important to note the level of variability in cooperation across the conditions. In 
every condition, scores range from 0% cooperation to over 80%. Analysis of the 
control variables showed that age, sex and prior experience have no significant 
influence on cooperation, and do not interact with the social information or token 














The initial factorial ANOVA (see Appendix 4-6 for homogeneity of 
variance and normality tests and Appendix 4-7 for confirmatory non-parametric 
tests) was significant overall (F(5,86)=2.85, p=0.02) and revealed that 
significantly more cooperative interactions occurred in the token condition 
(producers cooperated 59% of the time across all of the rounds) than the non-
token condition (44%) (F(1)=5.62, p=0.02). It also showed that social 
information had a significant effect on cooperation (F(2)=4.27, p=0.02). 
Figure 6-3: Violin plot showing the proportion of cooperation across the experiment 
for each participant in each condition 
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Specifically, giving participants information about who they are playing with 
increases cooperation (producers cooperated 59% of the time) relative to when 
players are anonymous (41%) (Tukey’s p=0.04). Giving participants information 
about what everyone is doing every round also increases cooperation 
(producers cooperated 60% of the time) relative to when players are 
anonymous (41%) (Tukey’s p=0.03). However, giving participants information 
about what everyone is doing each round does not increase cooperation 
(producers cooperated 59% of the time) relative to just providing participants 
with information about who they are currently playing with (producers 
cooperated 59% of the time) (Tukey’s p=0.99). I also found that there was no 
interaction between tokens and social information (F(2)=0.05, p=0.95), meaning 
that social information did not affect the level of cooperation differently in the 
token and non-token conditions. This supports the idea that token use is a 
cooperative dilemma that is affected by social information in the same way as 
any other cooperative dilemma.  
I conduct a model comparison to supplement the significance tests 
(Table 6-2). This first compared whether cooperation scores were more similar 
within groups than between groups regardless of the conditions to ensure that 
extraneous patterns of variation were not driving the results. I found little 
evidence of clustering as the ICCs reduce to 0 with the inclusion of the condition 
variables, and so I report a model comparison using only fixed effects. The 
comparison shows that the inclusion of both tokens and social information is 
important, as removing either one of these reduces model fit. The best-fitting 
model included tokens and social information, and the second-best model 
(although within 2 AIC of the best-fitting model) also included tokens and social 
information with the addition of the demographic control variables. The removal 
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of control variables marginally improves rather than damages model fit, which 
gives a simple best-fitting model with only tokens and social information 
included.  
Table 6-2: Model comparison examining predictors of cooperation 
 Random effect test Fixed effects comparison 





































































































Everything - 0.19** - 0.19** 0.19** - 0.19** - 0.19** 





















































- 0.08 0.07 - 0.08 0.07 - - - 
Random effect          
Group 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.00 - - - - - 
AIC 45.82 39.54 47.61 38.67 37.54 47.32 36.67 41.53 40.49 
 
Numbers in cells represent standardised coefficients apart from those for the 
random effect which represent ICCs. p<0.05*, p<0.01** 
 
I conducted further analyses to gain more insights into the drivers of the 
difference in cooperation in the token conditions (N=60). It may be the case that 
the increase in cooperation associated with the inclusion of social information in 
the token conditions is due to increases in unconditional help-giving as opposed 
to successful exchanges that depend on the use of tokens. Two separate one-
way ANOVAs showed that individual’s attempts to use tokens (successful or 
unsuccessful) (F(2)=0.14, p=0.87) and the frequency of unconditional help-
giving (F(2)=0.67, p=0.52) did not vary between the social information 
conditions. Figure 6-4 illustrates how social information had no effect on 
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attempted token use and help giving, although removing anonymity did cause a 
small number of participants to give unconditionally many times. The results 
shown in Figures 6-3 and 6-4 together show that there is no difference in 
attempts to use tokens between social information conditions, but an increase in 
the frequency of successful cooperation when social information is available. 
This increase is not explained by any changes in unconditional giving, which 
does not vary between conditions. Therefore, while people do try to use tokens 
when they are anonymous, they are rarely able to be used as a means of 




















Panel A presents the frequencies of attempted token use across the social 
information conditions; panel B presents the frequencies of unconditional help 
giving. 
 
I also examined whether tokens issued by individuals who show high 
levels of cooperation circulate in the population to a greater extent than tokens 
issued by individuals who do not cooperate as much. Contrary to my 
expectations, I found that there was no correlation (r=0.16, p=0.34). A high level 
of cooperation by a given player is not associated with an increase in the extent 
to which tokens they issued are used in exchanges in the population. For 
example, Figure 6-5 illustrates that in one instance, the tokens of a one 
participant circulated in numerous exchanges in the population despite this 














 Finally, I evaluated how the conditions influenced the stability of 
cooperation across the rounds of the experiment. Figure 6-6 shows that when 
Figure 6-5: Effect of players’ levels of cooperation on the amount of times their 
token circulated among the players 
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no social information was available, cooperation generally decreased across 
rounds whether the participants were able to use tokens or not. Although 
cooperation fluctuates across the rounds, there is a relatively consistent pattern 
in which the peaks of cooperation reduce in size. The introduction of social 
information ameliorates this decrease to an extent. When participants had 
access to knowledge about whom they were playing with or the behaviours of 
everyone in every round, cooperation was more stable across rounds. This is 
emphasised when the non-token and token conditions are collapsed together, 
as cooperation falls when there is no social information but stays relatively 
constant when there is. However, model comparison showed that model fit is 
weakened by the inclusion of an interaction term that captures whether the 
conditions have any effect on the change of cooperation over rounds (Table 6-
3). Therefore, the differences between the conditions indicated by Figure 6-6 
are too slight for me to conclude that social information or token use have an 
effect on the stability of cooperation over time.  
 More generally, in the absence of a mechanism such as institutions, 
declining contributions over time are expected in most cooperative games 
because of slight self-serving biases resulting in self-serving responses by 
others, which causes cooperation to deteriorate (Fischbacher et al, 2001). This 
is particularly true in anonymous interactions. The slight downward trend of 
cooperation in my anonymous condition is consistent with this. However, the 
downward trend in the other social information condition appears to be driven 
by particularly large peaks in cooperation in the opening rounds. This initial 
cooperativeness may be an expected aspect of indirect reciprocity, as the 
maintenance of cooperation using this mechanism depends on the 
establishment of a reputation for cooperating. Indeed, the levels of cooperation 
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in the opening rounds between the social information conditions map onto the 
visibility of reputation information, with no ability to establish a good reputation 
resulting in low cooperation in the opening rounds of the anonymous condition, 
the opportunity to establish a good reputation with one player resulting in higher 
cooperation in the condition providing information about the person one is 
playing with currently, and the opportunity to establish a good reputation with 
the whole population producing even higher cooperation in the condition where 
all choices are visible. This may provide some insights into the workings of 
indirect reciprocity, as it appears that knowledge that one’s actions are visible to 
others shapes propensities to cooperate and make oneself vulnerable to 
exploitation. While my study did not make any specific hypotheses regarding 
cooperation in the opening rounds of the game, these findings provide some 
guidance for future, more general experiments into cooperation, as digging 
down into the trade-off between how far a good reputation can reach (and 
therefore its benefits) and the costs of risking exploitation may offer insights into 













   
 
My analyses showed that access to social information allows people to 
form direct and indirect reciprocal relationships that enable valueless tokens of 
debt to be used as a medium of exchange. Introducing tokens into cooperative 
games and removing anonymity both increase the level of cooperation between 
individuals. Social information does not influence the extent to which individuals 
attempt to use tokens in exchanges, or the level of unconditional giving, but 












 Numbers in cells represent standardised coefficients. Coefficients represent 
standardised coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 
Qualitative themes 
 When participants had completed the experiment, they were given the 
opportunity to share what they thought was the best way to get the most points, 
how this strategy changed and any other detail they thought relevant. 71 out of 
Table 6-3: Model comparison of the effect of conditions on the stability of 
cooperation over rounds of the game 
 No interaction 
model 
Interaction model 
















Round -0.01 -0.01 
Tokens*Social information*Round    
No social informationPlayers: 




cooperation across rounds 
 0.002 
No tokensTokens: cooperation 
across rounds 
 0.004 
AIC -52.36 -44.95 
 
Figure 6-6: Stability of cooperation across the rounds in each condition 
165 
 
92 participants provided this feedback. 62 participants answered the question 
about the best way to get the most points, and 51 participants commented 
about their strategy. This feedback only ever referred to: being selfish, 
considering reputation and reciprocity, using tokens to protect against free-
riding, using non-payoff-sensitive strategies, token value or token stocks (see 
below and Appendix 4-9 for more detailed breakdown of numbers of people 
who gave these comments).  
 A large proportion of the participants (37%) stated that they considered 
people’s reputations as part of their strategy. Whether a participant decided to 
help another was highly contingent on their partner’s previous behaviour. This 
was phrased as creating a “bond” in some cases, and as related to punishment 
for the “greed” of other players in other cases. When participants were given 
information about what every participant did in every round, they expanded their 
strategy to indirect reciprocity, looking for patterns of behaviour in every other 
player. Consistent with the expectations of reciprocity theory, participants 
withheld help when matched with a player who did not help them or others in 
previous rounds, and preferentially helped players who had helped others.  
 Over half (54%) of the participants who gave feedback reported that their 
initial strategy in the game was to never give other players help or tokens. This 
is consistent with rational choice theory, which predicts that individuals always 
seek to maximise their own personal payoff. However, only 6 (7%) of the 
participants pursued the strategy of never giving help, and only 1 participant 
(2%) in the token conditions never used tokens. The correspondence between 
what individuals say and how they behave has been the subject of much 
research in motivation and marketing, but not in cooperative games. The 
difference between the participants’ reported strategy and their actual behaviour 
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most likely reflects a change in strategy in response to payoffs, emerging norms 
or other players’ behaviours. This is consistent with reciprocity theory, as 
understanding of the cooperative tendencies of others is necessary for 
cooperation to emerge in such a small-scale economic game (Nowak, 2006). 
However it should be noted that the participants’ written comments could simply 
reflect demand characteristics, as although most participants reported no 
experience with cooperative games (79%), they may have knowledge about 
how they would be expected to behave when participants in an experiment 
involving opportunism.  
 The participants’ comments suggest that the most common change in 
strategy was from giving help to selling help. Participants who began giving help 
were sometimes matched with consumers who did not issue tokens, meaning 
that the participant did not receive any tokens in exchange for giving help. 
Despite the tokens having no value, participants were motivated to avoid giving 
help without receiving tokens in return by selling help instead of giving help. 
Selling help is a conditional decision, meaning that it only provides the other 
player with help if they choose to transfer a token, otherwise no help is given. 
The participants’ decisions to move from giving help to selling help indicates 
that they preferred to acquire recognition of their helping behaviour in the form 
of a token of debt, even if this had the same payoff as if no such token was 
received. 
 A small minority of participants reported that they did not change their 
decisions in response to the behaviours of other players (4%). Of these, some 
reported alternating between cheating and helping or using tokens. In some 
cases this was due to indecision. But mostly, this was due to a desire to 
maintain ‘balance’ in their behaviour, where their decisions were equally 
167 
 
distributed between cooperation and non-cooperation regardless of payoff. This 
alternating strategy was most common in the conditions with no social 
information, suggesting that it may be an attempt to reap the benefits of 
cooperating with co-operators while protecting oneself against free-riders in the 
absence of any cues informing the participant about the tendencies of the other 
players.  
 Overall, I find that giving individuals access to information about the 
behaviours of the individuals with whom they are interacting increases 
cooperation in cooperative games in which individuals are allowed to exchange 
valueless tokens, as well as in games in which they are not. Allowing individuals 
to exchange tokens in games also increases cooperation. Cooperation is 
therefore at its highest when participants have access to social information and 
are able to exchange tokens. In general, these effects are modest in magnitude, 
with social information increasing cooperation when tokens are available by 
approximately 17%. Nevertheless, I show that enabling players to track the 
behaviours of others increases the successful use of tokens as a medium of 
exchange to a similar degree as it increases cooperation in the absence of 
tokens. This is in line with the hypothesis that token use is a cooperative 
dilemma, which suggests that the emergence of money is shaped by similar 
forces to those that affect cooperation within societies. Indeed, although the 
effects are modest in this controlled setting, such small benefits could lead to 
potentially larger effects in the real world where there are opportunities for 
communication and learning about the most beneficial strategies.  
 My findings build on a previous experiment that sought to explain money 
use. Camera et al’s (2013) study claimed that valueless tokens of debt are used 
because people develop trust in the tokens. I indeed find that introducing tokens 
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does increase the number of cooperative interactions. Importantly however, I 
show that token use appears to increase when social information is available. 
This is consistent with the logic of the debt theory of money, which implies that 
the use of token money involves a cooperative dilemma. Individuals can receive 
goods they desire at no cost by issuing tokens with no intention of repaying the 
debts they signify. Therefore, for tokens of debt to circulate, a system is 
required to ensure that individuals do not default on their debts. Ethnographic 
and evolutionary study indicates that such a system may involve reputation or 
reciprocity, as these are important for the emergence and spread of credit 
arrangements and cooperation in small-scale societies because they allow 
individuals to channel their cooperation to those who will not cheat them 
(Graeber, 2011; Znoj, 1998). I find that this mechanism appears to apply to 
money use, as while people’s attempts to offer tokens in exchange for real 
payoffs are not affected by the ability to track the behaviours of others, the 
acceptance of these tokens, and therefore the adoption of tokens as a medium 
of exchange, does appear to be dependent on people’s access to social 
information.  
 One particular effect of the social information conditions is that providing 
information about the behaviours of every other player every round does not 
increase cooperation or successful token use relative to information about 
whom individuals are playing with. In other words, giving players information 
sufficient to allow them to reciprocate supports the same amount of cooperation 
as giving players information that enables the development of reputations. 
However, indirect reciprocity theory suggests that making all behaviours public 
would make it easier to channel cooperation to co-operators and give a greater 
incentive to avoid defecting. One potential explanation for this discrepancy 
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could be that the total population size was small. Therefore, the interactions any 
given other has with oneself represent a relatively large proportion of their total 
interactions. This may mean that how others behave towards oneself is fairly 
representative of how they behave towards others, causing their interactions 
with others to provide relatively little extra information. On the other hand, 
another potential explanation could be that whether people repay tokens they 
issued to some does not necessarily mean that they will do the same for others, 
particularly in the context of an experiment where decisions are rapid and no 
real cost is ever incurred on any participant. Therefore, the only important 
information may be how individuals behave towards the self, and how they 
behave towards others is not seen as indicative of this information.  
 Another aspect of the debt theory of money is that individuals give the 
tokens that they issue value through their own actions (Graeber, 2011; Mitchell-
Innes, 1914). Individuals are responsible for repaying the debts that are 
signalled by the tokens they issue. If they do not do so, they receive benefits 
with no cost at the expense of others, which erodes the value of the tokens they 
issue as markers of a future repayment. However, I find little evidence for this 
process. The number of times a token issued by a specific individual circulates 
among others is an indicator of the value of the token as a medium of 
exchange, but I found that the degree of this circulation is not strongly 
correlated with the level of cooperation shown by the individual who issued the 
token. While there is a slight trend towards individuals preferring to use the 
tokens of co-operators as a medium of exchange, tokens issued by individuals 
who did not cooperate at all during the experiment also occasionally circulated 
among other players. One potential reason for this is that individuals were not 
interested in whom tokens were originally issued by, but this is inconsistent with 
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the qualitative reports of the participants (see above). Another explanation is 
that individuals may accumulate tokens from relatively non-cooperative others 
and not use them due to the behaviour of their issuer, but when they run out of 
other tokens, their remaining options are to refuse to exchange or use the 
tokens they have. In this case, individuals may attempt to use any token 
regardless of its issuer instead of refusing to exchange.  
This emphasises a potential limitation of my methodology. I gave 
participants a fixed and finite number of tokens to use. While this was 
convenient for the experiment’s mechanics and analysis, it may have been an 
unrealistic assumption that is potentially problematic for my interpretation. 
Theoretically, there is no reason why tokens of debt should be scarce. The 
objects themselves are immaterial and do not affect their ability to be used as 
money (Graber, 2011; Sahlins, 1974). Individuals should be able to issue 
anything in an exchange as long as it is attributable to them, which suggests 
that the number of tokens individuals can use may not be so limited in real life. 
Therefore, my experiment may have underestimated the extent to which tokens 
of debt are used in general, as the data suggest that 8% of participants ran out 
of tokens to use at some point during the experiment.  
Prior experience, sex and age all have no effect on token money use. 
The findings of previous studies into the role of gender in cooperation have 
been mixed. Some found that males cooperate more than females (Brown-
Kruse & Hummels, 1993; Kurzban & Houser, 2001; Rapoport & Chammah, 
1965), others showed that females cooperate more than males (Frank et al, 
1993; Nowell & Tinkler, 1994) and others still showed no evidence for a gender 
difference at all (Cadsby & Maynes, 1998). My findings are consistent with there 
being no systematic effect of gender on cooperation. While it may be the case 
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that gender captures systematic variation in how individuals are socialised to 
think about moral responsibilities (Gilligan, 1982), I show that this does not 
affect token use in experimental conditions.  
In contrast, the absence of an age effect in my experiment is less 
conclusive. My sample does not permit me to make claims about the role of age 
in cooperation, as the variation in age was too low to allow meaningful 
comparison between ages. For future research, a less age-restricted sample 
should be collected to allow age comparison and also to enable questions to be 
asked about cooperative interactions between different age groups, which 
would increase the applicability of the findings to the real world.  
The absence of an effect of prior experience stands in contrast to 
evidence that experience with cooperative games is associated with a decline in 
cooperation (Selten & Stoecker, 1986). However, it should be noted that this 
decline is commonly said to be due to individuals learning strategies that allow 
them to exploit others at little personal cost, which is accomplished mainly 
through defection towards the end of the game. In my experiment, I prevented 
participants from adopting such end-game strategies by presenting noisy 
information about the number of rounds in the game. That I did not find an effect 
of prior experience when end-game effects were impossible suggests that 
previously observed reductions of cooperation caused by prior experience may 
well be due to the learning of end-game strategies. On the other hand, it should 
be noted that prior experience was controlled for rather than systematically 
analysed, and had low variation with the vast majority of participants reporting 
no experience. Therefore, my sample does not permit any meaningful 
conclusions about systematic effects of prior experience on cooperation.  
172 
 
While my experiment offers insights into the conditions underpinning the 
emergence of money, my findings regarding the maintenance of money use 
over time are limited. Differences in token availability and social information 
both had little effect on the stability of cooperation across rounds. As 
mentioned, previous experiments have shown that over time, individuals in 
cooperation games tend to decrease their cooperation across rounds, often 
because they learn the benefits of free-riding over several rounds (Selten & 
Stoecker, 1986). In the experiment, cooperation was relatively stable across the 
rounds. Although there was more of a trend towards decreasing cooperation 
over time when participants were anonymous relative to when social information 
was available, a difference between the conditions in this trend was not 
supported statistically. Research on the stability of cooperation over time in 
various conditions is relatively limited, let alone cooperation involving token 
money. My findings do not permit me to make any strong conclusions about 
how stability of token use is affected by social information, and this represents 
an avenue for future research.  
 More generally, I offer support for the roles of direct and indirect 
reciprocity in cooperation, adding to the considerable evolutionary literature on 
the subject. I find that removing anonymity increases cooperation by shifting the 
distribution of cooperative behaviour from few persistent co-operators and many 
defectors to mostly co-operators and few persistent defectors. This pattern is 
consistent even when complexity is added to the cooperative interaction in the 
form of token money.  
 One limitation of my study is that while groups were randomised to 
ensure social relationships between participants were not introduced as a 
confounding variable, I used a student sample, so there is the potential for 
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individuals within groups to know one another and change their behaviour as a 
consequence. However, within the game participants were only referred to by 
randomly-allocated player IDs and no individual had any way of being able to 
discover which of the other players corresponded to which specific IDs. 
Therefore, in the unlikely event that some of the participants in a group knew 
one another, they could not change their behaviour to respond differently to 
those they knew. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the extent to 
which participants knew one another would have varied systematically between 
the conditions, suggesting that it could not have realistically driven the findings.  
 Another limitation is the terminology used in the cooperation game. The 
participants were sampled from a single university in the UK, categorising them 
as a WEIRD sample (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic) 
(Henrich et al, 2010). Not only does it make the sample unrepresentative, which 
severely limits the generalisability of my findings, it may be the case that the 
sample’s experience with high economic development and effective institutions 
means that they associate the terms ‘buying’ and ‘selling’ with successful and 
productive behaviours that make them preferable to donating or doing nothing 
in an economic game. In the non-token condition, buying and selling were not 
available options. Therefore, the difference in cooperation between the token 
and non-token condition could be because participants were attracted to buying 
and selling as a response to demand characteristics, without engaging in how 
these options may allow them to solve the cooperative dilemma presented by 
the task. However the results show that there was a lot of variation in responses 
in the token conditions. Many participants donated tokens and helped, as well 
as choosing to do nothing. Perhaps more importantly, this potential bias cannot 
explain the differences in token use and cooperation between the social 
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information conditions, which was my main point of interest. Potential future 
experiments may benefit from changing the terminology used in the experiment. 
Removing cues that the game is an economic exchange may minimise any bias 
participants have towards engaging in buying and selling behaviours.   
 A similar limitation concerns how participants perceived the tokens. A 
small number of participants sought to collect as many tokens as they could 
because they believed the tokens would be revealed by the experimenter to 
have a value that would increase their payoff. The participants were extensively 
briefed and tested on their understanding of the game mechanics and this is 
reflected in qualitative feedback stating that they anticipated tokens may have 
value “even after being told they didn’t”. There are a number of reasons why 
participants behaved in a way that the instructions were designed to prevent. 
Pollution of the participant pool is being recognised as a growing problem is 
psychology, as experiments that use deception can cause participants to 
develop suspicions about experimenters’ intentions in subsequent experiments. 
More general suspicion may also be to blame as many of the participants 
reported having never taken part in a cooperative experiment before. 
Suspiciousness can lead to changes in behaviour (Adair, 1972; Hertwig & 
Ortmann, 2002) and in the case of my experiment, may have been the reason 
why some participants tried to collect tokens. Collecting tokens inherently 
reduces the extent to which the individual uses tokens in exchanges, but also 
impacts the ability of other participants to use tokens. Consequently, the belief 
that the tokens were not valueless may provide another reason to think that my 
experiment underestimates the extent to which individuals use token money.  
 In summary, I show that valueless tokens of debt are more likely to be 
used as money when relationships based on reciprocity can be formed, to a 
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modest degree. Until now, no study had shown that money systems could 
emerge in these conditions, and studies struggled to create a money system 
even when the money objects had intrinsic value. I show that the debt theory of 
money is a more likely candidate for explaining the origins of money than 
traditional commodity theories. Far from being a rational, economic decision, 
the use of money is a fundamentally social behaviour that is vulnerable to 
exploitation and only sustainable in a specific social environment where people 
are invested in long-term reciprocal relationships with others. My findings offer 
insights into how people might conduct their economic activity in cases of 
economic instability or change, when confidence in modern institutions that 
prevent defaulting may be lost, or in cases where economic relationships are 
burgeoning and the value of goods, currencies and social relationships is 
uncertain. By demonstrating how and why social relationships are important in 
money use, this chapter offers some guidance about where resources may be 
most efficiently used to maintain economic activity in such situations of 













Chapter 7: Discussion 
In this thesis, I have attempted to contribute to our understanding of the 
diversity in economic development around the world by offering a perspective 
grounded in cultural evolutionary theory. I have used a cultural evolutionary 
framework to interrogate existing theories for variation in economic performance 
and money use between societies, and to devise new explanations based on 
shared history and cooperation. As well as making a theoretical contribution, I 
sought to demonstrate the value of a multi-methods approach, highlighting 
instances where traditional techniques may be inappropriate or biased. 
 In this concluding chapter I first summarise the findings from each of the 
individual analysis chapters. Then, I synthesise the findings across the 
chapters, exploring broader conclusions that emerge from taking the findings of 
chapters together. Following this I explore how the findings of this thesis have 
implications for studies of economic phenomena and cultural evolution, before 
offering recommendations for future research based on these findings.  
  In chapter 3, I found that the timing of statehood and agriculture both 
have primarily indirect effects on modern-day GDP. The timing of statehood 
strongly predicts the quality of modern-day institutions which in turn predict 
GDP, rather than having a direct effect on GDP as suggested in previous 
studies (Putterman & Weil, 2010). The timing of agriculture is associated more 
strongly with the earliness of statehood than GDP or other modern-day 
variables. These two indirect relationships are consistent with studies on 
societal evolution that suggest that 1) stable and effective institutions are the 
result of experimentation over many generations (Wright, 2006), with more time 
for experimentation with centralised governance leading to stronger institutions 
in future generations; and 2) the economic specialisation, sedentism and 
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growing population size associated with agriculture provide the conditions for 
centralised governance (Olsson & Paik, 2013; Putterman, 2008). I also 
evaluated other previously-identified direct relationships. On the one hand, I find 
support for various theories in institutional economics, showing that institutions 
are strongly predictive of economic development and that patterns of European 
settlement were related to ecological factors (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). On 
the other hand, I find no support for the ideas that in-group biases are predictive 
of GDP, or that in-group biases are responses to the disease environment 
(Fincher & Thornhill, 2012).  
 In chapter 4, I showed that patterns of shared history between modern 
societies play an important role in shaping the distribution of economic 
development around the world. Societies that share a relatively recent common 
ancestor are highly likely to be more similar in their modern-day economic 
performance than societies that are more distantly related. In contrast, societies 
grouped by other aspects of shared history such as similar environments and 
evidence of extensive communication do not seem to be as similar in their 
modern-day economic performance. This shows that the recency of shared 
history between societies is part of the explanation for variance in their 
economic outcomes. As this shared history cannot be captured by modern-day, 
nation-level factors, this suggests that it is being overlooked in existing cross-
national research on economic development.   
 In chapter 5, I found that enforcement institutions are the strongest 
predictor of token money use in traditional societies. This relationship is 
consistent with the debt theory of money (Graeber, 2011), as the ability to 
formally sanction individuals for their behaviours resolves the cooperative 
dilemma inherent in tokens of debt that would normally restrict their use. 
178 
 
Another strong predictor of token money use was taxation, which provided 
further support for the debt theory of money as taxation is another way of 
resolving the same cooperative dilemma by giving all tokens that can be used to 
pay taxes inherent value. I also found some support for more traditional 
predictors of money use such as market engagement and settlement fixity, but 
to a lesser extent than the support found for institutions.  
 In chapter 6, I showed that information about how likely people are to 
repay their debts influences the extent to which valueless tokens of debt are 
used in a population as payment for beneficial services. Specifically, I compared 
rates of token money use and debt repayment when people have access to 
information about the frequency with which others issue tokens relative to when 
they do not have this information. I found that people cooperate more when they 
have this information about peoples’ tendencies to default. I also found that 
tokens issued by individuals who do not often repay their debts actually appear 
to be able to circulate in the population, or at least are not necessarily avoided 
in transactions. The importance of this latter point requires further investigation, 
however, as this may be an artefact of a methodological decision to make 
tokens finite.  
 Across all the analysis chapters, I find support for the idea that cultural 
evolutionary mechanisms are important for explaining global variation in the 
development of economies. Cultural inheritance is the mechanism that drives 
the persistent effects of the timing of statehood and agriculture. Experience with 
centralised institutions and agricultural subsistence is passed down generations 
through social learning, which is necessary for this experience to accumulate 
within societies to the benefit of their modern-day institutions and economies 
(Bockstette et al, 2002; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2009, 2013). Furthermore, the 
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effect of shared history also reflects the importance of cultural inheritance, as it 
is differences in the timing and degree of social learning between societies that 
create the patterns of cultural similarity and difference that appear to explain 
diversity in economies. Previous work has used ideas about how social learning 
shapes individual level behaviour to explain cultural inheritance of group-level 
traits such as social structures and institutions (Smaldino, 2014). My findings 
present the next step of this line of thinking, showing that patterns of cultural 
inheritance shape nation-level economic variables on a global scale.  
 As well as inheritance being an important cultural evolutionary 
mechanism, I have argued that selection underpins the relationship between 
state history and modern institutions. My findings are consistent with the idea 
that different ways of governing centrally are discovered or identified through 
experimentation (i.e. variation is generated) and successful innovations are 
retained and built upon over thousands of years (Wright, 2006). These 
innovations tend to be retained because they outcompete alternative strategies 
that are less effective. The importance of this selection process is further 
illustrated in the role of institutions play in driving the variation in economic 
performance and money use. Accepting debts as payment and facing 
vulnerability in contracts with distant or anonymous parties would both be 
quickly extinguished by free-riders in the absence of strong institutions (North, 
1990). Therefore, societies with the strongest institutions provide the conditions 
in which economically beneficial behaviours such as large-scale mutually-
profitable contracting as well as token money use can increase in frequency. 
This illustrates how a cultural evolutionary framework can be used to generate 
hypotheses about why certain behaviours may be adopted in some societies 
and not others, in contrast to more classical economic thinking which focuses 
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more on universal commonalities in how humans perceive and choose between 
different actions. 
The findings of chapters 3 and 4 demand that we take seriously two 
statistical phenomena that have been overlooked in most previous cross-
national economic studies: indirect relationships and the non-independence of 
modern-day nations. In chapter 3, I showed that accounting for indirect effects 
changes the conclusions drawn about long-run effects. In the case of state 
history the results indicate that previous studies may have misattributed the 
cause of the relationship between state history and GDP as a direct effect 
rather than an indirect effect mediated by the effect of state history on the 
evolution of institutions. I also showed that had I conducted a simple multiple 
regression without accounting for indirect relationships, this would have led me 
towards an erroneous conclusion that state history is not important in 
understanding the causes of modern day variation in economic performance. 
This illustrates the potential consequences of using OLS regression to test 
relationships that are explicitly indirect.  
The difficulties of adjudicating between alternative explanations for 
human behaviour when one cannot easily specify mediators have been raised 
in previous work (Nettle, 2009) but so far not acted upon. Ultimately, I argue 
that as SEM can be used to explicitly model a detailed network of direct and 
indirect relationships, the approach can be used to address specific hypotheses 
more directly, and to isolate particular relationships to control for them or test 
them. One of the attractive features of this approach is that it encourages users 
to explicitly visualise the causal pathways assumed by different theories. In this 
way, it can provide an important conceptual tool for organising and synthesising 
alternative hypotheses. This makes it particularly useful for multivariate 
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analyses seeking to compare interrelated categories of variables such as 
ecological, historical and social factors. In particular, SEM makes the effects of 
far-reaching influences, such as ecological conditions that shape historical 
events and modern-day phenomena, much more statistically tractable. This 
makes it a valuable method that can be used to address a wide range of 
questions about cultural evolution and human behaviour, where there are often 
many competing ideas (Nettle, 2009).  
In chapter 4, I found that there is sufficient non-independence between 
societies to produce meaningfully different results if this shared history is not 
accounted for. Most cross-national studies in economics and other social 
sciences do not account for these systematic patterns of similarity between 
modern nations. This suggests that many previous findings may be driven by 
clustering in the data instead of relationships between variables (for example, 
Currie & Mace, 2012). Work in the field of cultural phylogenetics has 
demonstrated the potential for this, finding that patterns of common ancestry 
can be used to explain the diversity in various cultural traits (Currie et al, 2010; 
Mace & Holden, 2005; Tehrani & Collard, 2002). However, this direct approach 
of reconstructing trees that reflect shared history and mapping them onto traits 
cannot easily be translated to nation-level data, as the methods used are 
designed for ethnically homogenous, relatively closely-related societies. Dealing 
with non-independence in nation-level data therefore presents a statistical and 
theoretical challenge. I present the use of language families as a random effect 
as a protocol to enable subsequent cross-national research to build models 
containing theoretically-motivated controls for global patterns of shared history. 
Language family data are readily available at the country level, and although 
they are relatively crude in the way that they downplay linguistic diversity in 
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many countries, I have shown that they can be incorporated into models to 
capture patterns of non-independence that threaten the accuracy of commonly-
used statistical tests. 
Chapters 3 and 4 also have broader implications for the field of cultural 
evolution. Many cultural evolutionary studies are small-scale, evaluating 1) 
signals of cultural adaptation in cross-sectional analyses of small populations 
(Henrich, 2004), 2) patterns of diversity in cultural traits in traditional societies in 
certain regions of the world (Mace & Jordan, 2011), and 3) biases of information 
transmission in laboratory samples to measure cultural inheritance (Caldwell & 
Millen, 2008). I show that the same cultural evolutionary mechanisms that 
inform these studies allow me to generate testable hypotheses for patterns of 
cultural diversity at a much larger, global scale that are well supported by the 
available data. Just as biological adaptation at the individual level is reflected in 
a broader pattern of relationships between species, cultural evolutionary 
processes have a measurable signature at the nation-level. This forms part of 
the explanation for why some economies perform differently to others, and must 
be accounted for theoretically and statistically.   
In chapters 5 and 6, I further demonstrate the utility of a cultural 
evolutionary approach for generating new hypotheses. The relatively new debt 
theory about the origins of money framed the use of money as driven by trust, 
but overlooked the potential for trust to be exploited (Camera et al, 2013; 
Graber, 2011). This potential for exploitation should be obvious from a rational 
choice perspective that is based on individual utility. However, an evolutionary 
approach encourages further questions at different scales, such as what 
conditions can change this payoff dynamic, how different societies with different 
systems can reap the benefits of token money more effectively than others, and 
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how this shapes what groups outcompete others. The adoption of behavioural 
strategies in such cooperative dilemmas is evolutionary in nature, with 
strategies yielding high benefits being represented with greater frequency in the 
next generation. In most instances, cooperative or trusting strategies yield the 
greatest benefit in populations of other co-operators, but are otherwise 
vulnerable to exploitation by non-cooperators. I found that tendencies to engage 
in money use are low when systems that prevent defaulting on debts are not in 
place, showing that conceptualising money use as a cooperative dilemma and 
applying mechanisms from evolutionary theory to this dilemma enabled me to 
reveal previously-unknown complexities about the origins of money use. 
Namely, that social systems that maintain cooperation and govern actions 
appear to be important, rather than indiscriminate trust which is vulnerable to 
exploitation. This finding underlines broader arguments made in the literature 
about the value of highly proximate explanations for human behaviour (Ostrom, 
2003). Trust is an explanation that is arguably more proximate than other 
factors like institutions or the ecology. Related to my earlier discussion of 
indirect effects, this means that using trust as an explanation can often only 
provide limited insights into the origin or maintenance of a behaviour, as it 
simply shifts the question a step backwards and requires us to address what 
explains diversity in trust.  
These findings have considerable implications for existing theories of 
money. Currently, money is thought of as a means of maximising the efficiency 
of exchange (Jevons, 1897; Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989), the emergence of which 
is considered an economic decision driven by the benefit of making trade easier 
and quicker (Smith, 1776/1976). As an economic decision, the adoption of 
money is not affected by social context, and should occur anywhere where 
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exchange takes place. I instead find that the use of token money requires 
specific social conditions such as strong institutions to be able to emerge. 
Rather than the adoption of money only providing benefits through efficient and 
profitable exchange, the use of tokens of debt in the absence of mechanisms 
that support cooperation is likely vulnerable to exploitation by individuals who 
default on their debts, and cannot be maintained. Unlike previous theories, this 
provides an explanation that accounts for the many observed societies that 
engage in exchange but do not use token money.  
Furthermore, the debt theory has been positioned as an alternative to the 
traditional theory of money use which is based on the inherent value of 
commodities (Graeber, 2011), but they have never been compared. In the first 
test of the logic of the debt theory of money, I find evidence more consistent 
with the debt theory than the commodity theory. This is particularly interesting 
given that aspects of the debt theory are more consistent with how modern 
economies operate, especially in developed countries. Globally, there is 
approximately $30 trillion of narrow money (coins, banknotes, checking deposits 
etc), which is eclipsed by the $80 trillion of broad money (including money 
deposits lent by banks) (The Money Project, 2015). Most banks hold a fraction 
of their total deposits in cash and are connected by networks of credit and debt 
(Pennachi, 2012). Like with these individual banks, the assumption of the global 
financial system is that contracts can be fulfilled and debts can be repaid. Banks 
and customers are confident that default cannot occur despite there not being 
enough money in the world to satisfy all debts and contracts. My findings 
suggest that to some extent, this may reflect the far-reaching effect of high 
confidence in underlying contract law and enforcement, which works to ensure 
that debts maintain value. Indeed, the Western liberal democracies with the 
185 
 
strongest institutions are also the countries with the most debt (Schultz & 
Weingast, 2003).  
Further experimentation into token money use would help to confirm 
some of my conclusions about how people behave in circumstances that 
simulate the origins of money. One priority might be to make the tokens that 
people can use in these experiments infinite. In theory, tokens of debt can be 
anything provided they are attributable to the issuer in some way (Graeber, 
2011; Mitchell-Innes, 1914). Testing people’s behaviours when they can 
continually issue tokens accesses important questions such as: 1) do money 
systems emerge and stabilise through the actions of a single individual who 
issues lots of tokens that can be used in exchanges between others because 
the individual consistently repays their debts? And 2) does this cause money 
systems to be originally dependent on few strong co-operators whose behaviour 
can also potentially be the cause of the collapse of the money system? Another 
avenue for future experimental research would be to apply my token-based 
design to scenarios that are more explicitly based on exchange using goods. 
Whether variance in the value of different goods interacts with the ability to use 
tokens as payment is an as of yet unanswered question that would give 
valuable insights into the origins of money.  
One particular feature of my analyses that enabled me to draw 
conclusions was the use of cross-cultural comparative methods. Although there 
are archaeological and historical records of tokens of debt (Earle, 2002; Einzig, 
1966), previous evidence for the debt theory of money has largely been in the 
form of examples of when tokens have been used during specific historical 
events, such as IOU and bank crises in relatively small populations (Graeber, 
2011; Wedeman, 1997). These natural experiments offer some insights into 
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when tokens tend to be used, but their very specific social and historical context 
makes it difficult to isolate what variables are driving the use and failure of 
tokens of debt. For example, during bank crises, token use may be perceived 
as only a temporary measure, which may give people confidence in others’ 
abilities to repay their debts that would not normally be found. By examining a 
diverse sample of unrelated societies, I can access more general trends that 
repeatedly predict the use of token money and can make more representative 
conclusions about the mechanisms underpinning the evolution of money. 
Together, my systematic analysis and previous case-based analyses provide 
the beginnings of a convincing evidence base for the importance of debt in the 
emergence of token money. 
On the other hand, the cross-cultural data I used is not without its 
limitations. In the case of the SCCS, I have discussed the potential issues with 
the validity of the variables, given that they were derived from observational 
data. The cross-national data used in chapters 3 and 4 suffer from a similar 
problem, as well as a particular risk of omitted variables given how 
interconnected historical, ecological, social and economic factors are. Going 
forward, the expansion of datasets that capture social norms concerning the 
boundaries of cooperation would be particularly useful. Currently, these norms 
are captured using proxies or composite variables constructed from separate 
but related studies, which risks the introduction of alternative explanations. For 
example, my in-group bias variable was partly comprised of a measure of family 
orientation, which only partially concerns the scale of cooperation (see chapter 
3). This could mean that the variation in in-group bias I observed may be driven 
in part by differences in family systems, for instance.  
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 More generally, future analyses would benefit from larger sample sizes 
both cross-nationally and from the SCCS. SEMs in particular estimate many 
parameters, and therefore often require the researcher to trade-off sample size 
against what relationships can be modelled without affecting the accuracy of the 
results. Data sources such as the World Bank are increasing in coverage year 
on year, and repositories such as D-Place are seeking to amalgamate currently 
disparate databases, which will maximise sample sizes by allowing different 
measures taken of the same societies to be easily accessible.  
Across all the analysis chapters, I show that institutions are of key 
importance for the development of economies from their inception to the 
modern day. The movement of institutional economics over the last 30 years 
has primarily focused on explaining modern-day economic growth, revealing 
associations between institutions and market activity, contracting and effective 
enforcement (North, 1990). I find support for the association between 
institutions and economic growth in my analyses, showing that institutions are 
the component of economies that connect a society’s history to its economic 
performance today. Institutions potentially embody thousands of years of 
historical experience (Nunn, 2012) and use this accumulated knowledge to 
drive economic behaviours.  
However, I also demonstrate how to use an evolutionary approach to 
expand the institutional explanation to more foundational aspects of economies, 
namely money use. Fundamentally, institutions shape economies by resolving 
cooperative dilemmas. Much previous work has argued that the most important 
aspect of institutions is their inclusiveness, referring to the extent to which they 
provide the conditions for every member of the society to engage in cooperative 
behaviour with impunity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). An important insight 
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made by this thesis is that cooperative dilemmas are central to many aspects of 
economies, including exchange and investment in centralised government. This 
builds upon previous research that has shown institutions to be primary driver of 
major human transitions, including the transition from small, kin-based groups to 
societies characterised by large-scale cooperation (Powers et al, 2016). 
Therefore, the recognition that money use cannot be sustained by trust and 
involves a cooperative dilemma invites the expectation that people’s 
perceptions of the effectiveness of governance and sanctioning will affect their 
willingness to adopt money. This cultural evolutionary approach may be used to 
address future questions about the conditions underpinning the emergence of 
other major developments underpinning economic performance, such as 
effective contract-based law.  
The importance of history and social conditions shown across the 
analysis chapters contrasts with classical economic assumptions. For example, 
many societies have highly effective institutions which have considerable 
societal benefits. However, despite clear instances in which societies have 
learned how to improve their institutions by borrowing ideas from other societies 
(Ferguson, 2012), many societies still have ineffective institutions. These are 
partly the result of their historical experiences, such as long histories of 
exploitation affecting social norms that shape trust and cooperation (Nunn, 
2012). Such persistent effects of history are not well accounted for by rational 
choice models which focus more on how different people optimise their payoffs 
when choosing between the same options, rather than how the options 
themselves may vary due to context. That being said, I do find evidence for 
some level of optimisation, as individuals mostly only engage in behaviours like 
money use and large-scale cooperation when they are protected from the high 
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costs of exploitation by strong institutions.  This demonstrates how the 
synthesis of evolutionary theory with economic ideas can generate accurate 
models of real-life behaviour. Recognising how history, ecology and social 
systems can shape the variation in what decisions are available for people to 
make provides the context necessary to understand how attempts to maximise 
payoffs can lead to different behaviours in different societies and individuals.  
In this thesis I have shown how different methodological approaches can 
be used to interrogate theoretical claims from different angles. I have used 
different methodologies (secondary data analysis, experiments), employed 
different statistical techniques (SEM, multilevel modelling), conducted analyses 
at different scales (nation-, general factor-), and examined various samples 
(traditional societies, modern nations, real participants). In doing so, I have 
been able to drill down into the mechanisms underpinning my own findings. For 
example, having found that history is important for modern-day economic 
development, I examined other ways history could have an effect using a 
different method. Moreover, having showed that institutions were important for 
token money use, I asked further questions about how enforcement might work 
at a finer scale using an experiment. That there is a common conclusion about 
the role of institutions across all of these diverse approaches provides a strong 
case for the idea that institutions shape the development of economies from 
their inception to the modern day.  
I also showed that approaches can be combined, such as in the 
combination of multilevel modelling and SEM. There is a great deal of scope for 
the insights of SEM to change the way we use multilevel modelling and vice 
versa. For instance, they both allow researchers to partition effects 
appropriately in different ways, and so when specifying a multilevel model, one 
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must consider that variation being captured at the level of the random effect 
may be related to the omission of a particular pathway at the lower level. 
Moreover, when specifying an SEM, one must recognise that parameter 
estimates will be shaped by the ability to adjust for non-independence using 
random effects. The ability to partition variation using multilevel modelling also 
allows me to scrutinise datasets such as the SCCS which claim to contain 
largely independent societies, as well as existing relationships, which may be 
artefacts of using OLS regression. In addition, multilevel modelling and the 
information-theoretic approach more generally have shaped the way I analyse 
experimental data. Traditionally, the statistical analysis of experiments involves 
comparing a treatment to a control, due to the way that manipulations or 
interventions are most commonly structured. However, this does not 
necessitate null hypothesis significance testing, as one can compare models 
containing different combinations of independent and extraneous variables, as 
well as grouping variables that may capture underlying similarities between 
particular participants that may drive their behaviours.  
 In this thesis, I aimed to use a cultural evolutionary approach to examine 
existing theories for variation in economic development and money use, and to 
devise new explanations using a cultural evolutionary framework. The broad 
findings of each of my chapters have met these aims. I have shown that 1) state 
history and the timing of agriculture have largely indirect, not direct effects on 
modern GDP; 2) shared history explains a portion of the diversity in 
socioeconomic development between modern nations that cannot be explained 
by nation-level predictors or measured using traditional methodologies; 3) the 
emergence of money is likely to be related to the resolution of the cooperative 
dilemma of debt; and 4) the emergence of money from valueless tokens of debt 
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is possible but not inevitable, and depends on the ability to form social 
relationships.  
More generally, I show that despite the differences between economies 
at their inception in small-scale societies and globalised, digital economies in 
the modern age, economies are always underpinned by cooperation. This gives 
development at early and modern stages a common driver, namely the 
resolution of cooperative dilemmas which is most effectively achieved through 
institutions. Differences in institutions are responsible for both the ability of 
societies to adopt the money systems that are the foundations of economies, 
and the ability of economies to succeed in the modern day. I also show that a 
cultural evolutionary perspective is useful for guiding questions about what 
enables and what extinguishes various features of economies. This perspective 
forces researchers to ask under what circumstances could such a trait emerge, 
sustain and spread given the potential for exploitation and competition from 
alternative traits. It also demands that researchers address different scales of 
explanation, such as historical, population-level and environment-level as well 
as society-level. This comparative, multi-hypothesis approach stands as the 
most effective way to synthesise competing explanations across different 










Chapter 8: Appendices to long-run historical and ecological 
determinants of economic development mediated by the 





Appendix 1-1: Full table of hypotheses 
 Table 8-1 synthesises the main explanations for the global variation in economic development and its predictors found 
across the economic and evolutionary literature. The economic literature supplied most of the hypothesised direct effects, 
whether historical, ecological or proximate. The evolutionary literature, being more concerned with the role of endogenous and 
exogenous factors as conditions that shape the evolution of cultural traits, supplied the majority of the indirect effects.  
No cross-national SEM could feasibly estimate each of these pathways due to a lack of data. To overcome this I first 
conducted numerous linear models to systematically reduce the full hypothesis table to a selection of realistically important 
hypotheses.  
 
Table 8-1: Documented Hypotheses Concerning Economic Development and Cultural, Historical and Ecological Attributes of 
Societies 





Adjudication of contracts and enforcement of law 
allows large-scale cooperation. Checks on the 
executive ensure incentives for labour and skill 
accumulation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Aoki, 
2001; North, 1990; Rodrik et al, 2004). 
Higher institution quality  higher GDP 1 
In the absence of formal laws, in-group members 
represent the best source of cooperation (Hruschka 
& Henrich, 2013). 









Differences in standards used to treat in-group and 
outgroup members introduce risks of opportunism 
in transactions. Nepotistic aspect of these biases 
also contributes to political patronage and 
corruption (Kyriacou, 2016). 
Higher in-group bias  lower GDP 3 
Formal laws are applied equally to all individuals, 
which is inconsistent with in-group preferences 
(Greif, 2006; Hruschka & Henrich, 2013). 









Historical experience with central organisation is 
heritable and predicts greater levels of economic 
development in the present day (Putterman & Weil, 
2010; Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2013). 
Longer state history  higher GDP 4 
Accumulation of refinements to governance by law 
takes time and shapes the effectiveness of the 
modern formal institutions that develop from them 
(Currie et al, 2016).  
Longer state history  higher institution 
quality 
5 
Centralised governance selects for cultures of trust 
and impersonal treatment (Hruschka & Henrich, 
2013). Longer histories of statehood suggest more 
time for selection for impersonality. 
Longer state history  lower in-group bias 6 
Europeans tended to settle in regions where there 
was little development and low population density 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). 











Earlier transitions provided a head-start to the 
development of important technologies associated 
with economic performance (Diamond, 1997). 
Earlier agricultural transition  higher GDP 8 
Longer histories of features of agricultural 
subsistence (irrigation, large-scale coordination) 
suggest more experience with property rights 
(Baland & Platteau, 1998; Olsson & Paik, 2016), 
which may aid development of and engagement 
with centralised institutions.   
Earlier agricultural transition  higher 
institution quality 
9 
Agricultural production benefits from collectivist 
norms and increases pathogen pressure, implying 





that agriculture selects for in-group biases (Olsson 
& Paik, 2016). 
Growing population sizes associated with 
agriculture select for centralised governance to 
maintain cooperation and coordination (Diamond, 
1997). 








A body of knowledge and technologies associated 
with European populations aids economic activity 
(Easterly & Levine, 2012).  
Higher European ancestry  higher GDP 12 
Europeans transplanted relatively inclusive 
institutions when they settled in large numbers. 
Where they did not settle in large numbers, they 
established authoritarian systems designed to 
exploit populations and extract natural resources 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).  
Higher European ancestry  higher 
institution quality 
13 
European culture is relatively individualist and 
impersonal (Schwartz, 2006).  







Disease stunts productivity and investment in long-
term goals like education (Sachs & Malaney, 2002). 
Higher disease  lower GDP 15 
Disease stimulates the behavioural immune system 
owing to the fitness costs of contracting novel 
diseases (Fincher & Thornhill, 2012).  
Higher disease  higher in-group bias 16 
The disease environment influenced the extent of 
European settlement (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012).  







Latitude covaries with climate and natural 
resources (Bonds et al, 2012). 
Higher latitude  higher GDP 18 
Latitude covaries with natural endowments which 
predict the extent of bias of resources towards 
elites (Easterly & Levine, 2003; Engerman & 
Sokoloff, 2012). 




Latitude covaries with the suitability of regions for 
agriculture (Olsson & Paik, 2013).  
Higher latitude  earlier agricultural transition 20 
Latitude covaries with patterns of human migration Higher latitude  shorter state history 21 
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(Olsson & Paik, 2013).  Higher latitude  higher European ancestry  
Higher latitude  lower in-group bias 
22 
23 
Latitude covaries with environmental variables that 
predict extents of infectious disease (Bonds et al, 
2012).  




Appendix 1-2: Pathways tested in the model comparison 
 Figure 8-1 below shows the pathways I included following the linear 
models and those I manipulated for hypothesis testing. The pathways in black 
represent those that were supported by the linear models, and therefore 
appeared in every single SEM I conducted. The pathways in red were those 
relating to the main hypotheses about whether the effects of state history and 
the timing of agriculture are direct or indirect. The model comparison was a 
comparison of SEMs that always included the black pathways, and had every 












This diagram does not present the results of any SEM: the thickness of the 







Figure 8-1: Path diagram highlighting the pathways manipulated 
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Appendix 1-3 Multicollinearity checks 
 Table 8-2 below shows that the variance inflation factor (VIF) values for 
the variables are all <3; generally, VIF values of 5 are seen as a cause for 
concern, while VIF values of 10 or more suggest serious multicollinearity (see 
O’Brien (2007) for discussion of various rules of thumb). 
 
Table 8-2: Variance inflation factor values for predictor variables 
Predictor variable VIF 
Institution quality 2.89 
In-group bias 2.63 
European ancestry 2.29 
State history 1.73 





























Appendix 1-4: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 Table 8-3 presents a matrix of the pairwise correlations between the 
variables in the analysis. 
 
Table 8-3: Pairwise correlation matrix 












GDP 1        
Institution 
quality 





-0.76 1      
European 
descent 
0.64 0.49 -0.45 1     
State 
history 
0.36 0.30 -0.12 0.12 1    
Timing of 
agriculture 
0.34 0.15 0.05 0.26 0.59 1   
Disease -
0.66 
-0.55 0.51 -0.73 -0.15 -0.24 1  














Appendix 1-5: Linear model tables and diagrams with reference to the full 
hypothesis table 
 Table 8-4 presents the results of the initial linear models. Pathway 
numbers that correspond to the pathway numbers specified in the full 
hypothesis table are shown (Table 8-1).  
 




Predictor variable Path 
number 
Coefficient p 
GDP Institution quality 1 0.56 <0.001** 
 In-group bias 3 -0.09 0.23 
 European descent 12 0.14 0.09 
 State history 4 0.04 0.52 
 Agriculture timing 8 0.11 0.09 
 Disease 15 -0.09 0.26 
 Latitude 18 0.03 0.60 
Institution quality In-group bias 2 -0.54 <0.001** 
European descent 13 0.25 0.02* 
State history 5 0.15 0.04* 
Agriculture timing 9 0.06 0.45 
 Latitude 19 -0.05 0.49 
In-group bias Institution quality 2 -0.56 <0.001** 
 European descent 14 -0.17 0.13 
 State history 6 -0.02 0.84 
 Agriculture timing 10 0.12 0.17 
 Disease 16 0.09 0.34 
 Latitude 23 0.01 0.93 
European 
descent 
State history 7 0.06 0.24 
Disease 17 -0.17 0.03* 
Latitude 22 0.17 0.002** 
State history Agriculture timing 11 0.55 <0.001** 
 Latitude 21 0.07 0.47 
Agriculture timing Latitude 20 0.38 <0.001** 
p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
Despite several variables showing correlations with GDP, the only 
significant direct predictor of GDP when including all variables in a linear model 
is institutional quality. This result provides evidence against many of the 
hypotheses that propose a direct effect of certain factors on economic 
development. There is no support from these analyses for direct effects on GDP 
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of in-group bias, European ancestry, state history, agriculture timing, disease 
and latitude. The strong relationship between institution quality and GDP leaves 
little variation that can be explained by these other variables. This guides me 
towards potential indirect relationships, as I can turn my attention to which 
variables explain the variation in institution quality, and in turn, step further back 
to examine what factors explain variation in those variables.  
Higher quality institutions are predicted by lower levels of in-group bias, 
higher proportions of European descent, and longer state histories. This offers 
support for 1) the suggestion that strong institutions and in-group biases reduce 
the benefits of one another and 2) the hypothesis that institutions are among the 
cultural traits that European populations transmit. It also supports the theory 
that longer histories of statehood provide more time for the development of 
effective institutions. State history, in turn, is strongly related to the timing of 
agriculture but not latitude. This is consistent with the idea that sedentism and 
increased population density historically led to changes in political organisation. 
The timing of agriculture is related to latitude, in line with the suitability of 
agricultural subsistence being dependent on climatic and other ecological 
factors. I find no support for a relationship between disease and in-group bias, 
suggesting that disease does not influence GDP by creating avoidant norms. 
However, disease is associated with European ancestry, in line with the 
hypothesis that the extent of settlement by colonists was dependent on the 
disease environment.  
 Figure 8-2 recreates the diagram presenting the pathways with the most 
statistical support with the inclusion of the pathway numbers specified in the full 
















Red paths represent negative correlations and black paths positive correlations; 
line widths are proportional to the Akaike weighted coefficients of the pathways, 
specified by the key above; the dotted pathway was rejected from the linear 
















Appendix 1-6: Scatterplot matrix of the indirect effect of state history 
through institutions 
 Figure 8-3 below shows each stage of the indirect effect of state history 
on GDP through modern institution quality. State history is positively correlated 
with both institution quality and GDP, and institution quality strongly positively 
correlates with GDP. State history, however, does not correlate strongly with the 
variation in GDP left unexplained by institution quality, suggesting that state 

















A) state history is moderately positively correlated with GDP (r=0.36); B) 
institution quality is strongly positively correlated with GDP (r=0.82); C) state 
history is moderately positively correlated with institution quality (r=0.30); D) 
state history is weakly positively correlated with the variation in GDP left 
unexplained by variation in institution quality (r=0.06). 
Figure 8-3: Stages of the indirect relationship between state history and GDP 
through the quality of modern institutions 
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Appendix 1-7: Comparison of the Indo-European subfamilies and family 
data 
 Below I present the full SEM comparison from the dataset that used 
Indo-European sub-families (Table 8-5) and from the dataset that used the 
Indo-European family (Table 8-6). This comparison was undertaken to ensure 
the findings were not sensitive to my own decisions regarding how best to 
account for shared history in the data.  
The decision to use sub-families was driven by the large number of Indo-
European countries in the dataset and the diversity between these countries. 
The use of language families as a random intercept aims to account for 
systematic cultural similarities between countries that are the result of how 
recently they shared a common cultural ancestor. However, using the Indo-
European language family as a whole collapses together, for example, South 
Asian and Scandinavian countries. This suggests that use of the whole family 
does not capture patterns of shared history in as much detail as is possible. By 
contrast, using sub-families allows me to account for a greater number of more 




Table 8-5: Results from the 95% confidence set for the original SEM using 
subfamilies 






















1511.15 0.13  X X X   X 
1511.31 0.12  X  X   X 
1512.76 0.06  X  X  X X 
1512.93 0.05  X X X X  X 
1513.07 0.05  X  X X  X 
1513.09 0.05 X X X X   X 
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1513.15 0.05  X X X  X X 
1513.25 0.04 X X  X   X 
1514.08 0.03  X  X X X X 
1514.39 0.03    X X  X 
1514.65 0.02  X X    X 
1514.70 0.02 X X  X  X X 
1514.76 0.02 X X X    X 
1514.82 0.02  X     X 
1514.86 0.02  X X X X X X 
1514.86 0.02 X X X X X  X 
1514.93 0.02 X X     X 
1515.00 0.02 X X  X X  X 
1515.09 0.02 X X X X  X X 
1515.40 0.02    X   X 
1515.40 0.02    X X X X 
1516.02 0.01 X X  X X X X 
1516.02 0.01   X X X  X 
1516.26 0.01  X    X X 
1516.32 0.01 X   X X  X 
1516.37 0.01 X X    X X 
1516.43 0.01  X X  X  X 
1516.54 0.01 X X X  X  X 
1516.57 0.01  X   X  X 
1516.65 0.01  X X   X X 
1516.68 0.01 X X   X  X 
1516.76 0.01 X X X   X X 
1516.80 0.01 X X X X X X X 
1517.33 0.01 X   X   X 
1517.34 0.01 X   X X X X 
1517.37 0.01   X X   X 
1517.38 0.01    X  X X 
1517.38 0.01   X X X X X 
1517.59 0.01  X   X X X 
1517.70 0.01 X X   X X X 
 
 
Table 8-6: Results from the 95% confidence set for the SEM with the Indo-
European family instead of subfamilies 






















1616.27 0.08  X X X  X X 
1616.42 0.07  X  X   X 
1616.47 0.07  X X X   X 
1616.81 0.06  X X   X X 
1616.96 0.06  X     X 
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1617.01 0.05  X X    X 
1617.06 0.05  X X X X X X 
1617.60 0.04  X X  X X X 
1617.84 0.04  X  X  X X 
1618.22 0.03 X X X   X X 
1618.27 0.03 X X X X  X X 
1618.31 0.03  X  X X  X 
1618.37 0.03 X X     X 
1618.38 0.03  X    X X 
1618.40 0.03  X X X X  X 
1618.42 0.03 X X  X   X 
1618.43 0.03 X X X    X 
1618.47 0.03 X X X X   X 
1618.86 0.02  X   X  X 
1618.94 0.02  X X  X  X 
1619.01 0.02 X X X  X X X 
1619.06 0.02 X X X X X X X 
1619.79 0.01 X X    X X 
1619.80 0.01  X  X X X X 
1619.84 0.01 X X  X  X X 
1620.27 0.01 X X   X  X 
1620.31 0.01 X X  X X  X 
1620.34 0.01  X   X X X 
1620.35 0.01 X X X  X  X 
1620.40 0.01 X X X X X  X 
1621.61 0.01    X X  X 
1621.75 0.01 X X   X X X 
 
 Comparing tables 8-5 and 8-6 shows that using Indo-European 
subfamilies drastically improves model fit (by over 100 AIC). It also gives 
greater certainty as to the best-fitting model. Using subfamilies gives the model 
with the lowest AIC a 13% chance of being the best model, and also produces 2 
models that are at least twice as likely as any other model to be the best fitting 
model. In contrast, using the family instead of subfamilies gives the model with 
the lowest AIC an 8% chance of being the best model.  
Table 8-7 below summarises the results of the SEM comparison using 
the Indo-European family instead of subfamilies. This shows that my results are 
robust, as the direct and indirect pathways supported in the original SEM 
receive support in this model.  
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Table 8-7: Direct and indirect effects of state history and timing of agriculture in 
the SEMs within 2 AIC units of the best-fitting model using Indo-European 
language family data 
   Variables 
Predictor Institution 
quality 
State history Timing of agriculture 












        
1616.27 0.08 0.72 - 0.28  -0.21  0.09  - 0.13 0.53  
1616.42 0.07 0.72 - 0.19 - 0.09 - - 0.53 
1616.47 0.07 0.72 - 0.27 -0.14 0.09 - - 0.53 
1616.81 0.06 0.72 - 0.28 -0.21 - - 0.13 0.53 
1616.96 0.06 0.72 - 0.19 - - - - 0.53 
1617.01 0.05 0.72 - 0.27 -0.14 - - - 0.53 
1617.05 0.05 0.72 - 0.34 -0.26 0.09 -0.12 0.22 0.53 
1617.59 0.04 0.72 - 0.34 -0.26 - -0.12 0.22 0.53 
1617.84 0.04 0.72 - 0.17 - 0.09 - 0.06 0.53 
1618.22 0.03 0.71 0.04 0.27 -0.21 - - 0.13 0.53 




0.69 0.01 0.24 -0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.06 0.51 
 
 
 Table 8-8 below presents the Akaike statistics (importance of each 
pathway and weighted coefficients) for the pathways from the timing of 
agriculture and state history to GDP both directly and indirectly through 
institution quality and in-group bias, for both language family classifications. In 
the models using the Indo-European family, three minor differences are 
apparent: 1) the pathway from state history to in-group bias increases in 
importance; 2) the pathway from the timing of agriculture to GDP decreases in 
importance; 3) the pathway from the timing of agriculture to in-group bias 
increases in importance.  
 The most important aspect of this comparison is that the three minor 
changes mentioned above do not change my conclusions. The important 
pathway from state history is still through institutions and not directly to GDP. 
Similarly, the most important pathways from the timing of agriculture are still to 
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GDP and to state history. This consistency in the findings suggests that the 
decisions regarding language families did not influence the results.  
 
Table 8-8: Comparison of the Akaike statistics for the direct and indirect effects 
of state history and the timing of agriculture between the Indo-European 
subfamilies and family data 
  Akaike Statistics 
Predictor Outcome Indo-European Sub-
family 
Indo-European Family 












GDP 0.29 0.01 0.28 0.01 
Institution 
quality 
0.85 0.15 0.95 0.24 
In-group bias 0.44 -0.05 0.58 -0.11 
Timing of 
agriculture 
GDP 0.79 0.11 0.52 0.05 
Institution 
quality 
0.32 0.02 0.31 -0.01 
In-group bias 0.29 -0.01 0.45 0.06 
























Appendix 1-8: Region-specific relationships between the timing of 
agriculture and GDP 
 Previous research has suggested that the relationship between the 
timing of agriculture and GDP is negative within regions while being positive 
between them (Olsson & Paik, 2013). This makes it difficult to glean whether 
the direct relationship between the timing of agriculture and GDP that I found 
support for in the model comparison is supportive of the head-start hypothesis. 
Table 8-9 below presents the correlation coefficients between the timing of 
agriculture and GDP calculated within the language families/subfamilies. The 
relationships are mostly positive, although there is a slightly negative 
relationship in the Balto-Slavic family. This provides some support for the direct 
relationship identified between the timing of agriculture and GDP in the original 
comparison. 
 
Table 8-9: Relationships between timing of agriculture and GDP within 
language (sub)families 
Language family/subfamily* Coefficient of timing of agriculture and 
GDP 
Afro-Asiatic (N=8) 0.45 
Balto-Slavic (N=14) -0.09 
Germanic (N=15) 0.23 
Indo-Iranian (N=6) 0.21 
Italic (N=23) 0.54 
Niger-Congo (N=13) 0.28 
*Only those with >5 cases to ensure the coefficients are relatively meaningful.  
 
However, Table 8-10 shows the relationships within different continents, 
and supports previous findings of a negative relationship within Europe. As the 
relationship is persistently negative in some regions, this suggests that the 
direct relationship between the timing of agriculture and GDP I identified does 
not provide strong support for the head-start hypothesis. The alternative 
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mechanism that is underpinning this direct relationship is unclear, suggesting 
that future research drilling down into the reasons for a relationship between the 
timing of agriculture and GDP would be valuable. 
 
 
Table 8-10: Relationships between timing of agriculture and GDP within 
continents 
Continents Coefficient of timing of agriculture and 
GDP 
Africa (N=21) 0.29 
Americas (N=19) 0.57 
Asia (N=26) 0.05 

































Appendix 1-9: Instrumental variable analysis using settler mortality data 
 A central claim of the chapter is that state history shapes institution 
quality which shapes GDP in turn. But I recognise the potential for reverse 
causality between institution quality and GDP. My analysis deals with this 
somewhat: in the model comparison, state history only predicts institution 
quality and not other proximate factors, and correlates positively with GDP. As 
there is no obvious way in which modern GDP can influence state history, this 
provides evidence for an important pathway from institution quality to GDP.  
 One way of establishing whether there is evidence to support a proposed 
causal relationship is to employ instrumental variable analysis. Below I present 
my own instrumental variable analysis following the well-known work of 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), who used historical data on the 
mortality rates of European settlers in different countries as an instrumental 
variable to capture variation in the inclusiveness of their modern institutions 
(Table 8-11). I replicated the analysis of Acemoglu et al (2001) by replacing the 
institution quality variable with their measure of settler mortality and a more 
recent measure of settler mortality compiled by Auer (2013). When included in a 
model with the predictor variables I used in my analysis, the instrument for 
institution quality has a significant correlation with GDP in the same (negative) 
direction as found by Acemoglu et al (2001). Unsurprisingly, the coefficients of 
the other proximate predictors change but the ecological and deep historical 
factors remain non-significant. This suggests that the claim regarding the 











































Table 8-11: Results of the linear models including every predictor variable with settler 
mortality replacing institution quality 
Outcome 
variable 
Predictor variables Coefficient p 
GDP Settler mortality (AJR) -0.19 0.03* 
 In-group bias -0.28 0.03* 
 European descent 0.35 0.03* 
 State history 0.08 0.54 
 Agriculture timing 0.06 0.69 
 Disease -0.13 0.42 
 Latitude -0.03 0.78 
GDP Settler mortality (Auer) -0.39 <0.001** 
In-group bias -0.36 <0.001** 
 European descent 0.41 0.01* 
 State history 0.07 0.41 
 Agriculture timing 0.11 0.27 
 Disease 0.01 0.97 




Chapter 9: Appendices to assessing the importance of shared 





Appendix 2-1: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 Table 9-1 presents a pairwise correlation matrix of the factors used in the 
models. This suggests no multicollinearity between the factors.  
 
Table 9-1: Correlation matrix of the fixed effects and outcome variable 
 Development European 
descent 
History Ecology  
Development 1    
European 
descent 
0.61 1   
History 0.25 0.23 1  




















Appendix 2-2: Comparison using a different language family definition 
 In chapter three’s analysis I selected the largest language family in terms 
of population size within a country as the country’s language family. One 
potential outcome of this is that large-scale migration of populations conceals 
important historical differences between populations. This is particularly 
apparent in South America, where large European populations cause many 
South American countries to be members of the same language family as some 
European countries. This obscures important differences both between 
European and South American populations and between populations within 
South America. Indigenous language families are rarely the largest in South 
American countries, but often exceed a third of the population. Therefore, in 
chapter four I recategorised countries as their indigenous language family if 
members of this language family comprised over a third of the country’s 
population. Below I repeat the analysis of chapter four using chapter three’s 
language family categorisation to ensure that my decisions about how to 
categorise language families were not driving my results (Table 9-2). 
 
Table 9-2: Comparison of models using two different language family 
specifications 
Coefficients represent standardised coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 Language family (chapter 
four categories) 




    
European 
descent  
- 0.54*** - 0.53** 
History - 0.18* - 0.17 
Ecology - -0.13 - -0.15 
ICC 0.63 0.52 0.62 0.53 
AIC 302.54 290.06 305.58 289.85 
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 The similarities in the ICCs of models using these different categories 
suggest that my conclusion regarding the variation in socio-economic 
development attributable to language families is robust. While not the focus of 
this analysis, it should be noted that the parameter estimates also remain 
largely similar, although the effect of history does drop out of significance. This 
analysis suggests that my findings were not driven by the way I defined 
language families, and that variation in development is consistently attributable 





















Appendix 2-3: Comparison of different continent definitions 
In my analysis, I assume a particular definition of continents, Below I 
relax this assumption to ensure that it is not driving the results. Table 9-3 
presents the results of a model comparison with two alternative categorisations 
of continents. In the first of these alternatives, I collapse together Europe and 
Asia into Eurasia. In the second, I split the Americas into South America and 
North/Central America. I also present the findings from the original analysis for 
comparison. 
 
Table 9-3: Model comparison with different continent definitions 






      
European 
descent  
- 0.81*** - 0.82*** - 0.82*** 
History - 0.09 - 0.09 - 0.09 
Ecology - -0.13 - -0.13 - -0.13 
ICC 0.48 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.00 
AIC 352.11 338.69 369.71 338.69 353.67 338.69 
Cells contain parameter estimates. Coefficients represent standardised 
coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 
 Changing how I define continents does not meaningfully alter the 
parameter estimates or ICCs. The parameter estimates remain constant across 
each of the models. The largest change is between the ICCs of the different null 
models, which suggests that continents defined by a combined Europe and Asia 
or split Americas are marginally less able to explain the variation in socio-
economic development compared to my original continent definition. This 
analysis suggests that the results were not driven by the way I defined 
continents, and that even if categorised in several different ways, continents do 
not explain any variation in socio-economic development after country-level 
predictors are accounted for. 
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Appendix 2-4: Comparison using variables not factors 
 In the original analysis I conducted PCA to create factors for history and 
ecology that I used as the predictor variables. This is because I was only 
interested in broadly controlling for country-level variation in these factors, not 
testing specific relationships between socio-economic development and 
different historical and ecological predictors. Although the variables loaded 
highly on the factors in the PCA, there was some missing variation. Table 9-4 
presents another model comparison with raw variables as predictors, rather 
than factors, to test whether this omitted variation had any effect on the results.  
 
Table 9-4: Model comparison using the raw variables (not factors) as fixed 
effects to check whether missing variance using factors has any effect on 
results 
 Grouping Variable 
 None Language family Continent Religion 
Predictor of 
development 
       
European 
descent  
0.51** - 0.41* - 0.51** - 0.46** 
State history 0.43** - 0.27* - 0.43** - 0.31* 
Timing of 
agriculture 
-0.28 - 0.003 - -0.28 - 0.02 
Disease -0.59**  -0.39*  -0.59**  -0.32* 
Tropicality -0.32  -0.29  -0.32  -0.41* 
Precipitation 0.22  0.21  0.22  0.31 
Latitude -0.15  -0.07  -0.15  -0.03 
ICC - 0.63 0.50 0.48 0.00 0.39 0.41 
AIC 320.22 302.54 286.71 352.11 322.22 349.90 298.86 
Coefficients represent standardised coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 The results of the model comparison in Table 9-4 are not different to the 
results of the original comparison. Parameter estimates for historical variables 
change substantially with different grouping variables, while ecological variables 
are relatively unaffected. Most importantly, the proportion of variation in socio-
economic development attributable to language families, continents and 
religions is unchanged. When country-level predictors are accounted for, 
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language families account for the most variation, followed by religions, then 
continents which explain no variation. This suggests that the use of factors as 
























Appendix 2-5: Comparison without European descent 
 Different language families, continents and religions are likely to vary 
considerably in the number of people with European ancestry they have. 
Excluding this variable from the analysis gives more insight into to what extent 
the findings are driven by the variation in European ancestry. Table 9-5 
replicates the original model without the European descent variable. 
 
Table 9-5: Model comparison without European descent 
 Grouping Variable 
 None Language family Continent Religion 
Predictor of 
development 
       
History 0.09 - 0.18 - 0.05 - 0.29** 
Ecology -0.42*** - -0.20* - -0.24* - -0.33*** 
ICC - 0.63 0.60 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.41 
AIC 361.25 302.54 294.59 352.11 350.57 349.90 316.85 
Coefficients represent standardised coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 Table 9-5 shows that excluding European ancestry causes some change 
in the parameter estimates for history and ecology, likely due to the introduction 
of omitted variable bias. More importantly for my purposes though, the ICC 
values remain stable. This is in line with the theoretical expectation that the 
grouping variables are ultimately accounting for variation in socio-economic 
development that is at a different scale, and so cannot be heavily influenced by 






Appendix 2-6: Grouping variables as fixed effects and multiple grouping 
variables 
 Table 9-6 explores how the results change if I use grouping variables as 
fixed effects instead of random effects, and shows the effects of combining 
multiple grouping variables into one model using fixed and random effects. As I 
have strong theoretical and statistical reasons to use random effects (see 
chapter 4), this supplementary analysis is exploratory, and seeks to examine 
what (if any) effects using fixed effects would have on the results. In this 
analysis I only include religions and language families as continents did not 
account for any variation in socio-economic development when country-level 
variables are controlled for.  
 
Table 9-6: Model comparison with language families and religions in the same 
model 
 Grouping variable 
 Null: language 










    
European 
descent 
0.34 0.65*** 0.56** 0.32 
History 0.22* 0.24* 0.09 0.13 
Ecology -0.07 -0.14 -0.22** -0.22** 
Language 
family 
◊ - RANDOM ◊ 
Religion - ◊ ◊ RANDOM 
ICC - - 0.67 0.77 
AIC 272.81 299.12 257.77 241.61 
◊: coefficients not recorded here because each factor has so many levels. 
RANDOM means the variable was included as a random intercept. Coefficients 
represent standardised coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 
 The first two columns of Table 9-6 largely mirror the results of the original 
analysis. Compared to models using religions, models including language 
families reduce the role of European ancestry and marginally decrease the 
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effects of history and ecology. Additionally, models that include language 
families fit the data better than those with religions. The second two columns 
present my more exploratory analysis. These models indicate that including 
religions and language families together improves model fit. This is consistent 
with the idea that they capture different sources of variation, namely idea 
borrowing and common ancestry respectively. This is also reinforced by the 
increases in their ICCs, which indicate that language families (religions) can 
explain more variation in socio-economic development once religions (language 
families) have been accounted for. Specifying the models in this way also 
causes some slight changes in parameter estimates, with history reducing in its 
effect and the ecology increasing in its effect. However, I note that caution 
should be exercised with the interpretation of these two models, as using 
categorical variables with imbalanced levels as a fixed effect can create biases 
























Appendix 2-7: Modelling using the non-transformed religion variable 
 I constructed the religion variable used in the chapter by separating the 
largely African (excluding North African) religions collapsed together as “other” 
religions into distinct groups. Therefore, rather than treating African religions as 
one single religion, I treat African religions as distinct. Obviously, neither of 
these alternatives is representative of the real world. The former demands that 
African countries share one religion, while the latter demands that African 
countries have unrelated religions. Consequently, below I present the results of 
analyses using both definitions to ensure that this decision is not driving the 
results (Table 9-7). 
 
Table 9-7: Model comparison using both definitions of African religions 
Coefficients represent standardised coefficients. p<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05* 
 
 This analysis shows that changing the definition of African religions does 
not meaningfully affect model fit or parameter estimates. This indicates that the 
results in the chapter are not the result of how I chose to categorise African 
religions. One thing to note however is that defining African religions as a single 
religion (the non-transformed version) allows the religion factor to explain 
marginally more of the variance in development than when African religions are 
separated. The reason for this is unclear, but is potentially related to how the 
original ‘other’ category largely captures Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, it may 
 Religion (used in chapter) Religion (non-transformed) 
Predictor of 
development 
    
European 
descent  
- 0.65*** - 0.64*** 
History - 0.25** - 0.25* 
Ecology - -0.14 - -0.14 
ICC 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.46 
AIC 349.90 304.02 347.14 303.15 
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be proxying for patterns of shared history or shared ecology at a finer scale than 























































Appendix 3-1: Frequency tables 
 Table 10-1 presents the frequencies of societies that are members of the 
various measured categories to show their raw covariance. For every level of 
each predictor variable, I show how many societies use money and how many 
do not.  
 
Table 10-1: Frequency tables for each of the predictor variables and money use 
Predictor Money use 













































































 Table 10-1 shows some notable covariances that align with the results of 
the original modelling. Approximately 73% of societies that have no sanctioning 
power do not use money. By contrast, 86% of societies that have the ability to 
sanction all decisions use money. 74% of societies that have zero levels of 
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hierarchy do not use money, while 90% of those that have three or more levels 
use money. 60% of societies that have regional or smaller markets do not use 
money, but 64% of societies with supra-regional markets use money. Moreover, 
69% of nomadic societies do not use money while 70% of permanent societies 
do use money. These covariances are all consistent with the theoretical 
expectations presented in the chapter. However, famine and gossip present 





















Appendix 3-2: Accounting for foreign influence in money systems 
 To aid interpretation and ensure that the results were not affected by the 
inclusion of categorical variables with imbalanced levels, I collapsed money use 
into no money and money in the original analysis. However, in the SCCS, some 
societies were categorised as using tokens that had been introduced by other 
societies, rather than those that emerged endogenously. This introduces the 
potential for foreign influence to drive the results. For example, foreign powers 
may have systematically introduced money into societies that had stronger 
sanctions. Consequently, I conduct further analysis to separate foreign money 
systems from indigenous money systems. First, in Table 10-2 I use multinomial 
logistic regressions to replicate the original bivariate logistic regressions of the 
relationships between individual predictors and money use, but split the 
outcome variable into three levels: no money, indigenous money and foreign 
money. 
  
Table 10-2: Multinomial logistic regressions for each predictor variable and 
money use split into none, foreign and indigenous 
























































































































































































Latitude 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 60 0.01 0.06 
 
 Table 10-2 shows that the findings are not changed by recategorisation 
of the outcome variable to account for foreign influence. The predictor variables 
have similar effects on the probability of indigenous or foreign money use. This 
is consistent with the theory concerning the role of sanctions in money use. Due 
to the cooperative dilemma underpinning tokens of debt, sanctions should be 
important in the maintenance of imported money systems as well as their 
endogenous emergence. The introduction of tokens of debt by foreign powers 
would likely be quickly exploited by defectors, meaning that sanctions are just 
as important in these conditions as they are when money emerges 
endogenously. One exception to the stability of the findings is that Table 10-2 
shows that the shift from nomadic to semi-nomadic is associated with a small 
increase in the likelihood of indigenous money use, but a decrease in the 
likelihood of foreign money use. It is unclear why the likelihood of foreign money 
use would be higher in nomadic societies than in semi-nomadic societies, 
suggesting that this finding may be an artefact of the limited sample size and 
the relatively small numbers of semi-nomadic societies available in the data.  
 Table 10-3 below continues this analysis by replicating the full model 
comparison using the three-level outcome variable. Importantly, this also shows 
that the results are not affected by the collapsing together of foreign and 
indigenous money. Sanctions are still the most important influence, followed by 
taxation (hierarchy). The Akaike weight scores also show that I have few 
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models that are comparatively highly likely to be the best model, and many that 
are very unlikely to be the best model. This gives a 95% confidence set that 
contains only the top four models, which means that there is high dispersion 
across the Akaike importance scores, with gossip, fixity, famine and latitude all 
































Table 10-3: Model comparison for different combinations of predictor variables and money use split into none, foreign and indigenous 
AIC Enforcement Gossip Levels of hierarchy Market Fixity Famine Latitude Akaike 

















119.80 X X          0.43 
120.98    X X       0.24 
121.71 X X  X X       0.17 
123.51 X X    X      0.07 
123.74 X X X         0.06 
126.84 X X X X X X X X   X 0.01 
127.71           X 0.008 
128.67 X X X   X X X X X X 0.005 
129.98       X X    0.003 
130.45   X X X X X X X X X 0.002 
130.55 X X X X X  X X X X X 0.002 
130.56 X X  X X X X X X X X 0.002 
132.99      X      <0.001 
133.68         X X X <0.001 
134.03 X X X X X X X X X X X <0.001 
135.48 X X X X X X   X X X <0.001 
135.78       X X X X  <0.001 
136.39   X         <0.001 
137.28         X X  <0.001 
142.56 X X X X X X X X X X X <0.001 
Akaike 
importance 





Appendix 3-3: Distinguishing commodity money and tokens 
 In the chapter, I explain the results of the models with reference to the 
debt theory of money. This theory specifically concerns the mechanisms 
underpinning the use of token money. However, due to data limitations, the 
money variable also contains a limited number of societies that use commodity 
money instead of tokens. To ensure that these cases are not driving the results, 
Table 10-4 explores the relationships between the individual predictor variables 
and money use having excluded cases in which societies use commodity 
money instead of tokens.  
 
Table 10-4: Bivariate logistic regressions for each predictor variable and money 
use excluding commodity money cases 


































Market activity (reference 
category: local-regional) 





































Latitude 0.04 1.04 57 0.005 
 
 Table 10-4 shows that the results are not changed when I use a sample 
in which the only money systems are token-based or absent by excluding 
commodity money cases. Sanctions and taxes are associated with the highest 
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probability of money use and differences in famine conditions are associated 
with the least change in the probability of money use. This is consistent with the 
proposal that the original findings are driven by differences in how societies 
solve the cooperative dilemma at the heart of the debt theory of money, which is 


























Appendix 3-4: Dividing gossip into categories 
In the original analysis, I treated gossip as a categorical variable. This 
was to aid with interpretability, but does require the assumption that the 
spacings between the levels of the gossip variables were equal in size. 
Therefore, to ensure that this treatment of the gossip variable is not driving my 
results, I repeated the full model comparison with gossip defined as a 
categorical variable (Table 10-5).  
Table 10-5 shows that treating gossip as a categorical variable made 
little qualitative difference to the findings. Sanctions and hierarchy are still the 
most important predictors and famine is the least important. However there is 
more uncertainty regarding the best-fitting model with the highest Akaike weight 
being 0.28. Fixity also has less importance than in the original model 
comparison, although it still appears in two of the three best-fitting models. The 
gossip variable itself does appear to have some influence on money use, but 
not in any systematic or linear pattern, particularly because societies with the 
highest gossip score seem to have a lower probability of using money when 
compared to those that scored 1, 2 or 3 on the gossip scale, but not those that 
scored 1. This is in line with the discussion in chapter 5 about the potential 






Table 10-5: Model comparison for different combinations of predictor variables and gossip divided into categories 
AIC Enforcement Gossip Levels of hierarchy Market Fixity Famine Latitude Akaike 
















67.64 4.61 3.89 2.16 12.27 9.98 1.26 8.63 18.61 1.06 0.25 1.45   1.04 0.28 
68.33 4.12 3.22     1.97 7.96 1.30 0.12 1.69 1.46 0.98 1.04 0.19 
69.47 3.76 6.69     3.90 4.04       0.11 
69.74 4.28 3.64 2.39 12.95 9.11 1.45 8.06 19.33  0.27 1.39 1.29 0.87 1.04 0.09 
70.30 5.67 13.99             0.07 
70.35 4.31 4.69 5.82 46.04 47.27 3.71 22.43 29.41 0.87   1.38 0.79 1.02 0.07 
71.22   0.79 5.69 3.53 0.51 13.05 41.81 1.63 0.34 1.87 1.37 0.78 1.04 0.05 
72.04 4.16 3.50 2.39 11.96 8.52 1.44 7.47 17.55 1.01 0.28 1.39 1.29 0.89 1.03 0.03 
72.09 5.25 12.06       1.37      0.03 
72.52       6.38 17.31       0.02 
72.88 5.80 7.79 1.66 1.97 1.11 0.58   1.12 0.11 2.04 1.09 0.90 1.05 0.02 
73.95 8.42 16.71 8.24 7.33 9.85 3.73         0.01 
76.30 3.69 3.01 2.32 20.23 23.14 2.33 12.66 43.13 1.28 0.09 INT 0.59 INT 0.08 INT 1.28 INT  0.004 
79.65              1.03 <0.001 
80.01          0.87 4.87    <0.001 
82.23            2.25 1.36 1.03 <0.001 
82.36          0.94 4.59 2.39 1.76  <0.001 
84.75         2.57      <0.001 
87.57            2.71 2.07  <0.001 


















Cells contain odds ratios. INT=interaction between fixity and famine included in model 
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Appendix 3-5: Accounting for language families 
 Although the SCCS was created to contain independent societies to 
reduce the effects of Galton’s problem, some research has suggested that non-
independence is still an issue in this sample (see chapter 5). Therefore, I 
conduct further analysis with various controls for non-independence to ensure 
that the results were not impacted in any way by relationships between the 
sampled societies. As we have seen in previous chapters, multilevel models 
can control for patterns of non-independence using proxies for shared history 
such as language families. However, owing to the relatively small sample size, 
and the large number of language families in the sampled societies due to their 
relative independence, multivariate models containing all of the predictor 
variables and a random effect for language family face convergence issues. 
Consequently, I use other available tools to evaluate the impact of potential 
non-independence on the results. First, I replicate the bivariate logistic 
regressions with language families as a random effect to see whether this 
changes the nature of any relationships. Then, I explore the proportion of 
variation in money use that is attributable to language families in various 
models, specifically combinations of the strongest predictors: sanctions and 
hierarchy. Finally, I replicate the full model comparison with the inclusion of 
language families as a fixed effect. While including language families as a fixed 
effect may result in slightly biased estimates because of imbalances in the 
number of members of different language families, I present this analysis as an 
exploration into how sensitive the findings are to variables that attempt to 
capture relationships between societies.  
 Table 10-6 below presents the replicated bivariate logistic regressions 
with language families as a random effect. Crucially, this shows that the 
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relationships between the predictor variables and money use are not changed 
when I account for language families. None of the relationships change 
direction; in fact, the findings seem to be exaggerated as coefficients that were 
high in the initial analysis increase in size, and coefficients that were originally 
relatively weak reduce in their strength.  
 
Table 10-6: Multilevel logistic regressions for each predictor variable and 
money use including language families as a random effect 


































Market activity (reference 
category: local-regional) 


































Latitude 0.05 1.06 57 0.03 
 
 Table 10-7 below uses ICCs of multilevel models to explore the 
proportion of variation in money use attributable to language families. When no 
predictor variables are included in a model other than language family as a 
random effect, 30% of the variation in money use can be attributed to 
differences in language families. This suggests that shared history may have a 
limited effect on the results. The variation in money use accounted for by 
shared history is relatively modest even when there are no other predictor 
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variables in the model, which is when one would expect the variation explained 
by shared history to be at its maximum as there are no other variables present 
that may take some of the variation currently attributed to shared history. Table 
10-7 also presents an exploratory exercise in which I include the variables that 
feature in the best fitting models: sanctions and hierarchy. It shows that the 
inclusion of the hierarchy variable removes any variation attributable to 
language families. This implies that the best-fitting models are robust to any 
effect of non-independence, as they capture all the variation that language 
families appear to account for.  
 
Table 10-7: Multilevel logistic regressions for each combination of the predictor 
variables sanctions and hierarchy, with language families as a random effect 
Variables Random effect 
Sanctions Hierarchy ICC (language family) 
  0.3 
X  0.28 
 X 0.00 
X X 0.00 
 
Table 10-8 below presents a replication of the full model comparison, 
with language families included as a fixed effect in every model. This shows that 
the main finding is unchanged: the odds ratios and Akaike importance scores 
both suggest that sanctions are the most important predictor variable. However, 
the effect of one variable does appear to change. In the original analysis, 
hierarchy is one of the stronger predictors. If language families are included as 
a fixed effect, the influence of hierarchy drops substantially, making it one of the 
weaker predictors of money use according to odds ratios and Akaike 
importance scores. Taken together with Table 10-7 above, this suggests that 
there is some covariation between levels of hierarchy and language families in 
the SCCS. Consequently, we must exercise caution with the interpretation of 
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the strength of the role of taxation in the evolution of money from the model 
comparison. It is worth noting however that including language family as a 
random effect did not decrease the strength of the relationship between 
hierarchy and money use in a bivariate model (see Table 10-6). Moreover, 
including categorical variables that have imbalanced levels such as the 
language family variable is known to produce biased estimates in fixed effects 
models, which makes it difficult to establish whether this apparent change in the 
effect of hierarchy is a result of non-independence in the data or bias in the 
model. Ultimately, it must be stressed that the analyses in these last three 
tables are seeking to replace a full model comparison that explicitly accounts for 
any hierarchical structure using multilevel modelling, as the sample and 
variables restrict the ability to conduct such a comparison. Therefore, I 
encourage further study that specifies a range of variables that are more 
appropriate for multilevel modelling and that will enable us to understand what 
(if any) effect non-independence in the SCCS has on the results. 
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Table 10-8: Model comparison for different combinations of predictor variables with language family included as a fixed effect in each model 
AIC Enforcement Gossip Levels of hierarchy Market Fixity Famine Latitude Akaike 

















88.75 11.54 28.99 1.74         0.38 
90.79 6.62 18.22          0.14 
91.08       0.52 11.74    0.12 
91.47 4.50 10.76    3.29      0.10 
92.98 7.93 12.67 1.49   2.42 0.06 2.83 0.39 0.45 1.00 0.05 
93.00 7.57 41.32  0.66 0.09       0.05 
93.06           1.08 0.04 
93.49 15.95 16.35 1.70 0.78 0.24 1.82 0.06 2.35   0.99 0.04 
94.74      6.94      0.02 
94.99   0.86 2.36 8.80 8.16 0.07 6.66 0.20 0.09 1.06 0.02 
95.07       0.49 12.46 0.63 0.78  0.02 
95.70         1.23 2.89 1.08 0.01 
96.10 9.87 39.54 1.44 0.59 0.07 1.60   0.95 2.96 1.04 0.009 
96.34 10.76 19.29 1.48 0.59 0.19  0.14 3.09 0.43 0.78 1.00 0.009 
97.08 4.21 11.99  0.64 0.21 1.96 0.16 3.46 0.33 0.43 1.02 0.006 
98.83 7.39 14.06 1.38 0.68 0.22 1.65 0.13 2.92 0.41 0.62 1.00 0.003 
100.09   1.38         0.001 
101.02         1.88 3.69  <0.001 
107.42 6.66 9.97 1.43 1.03 0.60 0.79 0.09 4.12 0.36 0.87 1.01 <0.001 
Akaike 
importance 
0.74 0.48 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.06 0.14  





Chapter 11: Appendices to an experimental test of the tokens-







Appendix 4-1: Participant information form 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FORM 
 
 
What is this study about? 
This project is being conducted by the University of Exeter’s Human Biological 
and Cultural Evolution research group. This research is interested in the 
evolution of money and how people use IOUs in cooperative situations.  
 
What will I have to do? 
You will take part in a computer-based game that is comprised of several 
rounds. Each round, you will be randomly matched with a different partner with 
whom you will play. Each round you will also be randomly allocated to one of 
two player types that can make different decisions. ‘Producers’ choose whether 
or not they want to increase the score of their partner at a cost to their own 
score. ‘Consumers’ can choose to give an IOU, signed by themselves, to their 
partner. Some participants will be able to see the choices made by other 
players throughout the game.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Participation is entirely voluntary. If you decide you do not want to take part 
you will be free to leave the study at any time without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to my data? 
Your data are entirely anonymous. The choices you make will be stored with an 
identification number, so we are unable to link your data with your name or any 
other personally identifying information. Your data will be stored and analysed 
by Adam Flitton at the University of Exeter. Any findings will be written in a 
thesis.  
 
Are there any risks to taking part? 
There are no risks to taking part in this study. This study has been granted 
ethical approval through the university’s ethics committee, which abides by the 
guidelines of the British Psychological Society. If you have any concerns about 
this study, please contact the lead researcher at: af395@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Questions? 
Please ask any questions you have about this information or the study before 













Researcher’s name: Adam Flitton (af395@exeter.ac.uk). 
Project title: Cultural evolution of money.  
 
 YES NO 
I understand what is on the participant information form.   
I understand that I can withdraw from the experiment at any 
time without providing a reason.   
  
I understand that my data will be kept strictly confidential.   
I understand that anonymity will be maintained in the data and 
the written report.  
  






































Thank you for participating in this study. 
 
 







































What was this about? 
This study was conducted to investigate the evolution of money systems. We 
wanted to see if the ability to see other people’s behaviours would affect the 
extent to which people give help in exchange for different people’s IOUs. This 
experiment is part of a wider research project investigating the role of 




Your data are entirely anonymous. Any choices and payoffs are stored with an 
identification number, making it impossible to link data to personal information. 
The data you have provided will also remain strictly confidential.  
 
Who can I contact if I am worried about this study? 
























Appendix 4-5: Images of the screens for different conditions 
 Below I present screenshots that show what the computer screens 
showed the participants in different conditions and highlight the differences 
between them. The screens in every condition have some commonalities. The 
participants can always see the round number, what role they have been 
assigned to be, a reminder of the payoff matrix, their available choices, and a 
table that reminds them of what they chose to do and what the outcome of this 
decision was. This table updates every round.  
 Figure 11-1 presents the parts of the screen that varied between the 
control social information conditions. First, the no social information condition 
does not provide information about who the participant is playing with, while the 
other two conditions do. Second, the social information conditions track partner 
information in the updating table, as a reminder of how different players acted 
previously. Thirdly, the all social information condition includes a separate table 
which also updates every round and shows what every other player chose to do 





































Panel A shows the control condition with no social information; Panel B shows 
the control condition with partner information; Panel C shows the control 
condition with all social information. 
A) 
Figure 11-1: Screenshots of what the participants in the different control 






 For the token conditions, an extra piece of information is displayed on the 
screen for all participants. A count of the number of tokens in the participant’s 
possession is presented on the screen. In addition, as tokens are attributable to 
different players in the token condition, counts of how many tokens the 
participant has received from specific other players is also presented. In terms 
of the social information manipulations, these are the same as in the control 
conditions, with the social information conditions presenting the ID of the person 
the participant is currently playing with and the all social information condition 
































Panel A shows the token condition with no social information; Panel B shows 
the token condition with partner information; Panel C shows the token condition 















Figure 11-2: Screenshots of what the participants in the different token 




Appendix 4-6: Tests of normality and homogeneity of variance 
 The importance of homogeneity of variance and normality is increased 
when using a proportional outcome variable (Ferrari & Cribari-Neto, 2004). A 
Bartlett’s test of homogeneity of variances revealed no evidence for differences 
in variance across the social information (K2=2.17(2), p=0.34) and token 
(K2=0.01(1), p=0.94) conditions. A Shapiro-Wilk test of the normality of the 






















Appendix 4-7: Non-parametric analysis of the conditions 
 Although the data did not violate the assumptions regarding normality 
and homogeneity of variance, the sample size and distribution suggest that 
confirmation of the effect of the conditions using non-parametric tests would be 
informative. Unfortunately, at the time of writing there is no non-parametric 
equivalent of a factorial ANOVA. Therefore, I conduct two separate bivariate 
non-parametric tests, one on the effect of social information on cooperation and 
one on the effect of tokens on social information. A Mann Whitney U test 
showed that the token condition had a significant effect on cooperation 
(W=711.5, p=0.02). A Kruskal-Wallis test showed that social information also 
had a significant effect on cooperation (H=8.19, p=0.02). Post-hoc pairwise 
Wilcoxon tests showed significant differences in cooperation between the 
conditions in which participants had no social information and when they had 
information about with whom they were playing (p=0.05). There was also a 
significant difference between when participants had no social information and 
when they had information about everyone’s behaviours every round (p=0.02). 
No significant difference was found between the condition in which participants 
had information about with who they were playing and the condition in which 










Appendix 4-8: Analysis of control variables 
 In Table 11-1 I present analyses of the control variables. First I explore 
their effects on the outcome variable (cooperation), and then I test their 
association with the different conditions to ensure that there is no systematic 
variation in the control variables that may be driving the effects of the 
conditions.   
 
Table 11-1: Tests of the relationships between the control variables and the 




Statistical test Result 
Cooperation   
~Sex  Linear regression FM 
r=0.07, p=0.27 
~Age  Linear regression r=-0.01, p=0.42 




Token conditions   
~Sex χ2 test of independence χ2=0.09, p=0.77 
~Age Binomial logistic 
regression 
r=0.01, p=0.81 




~Sex χ2 test of independence χ2=0.03, p=0.98 






~Prior experience χ2 test of independence χ2=3.76, p=0.44 
 
Table 11-1 shows that none of the control variables had any relationships 
with the outcome variable. Cooperation does not vary as a result of sex, age or 
prior experience with cooperative games. Importantly, Table 11-1 also shows 
that the distributions of age, sex and prior experience in the sample were not 
systematically different in any given condition. Age, sex and prior experience 
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did not vary across the levels of both of the between-participants independent 
variables (tokens and social information). Therefore, I can be confident that it 

























Appendix 4-9: Qualitative feedback 
 At the end of the experiment, each participant was given a form on which 
they were encouraged to voluntarily record their thoughts about what they were 
doing, the best way to get the highest payoff and their strategies. 71 participants 
completed at least part of this form. Table 11-2 below presents a breakdown of 
the comments made by the participants. 
 
Table 11-2: Comments given by participants on qualitative feedback forms 










Cooperate/help 14 Reciprocate 18 
Buy 7 Random  2 
Reciprocate  3 Ran out of tokens 4 
 
 The first section of Table 11-2 shows that most participants believed the 
best way to get the highest payoff would be to never help others. Far fewer 
believed that cooperation or reciprocation were the most successful strategies. 
This is in line with the expectations of rational choice theory, as defection is the 
optimal strategy for any one individual, in contrast to cooperation which requires 
every group member to cooperate to ensure the maximum payoff for everyone. 
This is reiterated in the second section of Table 11-2, which shows that the 
most commonly reported strategy was defection. However, it should be noted 
that despite the fact that over half of the participants who completed the form 
claimed that defection was both the best way to get a high payoff and the 
strategy they used, the behavioural data show that very few participants 
consistently defected (this is explored further in the chapter).  
 The second section of Table 11-2 also shows that several participants 
explicitly stated that their strategies involved reciprocation and management of 
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their reputation, lending credence to the interpretation that direct and indirect 
reciprocity are important underlying mechanisms of token money use. Finally, a 
very small amount of participants reported making choices at random and 
reported running out of tokens (also as examined in the discussion section). 
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